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Chapter 1: Introduction 
When applying for my Ph.D. bursary, my tireless curiosity for studying the ‘Us’ versus 
‘Them’ mentality in organisations seemed to have been driven by a very concise and 
particular experience: the participant observation phase of my Bachelor dissertation in 
a multinational car manufacturer; the same organisation in which I was trained for 
three years prior to commencing my Bachelor degree. Despite focusing on intragroup 
dynamics at that time, I was struck by the obvious enmity between task groups that 
led to the organisation’s segmentation into ‘opposing camps’. Much of the discourse I 
observed on a daily basis directed at other organisational members seemed to show a 
repetitive pattern: “them over there”, “them up there”, or, “them down there”. It 
appeared to me as though the unity of the organisation portrayed to the outside world 
– through the slogan “Wir bei FutureCo” (Us at FutureCo) - was not reflected 
internally. Furthermore I came under the impression that this organisational ‘falling 
apart’ led to a great amount of mistrust and resentment between task groups and that 
this mistrust in turn hampered the organisation’s ability to satisfy its members’ need 
for identity and belonging as a result of a hostile climate for social relationships.  
But not only did I make such observations during my dissertation research. While 
training in the same plant, I had plenty of opportunities to witness the appearance, 
conduct and consequences of ‘Us versus Them’ thinking both, from a distance and 
through personal involvement, and I will share some of these moments via memories 
in the first case study. I learnt to mourn the canyons such dichotomised thinking 
created, the segregation and separation, accompanied by a degree of vanishing 
understanding and misperception for each other’s differences and commonalities, and 
lastly the complete abandonment of the common goal: the organisational mission. 
Instead of a sense of ‘pulling together’, a ‘magnetism’ throughout the manpower due 
to shared interest in the success of the organisation, and the recognition, therefore, 
that working together in unity would lead to that success, I experienced the 
compromising of human well-being in a workplace, where ‘enemy-thinking’ and ‘blame-
culture’ had long demolished the spirit of creating something together. 
Following on from this experience, I was beginning to enquire into the origins and true 
motives behind this group dynamic, which seemed to solidify itself in front of me as an 
urge to differentiate oneself from the Other and simultaneously ‘shine in a better light’ 
than that Other; the more so as I became more and more aware of the same social 
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phenomenon among other groups of belonging - students, colleagues, family 
members, ethnicities and countries at large, only to mention a few. 
With this awareness of my own motivation in mind, I started my research journey. It 
was not until the end of the first year of my studies that I began to ponder further 
upon, maybe more unconscious motives that fired my interest in this topic. I began to 
explore how my own life history could be related to my Ph.D. work. The first emotion 
that caught my attention was my predominant dislike for ethnocentrism. Being of 
Middle-Eastern origin (the Orient) and having some level of insight into that culture as 
a ‘native’ in the scientific sense of the word, but on the other hand having been born 
and brought up in Germany (the Oxidant), I have witnessed in both settings the ‘brick 
walls’ between the ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ that ethnocentrism can build among people. Fuelled 
by a lack of understanding for one another, and more importantly, the failure to 
acknowledge this lack of understanding, this need to feel superior against some form 
of Other is, to my mind, a very different embodiment of the very same underlying 
group dynamic as I have witnessed in the car manufacturer. Now in my early years of 
adulthood, I am beginning to grasp with great disappointment, the impossibility of 
both sides ever understanding that we are mistakenly taking our own, subjective 
frames of references for objective truths. This typically compels us to judge the Other, 
the ‘different from Me’ as being ‘wrong’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have come to believe myself to be in some kind of ‘privileged’ position, having gotten 
to know from ‘the inside’, as a member of two cultures, the Orient and the Oxidant. 
Whether this position is truly privileged is questionable, however, as it more likely 
describes a state of ‘sitting between two stools’. Volkan, for example, comments that 
such a position can provoke an inner struggle: “If the ambivalence arises because the 
individual has identified with more than one ethnic or cultural group, it may become an 
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issue in itself. When one is simultaneously invested in the relations of more than one 
group, his relations and identifications with other adult groups can become 
complicated, and his sense of self may suffer.” (1988, p. 50).  
Not only does my multi-cultural background provide a possible insight into my ‘Us 
versus Them’ interest, but I could also argue to be the embodiment of this 
manifestation myself – I have been created by ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. My mother’s family and 
my father’s family have been in deep animosity with each other since two months 
before my birth, when my father passed away. They have not exchanged a single word 
with each other in more than 30 years - I am the only link between these two 
frontiers. Experiencing since the very first day of my life (or earlier) this very dramatic 
manifestation of ‘Us versus Them’, the strength of boundaries, the depth of canyons it 
created, and having to straddle these boundaries without being caught up in either 
side, trying to satisfy my need for identification and belonging from both sides, might 
in fact have been the strongest, yet unconscious, drive behind my Ph.D. endeavour.  
Reflecting on my experiences of friendship and friendship groups in Kindergarten and 
school years, I might have brought to my own awareness yet another personal 
motivation. I have witnessed ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics in manifestations of 
scapegoating, bullying and the formation of ‘in-‘ and ‘outgroups’ first hand. This may 
have been due to my noticeably Arabic appearance in comparison to the other 
children, my dominant and ‘loud mouthed’ personality, or other reasons I am not 
aware of. 
Consequently, on a number of occasions, I have been someone who is ‘sitting on the 
fence’: between the Orient and the Oxidant, my mother’s family and my father’s 
family, and childhood friendship groups. Occupying such boundary position is ‘a 
dangerous place’, for one is neither belonging nor not belonging, so that one could be 
included in either ‘in-’ or ‘outgroup’ or just as likely as one might suddenly be expelled 
from it (Shapiro, 1997). 
Being so occupied with the dynamics surrounding the creation of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
groups, I started to detect them more and more frequently. When travelling by coach 
on the motorway, I noticed for the first time with great interest and attention, how 
coach drivers enthusiastically greeted each other, but not other motorists. There was a 
certain ‘technique’ to it. This observation also reminded me of my own behaviour when 
riding my motorcycle. What ‘Us bikers’ usually do is greet each other with a nod of the 
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head - diagonally to the right with a twist of the neck. In both examples, there seems 
to be an intense feeling of camaraderie.  These expressions of ‘You and Me equals Us’ 
may vaporise as fast as they emerge, but in these fractions of time they are the 
strongest bond between the individuals involved. It is fascinating and bizarre. For that 
moment, it does not matter who the other person is: age, gender, nationality, 
ethnicity, religious belief, appearance do not matter; all that counts is that ‘You are like 
Me’, because you drive a coach or ride a motorbike. There seems to be a common 
urge indeed to define who we are, and who we are not, with regards to Others. 
Why then, have I decided to commit myself to three years of intense research and 
reflection on the underlying dynamic of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality that is 
observable in manifestations such as ethnocentrism, scapegoating and stereotyping 
alike? Was I hoping to heal the world? Maybe it was for purely egotistic reasons, so 
that fence-sitters like me, who are different everywhere and do not truly belong 
anywhere, find it easier to satisfy their need for identification.  
I am myself still unsure about the ‘true’ motives behind my wish for exploration. 
However, I am aware of the importance of expressing here openly my perspective on 
the phenomenon I am investigating. I need to present myself as author and lay open 
my personal relationship to this study so as to offer the reader insight into my life 
experience and the patterns of thinking that I bring to this research. After all, I will not 
claim to present an unbiased explanation of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamics: my, now 
partly conscious, antipathy to the literature and cases forthcoming might have inclined 
me to see ‘Us versus Them’ mentalities in social settings where others conclude they 
are not present.  
This three year project has intensely changed my way of thinking and in turn, this has 
influenced my writing. I feel that any journey into understanding human nature is also 
a journey into understanding oneself, for the world is not perceivable other than 
through one’s own Self in relation to Other (Chang, 2008). As Louis puts it: “I am an 
instrument of my inquiry: and the inquiry is inseparable from who I am.” (1991, p. 
365). In writing up my thesis, I intend to tell my story in a manner that draws the 
reader “into a collective experience” (Butler, 1997, p. 928), thereby not only 
emphasising my key findings, but also the process of my work; those Eureka moments 
just as much as those that led me into great confusion.  
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Throughout this process, I am constantly and continuously accompanied by the doubt 
that everything I so passionately and rigorously observe, record, analyse, scrutinise 
and report, may at the end of the day, only exist in my own head.  
 
1.1. Research Interest and Objectives – Lighthouse for the Thesis 
This research has been undertaken in order to address two underlying key interests. 
Understanding better the origins and consequences of the so called ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality is one of them. Especially the notion of ‘versus’, sometimes hidden between 
the ‘Us’ and the ‘Them’ has caught my attention, as the psychoanalytic literature 
suggests that this ‘versus’ expresses an innate, biological human need to have enemies 
for the sake of a healthy development of self-identity (see for example Barash, 1991; 
Duek, 2009; Erlich, 2001; Gold, 2010; Robins and Post, 1997; Shapiro, 1997; Volkan, 
1988). The first research objective is therefore divided into three questions: 
I. Is ‘enemy-thinking’ an innate characteristic of being human or do we 
have a choice other than having enemies? 
II. If ‘enemy-thinking’ is not innate, what provokes it? 
III. What needs does having an ‘enemy’ satisfy? 
Since the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality is a group dynamic, the second key interest 
focuses on how individuals relate to one another when forming a group, as well as on 
how these different kinds of bonding affect the ‘enemy-thinking’ of individuals and the 
group they belong to. Out of this, the following three questions arise: 
IV. What are the differences in the way individuals relate to one another 
when shaping a group? 
V. Do these different kinds of bonding have any impact on the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality? 
VI. Is ‘enemy-thinking’ exercised on the group level or on the individual 
level? 
 
1.2. Theoretical Frameworks: Why Psychoanalysis? 
Before embarking on a thorough and critical review of the literature relevant to my 
thesis, I would like to make explicit the reasons for my commitment to the 
psychoanalytic framework as my main perspective of investigation, especially in view of 
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the chequered and continuously contested reception that this body of knowledge has 
received (Eisold, 2005a). Where does its value reside for my own research? 
Psychoanalysis is a depth psychology (Volkan, 1988) and as such a theory of tension 
and conflict (Gosling, 1994). It will become evident throughout this thesis that my 
inquiry is about the nature of human tension and conflict, within the individual as well 
as between individuals. In this research study, I endeavour to understand what it 
means to be human more deeply than social psychology or sociology alone would 
allow. This is not to say that these latter theoretical frameworks do not offer depth; 
however, if I am to understand better the complex drives behind human behaviour, 
conscious or unconscious, then psychoanalytic thought cannot be neglected. Austin 
and Worchel (1986) agree with my approach and declare that by expanding the scope 
of social psychology theories to account for intrapersonal dynamics – such as 
considered by psychoanalysis - greater understanding of human relations between the 
person and the social system (the group) can be developed.  
Similarly, Freud himself declared that “much of what happens at a surface level must 
take account of the hidden structure and dynamics of the human psyche” (1958, p. 
153), and Bion proclaims that in order to really understand what is going on in groups, 
psychoanalysis cannot be omitted (1961). Further emphasising the depth of insight the 
psychoanalytic perspective offers for understanding organisations, Erlich (1997) 
believes that in large group dynamics, enmity plays a central role, and early Kleinian 
psychoanalysts, such as Jaques (1955, cited by De Board, 1990) have identified 
projective and introjective identification as the two primary mechanisms operating in 
groups and organisations. Clancy, Vince and Gabriel add that “(p)sychoanalytic 
literature emphasizes the centrality of unconscious processes and seeks to balance the 
view of organizations as rational entities with that of organizations as emotional and 
emotion-generating environments.” (2011, p. 3). 
 
On the other hand, psychoanalysis is often accused of working ‘below the surface’ 
without ‘coming back up’, hence indicating the lack of integration to other perspectives 
(see for example Huffington, Armstrong, Halton, Hoyle and Pooley, 2004). It is for this 
reason that I have drawn on the social psychology body of knowledge as well. With 
discussions on in- and out-group bias, this perspective has predominantly concentrated 
on ‘above the surface’ dynamics of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, at the interpersonal 
and intergroup level. Psychoanalysis, in comparison, has drawn more attention to 
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dynamics ‘underneath the surface’ of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, which I interpret 
to be the intrapersonal level of inquiry for my research. As human life is caught in this 
tension between group and individual existence, it is helpful to consider both 
approaches as mutually complementary, whereby ultimately, as in case of this 
research, psychoanalysis proved to be more insightful for the advancement of my 
argument. 
When applying the terminology ‘inner world’ to ‘below the surface’ dynamics, and 
‘outer world’ to ‘above the surface’ dynamics, additional authors can be presented in 
support of this argument. Similar to Frosh (2003), Shapiro explains that psychoanalysis 
focuses on the internal world of the individual; however, as theoretical advances have 
deepened, “we have increasingly noticed the influence of the other – the analyst, the 
family, the larger social network (or any other group) – on that internal creation.” 
(1997, p. 2). Hence, Shapiro indicates the mutual interconnectedness between inner 
and outer world and states that “any attempt to separate (them) is artificial; the two 
are in dynamic interaction.” (1997, p. 2), and Freud already pointed out in 1921 that 
the individual psychic structure represents relationships between people. 
Following this alignment, the main findings of this research will be constructed from 
two components (figure 1): insight from the intrapersonal angle will be based on 
prevailing psychoanalytic theories such as splitting, projection and the Paranoid-
Schizoid and Depressive positions (for example Klein, 1946, 1952, 1959).  Together 
with predominant social psychology concepts such as social comparison and social 
identity theory (for example Goethals and Darley, 1987; Tajfel and Turner, 1986), as 
well as theories derived from Bion’s 1961 contributions to group psychoanalysis, 
primary data will support insight from the interpersonal and intergroup angle. 
Throughout the development of my argument, both approaches will be aligned into 
one perspective, thereby emphasising that I am interested not only in the intrapsychic 
dynamics of the individual and in group dynamics but also in the tension created 
between them (Bion, 1961). 
 
                                           
      
 
 
Individual 
(Intrapsychic Perspective) 
Group 
(Interpersonal & Intergroup 
perspective) 
Theory / Literature  Primary Research 
Theory / Literature 
Self The Inner World The Outer World 
Tension 
Figure 1: The two components of this research 
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1.3. The Structure of the Thesis 
In the following, I will provide an overview of the thesis structure and the purpose of 
each chapter.  
This introduction has considered the origins and motivation behind this research 
project as well as my personal attachment to it. The research objectives have been 
stated clearly and a justification for the dominant theoretical perspective with which 
they will be explored has been elaborated. 
Chapter two will indicate key theoretical frameworks with which the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality has been investigated, thereby highlighting insights gained from the 
psychoanalytical and social psychology perspectives. This mentality is portrayed as an 
innate need to have enemies and the intrapsychic dynamics explained. Gaps in the 
body of knowledge will be identified and articulated. 
Chapter three will detail the research design of the primary data collection phase, 
including a description of the three case study settings, methods applied for each, as 
well as the integrated approach to data analysis. The underlying research philosophy of 
ethnography that has informed this design will also be examined. 
Chapters four, five and six will offer an extensive account of the primary data of each 
case study, together with a preliminary analysis. A full theoretical framework, however, 
will be constructed in chapter seven based on analysis of case study three. This 
framework will then be used to revisit case studies one and two in chapter eight.  
Chapter nine will then summarise the core insights gained from the analysis of the 
three case studies and relate them to each other. Core findings will be elaborated and 
reviewed in depth. 
Lastly, chapter ten will present a summary of core findings and relate them back to the 
research questions outlined above. Contributions to knowledge will be made explicit 
and my own learning highlighted. The limitations of this research will be discussed and 
suggestions made for possible future research.   
9 
 
Chapter 2: ‘Us versus Them’ - Above & Underneath the Surface 
The “‘Us versus Them’ mentality” is a term that I have introduced since it best portrays 
my own experiences and research interest; it does not exist as such in the literature. 
However, many authors have used similar expressions to describe this intergroup 
dynamic – for example ‘We’ and ‘They’ (Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Riketta and 
Sacramento, 2008), ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt and Orina, 2006; Perdue, 
Dovidio, Gurtman and Tyler, 1990) or ‘Us against Them’ (Guidice, Vasudevan and 
Duysters, 2003) – the literature is yet to offer a concise body of knowledge with an 
agreed terminology and definition.  
Despite varying terminology, it can be argued that the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality has 
been attracting interest from a wide range of fields from both academic and special 
interest literature. Since no dominant theoretical framework for it exists, this chapter 
serves to ‘set the scene’ for this phenomenon and prepare the reader for my own 
theoretical contributions. Following my own interpretation, the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality expresses so called ‘enemy-thinking’, a term indeed applied in the literature, 
on the intergroup level. This thesis therefore treats enemy-thinking as directly related 
to it. 
In the following, I will give a general overview of the proliferation of literature relevant 
to the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality before focusing in more depth on those approaches 
that I appraise as most relevant for the advancement of this research. 
  
2.1. Scenes of ‘Us versus Them’ 
Starting with a renowned perspective is the body of knowledge on ‘new industrial 
relations’. Experts have long concentrated in depth on the ‘Us versus Them’ 
phenomenon with the aim of eliminating its deteriorating consequences on industrial 
efficiency through intervention strategies such as employee involvement techniques 
(see for example, Coupland, Blyton, and Bacon, 2005; Cronin, 1994; Griffin, 1988; 
Guest, Peccei, and Thomas, 1993;  Kelly and Kelly, 1991). In this case, ‘Us’ most 
commonly refers to skilled and unskilled labourers, so-called blue-collar workers, and 
‘Them’ to management, so-called white-collar workers, of a production-based 
organisation. One must recall that ‘Us versus Them’ thinking is exercised in a dual 
manner by two opposing parties, so that ‘Them’ is always relative to ‘not Us’. Many 
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sources report that the gap between the ‘Us’ and the ‘Them’ remains large, despite 
ongoing efforts to bridge it (Guest et al., 1993) with even team work on the shop floor, 
supposed to facilitate consensus with management, failing to achieve its purpose (D’Art 
and Turner, 2005). Instead, such initiatives continue to reinforce employee resistance 
to change (Coupland et al., 2005). Bercovitch (1983) and Bassett (1986) suggest that 
superordinate goals might foster a common sense of identity and hence eliminate 
animosity within, whereby the focus is shifted away from ‘Us’ as the workers against 
‘Them’ as the management, towards ‘Us’ as the company versus ‘Them’ as the 
competition. So Bercovitch states that when “departments are in conflict, individual 
members tend to bury their differences and display greater loyalty to their 
department.” (1983, p. 115). Underlying this argumentation is the assumption that in 
order to distract from a lower-level ‘Them’, ‘Us’ needs to find a replacement. Along 
with that, he postulates the constant need for opposition. 
Cronin (1994) adds to this line of thought a case study whereby a CEO tries to 
overcome the danger of management being trapped in an ‘ivory-tower’ perception by 
including in the company policy the regular participation of members of the corporate 
offices in a shop floor team. One must note that the formulations ‘shop floor’ and ‘ivory 
tower’ themselves are terms that emphasise the dividing gap between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
in many production-based large organisations, such as the one that will be presented 
in case study one.  
This is not to say though, that ‘Us versus Them’ thinking occurs explicitly in production-
based industries. Cilliers and Greyvenstein, for example, describe how the so called 
‘silo-mentality’ can contribute to strong feelings of ‘Us versus Them’ (2012). Similarly, 
Dobson (2000) describes the antipathy of many members of the academic community 
in higher education institutions towards non-academic staff, and how the term ‘non-
academic’ itself is used as an exclusionary expression. Also within the educational 
sector, Gillispie and Chrispeels (2008) look at a group of teachers and a consulting 
team, who were meant to collaboratively work on a school district reform, but failed to 
do so due to ‘Us versus Them’ attitudes. 
‘Us versus Them’ dynamics are not merely a topic restricted to the 1980s and 90s, the 
era of new industrial relations. They must also be taken into account at an inter-
organisational level, in the increasingly competitive market with which organisations 
are faced.  This gives it a very different facade and new application indeed, requiring 
attention to mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances and inter-alliances (see for 
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example Guidice, Vasudevan and Duysters, 2003; Shin, 2004; Terry and Callan, 1998; 
Terry and O'Brien, 2001). Within this perspective, Schaller, Rosell, and Asp (1998) as 
well as McQueen (2004) highlight how distinctions between groups can negatively 
influence the integration of these collaborations through ‘Us versus Them cognition’. 
Case study two will analyse a representative example of this. 
Expanding the outlook on the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality even further invites the 
shifting of focus towards society at large. So for example, Southerton (2002) conducts 
a study in a small town where people identify themselves around class-based social 
groups and along with that decide who is ‘Us’ and who is ‘not Us’. Moving on to the 
national and global level, Chattopadhyay (2007) investigates the ‘Us versus Them’ 
dynamic from a neo-colonialism point of view, identifying the invader and the invaded 
as representatives of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ parties. Similarly, Kinder and Kam concentrate on 
the global consequences of ‘Us versus Them’ thinking in the form of ethnocentrism, 
which they define as “a predisposition to divide the world into in-groups and out-
groups” (2009, p.8). Klein (2002) has similar research interests and talks about the 
phenomenon of consumer ethnocentrism as an animosity model of foreign purchase.  
Likewise, Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, and Schmader (2006) include the sectarian 
conflict in Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics, as well as the ethnic 
killings in Ruanda between the Tutsis and the Hutus as global examples of the ‘Us 
versus Them’ mentality. Similarly, the Israel-Palestine conflict has been well 
documented with regards to the ‘Us versus Them’ phenomenon (see for example 
Berman, Berger, and Gutmann, 2000; Shapiro, 1997). The list of examples on a 
political scale continues, and so Barash (1991) adds the Cold War, the Armenians and 
the Azerbaijanis, the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims, with each opposing pair being 
certain of the ‘Them’ to be following a strategically designed malicious plan for world 
domination. 
This section has given insight into a small selection of examples which illustrate the 
multi-faceted appearances of ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics in versatile everyday life 
situations – may these be small scale between two work groups in a company or large 
scale between nations - and hence stresses the phenomenon’s significance in human 
interaction in general.  
Furthermore, the diversity of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality becomes appreciable 
when considering its multitude of manifestations. Following such criteria, the body of 
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literature can be summarised into scapegoating (see for example Eagle and Newton, 
1981; Gold, 2010; Kessler and Mummendey, 2001), bullying and ganging (see for 
example Waddell, 2007; White, 2004) and prejudice and stereotyping (see for example 
Fein and Spencer, 1997;  Newman, Caldwall, Chamberlin and Griffin, 2005). Even 
racism (Hunt, 2009) and ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam, 2009) can be derived from 
the underlying ‘Us versus Them’ dynamic and are provoked by social clues such as, for 
example, age, gender, profession (see for example Heron, 2006; Parker, 2000), 
nationality, ethnicity or any other salient trait which can initiate identification of 
difference (Diamond and Allcorn, 2006; Ostroff, 2000). This complicates the decision 
process on relevant literature in so far as it is the underlying dynamic that I am 
interested in, not the above listed manifestations of it. 
Despite of these examples occurring in fundamentally different settings with different 
parties taking on the role of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, they share a common underpinning: it is 
not rational, external reasons that drive segregation, enemy-thinking and conflict, but, 
as I will argue throughout this thesis, partly something that underlies all of these; 
namely, the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, or in other words, the need for the 
identification of an enemy, itself.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The world of ‘Us versus Them’ (Copyright 1986, Paul 
Conrad for the Los Angeles Times, reprinted with permission of the 
Conrad Estate). 
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2.2. Theoretical Frameworks that Dominate the Literature 
Several theoretical frameworks can be identified that shed light on the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality (figure 3). Parker (2000) for example, applies an organisational 
culture perspective to a study which recognizes different categorisational clues (age, 
profession and space) alongside which ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics have created 
segregation due to subcultures in organisations. Another framework that engages with 
this phenomenon is intergroup rivalry (see for example Roberts, 1994) or intergroup 
conflict (see for example Bercovitch, 1983; Campbell, 2008; Gillispie and Chrispeels, 
2008; Thalhofer, 1993). Likewise, several studies were conducted using discourse 
analysis, implying that ‘Us versus Them’ attitudes stem from the social constructive 
power of language. Perdue et al. (1990), for example, argue that the terminology ‘Us’ 
and ‘Them’ influences people’s perception of themselves and Others as it leads to 
group bias and Heron (2006) adds a case example of a film crew team that had 
divided each other up into the “Lampies” (lighting technicians) and the “Vidiots” 
(camera technicians). A key article by Leudar, Marsland and Nekvapil (2004) analyses 
the discourse of Bush, Blair and Bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks and explores ‘the 
making of the enemy’ by the use of the words ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ of the three political 
actors involved.  
Despite the diversity of approaches that have made the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality 
subject to their interest, two theoretical frameworks dominate. The majority of authors 
treating this phenomenon on an international political level do so from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, often driven by the Israeli conflict (see for example Covington, Williams, 
Arundale and Knox, 2002; Erlich, 1997; Friedman, 2010; Hicks, 1994; Moses, 1982 and 
2002; Nash, 2004; Ostroff, 2000; Ross, 1995). Within the organisational domain, 
psychoanalytical sources that explicitly look at ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics are less 
frequent, leaving it to the social psychology framework to offer most research insight. 
Exceptions with high relevance to this research are Daum (2002) who investigates 
from a psychoanalytic perspective into the hostile relationship between two psychiatric 
staff teams, Gould, Ebers and Clinchy (1999), who take on the same approach in order 
to shed more light onto the difficult relationship among three parties of a joint venture, 
as well as Czander (1993), Lazaar (2004) and Diamond and Allcorn (2006) who analyse 
case studies of intergroup hostility based on a psychoanalytically informed framework; 
whereby the latter source is the only one making direct reference to ‘Us versus Them’. 
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For reasons of completion, I also mention Lewis, Bates and Lawrence (1994), who 
present a review of 13 research publications that concentrate on the related concept of 
projection, which, especially since Bion’s application in group analysis (1961), has 
become a useful psychoanalytic construct for understanding intergroup dynamics. 
However, although making reference to Freud as originator of projection, these 
contributions seek the ‘validation’ of projection in a positivistic fashion through 
laboratory experiments and are hence not drawn further into the body of knowledge 
that informs this research. 
I have included both frameworks, social psychology and psychoanalysis in this 
literature review for two reasons. First of all, I postulated earlier that the underlying 
‘Us versus Them’ mentality is the same, regardless of the setting in which it occurs; an 
assumption that enables me to embrace in my review those sources that also describe 
the political, not only the organisational arena. As Bowler puts it, “(i)ndividuals 
castigate other individuals, groups disparage other groups, societies defame other 
societies, often hardly recognizing that the focus for their attack might reside in 
themselves.” (1991, p. 390). Secondly, although I will later solely make use of 
psychoanalytic theory for building up the theoretical framework of my own primary 
data, social psychology has offered too much insight into ‘Us versus Them’ thinking to 
be ignored, even if research within this school of thought is traditionally conducted and 
presented in a positivistic fashion.  In particular, a range of theories of in- and 
outgroup formation and intergroup bias have been applied to the organisational setting 
over the last two decades (see for example Duck and Fielding, 1999; Guidice et al., 
2003; Ledgerwood and Chaiken, 2007; Perdue et al., 1990).  
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2.3. The Need to Have Enemies - Innate to Human Nature 
There has been a covert debate of an epistemological nature about whether the ‘Us 
versus Them’ phenomenon is the product of a social construct or the outcome of an 
innate behaviour shared by the totality of humanity. Generally, the literature can be 
organised around these two broad and seemingly contradicting assumptions. Since 
they affect the way in which the phenomenon under investigation is understood, it is 
important to give these assumptions further attention. 
In stark contrast to the constructivist school of thought, most key psychoanalytical 
thinkers have consistently and confidently come to view that the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality is an inborn, biological determinant of human social behaviour (Gold, 2010). 
Berman, Berger and Gutmann, for example, argue for the understanding of the ‘Us 
versus Them’ split as a “basic structure of human social organisation” (2000, p. 53) 
and claim it to be a universal social structure that expresses an instinctive defensive 
'Us versus 
Them' 
Organisational 
Culture 
Conflict 
Theory 
Competitive 
Strategy & 
Alliences 
Discourse 
Analysis 
Social 
Psychology 
(Intergroup 
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Kleinian 
Positions) 
Figure 3: Theoretical Frameworks related to ‘Us versus Them’ 
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behaviour of a deeply rooted, unconscious need (see also Duek, 2009). This need can 
be expressed, so the authors claim, as the need for identity or, synonymously used, 
the need for belonging. As such, it characterises human society at large and is primal, 
basic and inborn (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). In line with this, Barash adds that the 
need for enemies is a natural inclination, comparable to the need for food, sex, sleep, 
shelter and companionship.  
“In brief, I hold that from the very beginning of human evolution, the conduct 
of every local group was regulated by two codes of morality, distinguished by 
Herbert Spencer as the ‘code of amity’ and the ‘code of enmity’. There were 
thus exposed to ‘natural selection’ two opposing aspects of man’s mental 
nature.” (1991, p. 68).  
Pinderhughes draws related conclusions based on a study in 34 globally dispersed 
countries and proposes that this behavioural bias is a universal human trait and the 
need to see another group as the enemy a universal process. He postulates a universal 
drive to dichotomise under the umbrella of ‘differential paired bonding theory’:  
“The principle of the bond formed by having something in common, which has 
to be defended against outsiders remains the same, from cichlids defending a 
common territory or brood, right up to scientists defending a common opinion 
and, most dangerous of all, fanatics defending a common ideology. In all these 
cases, aggression is necessary to enhance the bond.” (1982, p. 8).  
Pinderhughes portrays the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality as globally universal and Gold 
(2010) makes it timeless, declaring that even ancient cultures functioned in this way. 
Erlich, another key advocate of this point of view, holds that enmity crucially affects 
our everyday living and survival: “If there were no enemy”, he claims persuasively, “we 
would certainly have to invent one.” (2001, p. 126; see also Abecassis, 2003; Boyer, 
1986; Eaton, Eswaran and Oxoby, 2011; Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967; Frank, 1967). 
Borrowing from the related body of knowledge of scapegoating, Girard (1986) explains 
that social co-existence would be impossible without a surrogate Other as victim; such 
is the primacy of self-preservation (Gold, 2010). 
 
2.4. Origins of ‘Us versus Them’ 
The literature proposes two strands of explanation for the origin of the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality. First of all, many authors argue for an evolutionary understanding of 
human behaviour, and there exists a wide array of exploration indicating that the fear 
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of the enemy and distrust are biologically rooted to survival value. Robins and Post 
(1997) as well as Barash (1991) and Volkan (1988), for instance, make references to 
the animal world to explain human behaviour, as the opposing tendencies of 
competition and cooperation coexist there, too. Accordingly, ‘Us versus Them’ thinking 
promotes cohesion among ingroup members, in which chances for survival are greater 
due to a shared pool of individual resources (Stein, cited by Volkan, 1988; see also 
Rozenblit, 2008). Eaton et al. (2011) add that the proclivity to distinguish between 
insiders and outsiders is innate as the establishment of identity facilitates survival. A 
similar evolutionist perspective claims that just as physical characteristics evolved, so 
did behavioural ones such as tribalism, which still affect human dualistic thought today 
and are a common biological thread of humanity (Rozenblit, 2008). 
A second strand of argument tries to portray the predecessors of the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality as the fear of uncertainty and chaos (see for example Gold, 2006). Among 
others, Berman et al. (2000) describe the fear of annihilation in an undefined space to 
be responsible for similar detrimental feelings in an anonymous and unstructured 
crowd without boundaries between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Likewise, Bion (1967) refers to this 
fear of disorder as ‘nameless dread’ (p. 116), and Kohut (1984) calls it ‘disintegration 
anxiety’ (p. 16). Concepts such as ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ can then be seen as measures 
that organise the threatening chaos into categories of order (Bauman, 1991). A 
stranger, for example, someone who is neither ally nor enemy, arouses anxiety and 
hostility, because he or she embodies uncertainty and poses a threat to the clear order 
of binary opposition.  
“Strangers are the premonition of that third element which should not be. 
These are the true hybrids, the monsters- not just unclassified, but 
unclassifiable. They question oppositions as such - the plausibility of dichotomy 
it suggests and the feasibility of separation it demands. They infringe onto the 
division of things.” (Bauman, 1991, p. 54). 
Edelman 1983 (cited by Volkan, 1985) draws out that the enemy-category is based on 
assignments of attributes which often have no resemblance to any demonstrable 
reality, and hence that ‘Us versus Them’ thinking does not arise from external, 
objectively existing differences, but is caused by primal human behaviour itself. 
Middents (1990) adds that worries referring to some threatening enemy may not even 
exist in reality. Again, this indicates a certain innate urge for division and 
differentiation. As soon as a characteristic that could in some way provoke 
categorisation becomes salient, it is used as a ‘justification’ to set a boundary between 
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an ‘Us’ and a ‘Them’. Parker (2000) also states that such artificial divisions are often 
used as a short-hand for other, underlying issues, further strengthening Edelman’s 
point of view that the division between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ does not reflect any objective 
reality. A famous class room experiment conducted by Jane Elliott in 1968 and 
documented by Peters (1971) supports Edelman’s conclusion by demonstrating how 
the statement alone, that blue-eyed children are more clever and likeable than their 
brown-eyed classmates was enough to inflict enmity between these two groups of 
children within three days. Similarly, in several group relations conferences conducted 
by, for example, Berman, Berger and Gutmann (2000), members had spontaneously 
formed into groups of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ and exhibited aggressive behaviour towards 
each other by accusing messengers of the respective other group of being spies, 
ordering them to ‘get out of here’. Likewise, the classic work of Sherif, White, Hood 
and Sherif (1961) known as ‘the Robbers Cave Experiment’ demonstrates the degree of 
animosity humans are capable of displaying, even if in- and outgroups are formed on a 
meaningless ad-hoc basis with pseudo-tasks: by separating two groups of boys at a 
summer camp and fostering separate group identities, friendships within groups were 
severed and intergroup hostility fostered (see also Silverstein, 1989). 
 
 
2.5. ‘Us versus Them’ and the Need for Belonging and Not Belonging 
Underlying much of the above mentioned literature is a fundamental dualism: 
“The need for an enemy is coupled with the need for a friend. They constitute 
two opposite poles of the same continuum and have a contradictory form of 
coexistence.” (Duek, 2009, p. 71).  
In support, Segal (1995) follows Freud’s explication that we can love one another 
dearly, only as long as we have someone to hate; whereby enmity has subtly been 
transformed into dependence (Barash, 1991; see also Robins and Post, 1997). The 
presence of an Other helps provide the social glue that makes for stronger bonding 
among those who are ‘in’, and Freud already postulated in 1921 that hatred against a 
particular person or institution might operate in just the same unifying way, and might 
call up the same kind of emotional ties as positive attachment. He clarified his 
understanding by referring to ‘the primal horde’ and how it seeks an ‘opposing horde’ 
(see also Bion, 1961), with each ‘horde’ satisfying its members’ need for identity and 
sense of belonging; the two may be inseparable (Barash, 1991).  
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In agreement, Middents proclaims that “Enemy images are created by people as they 
divide the world into ‘we-they’ polarizations.” (1990, p. 55). Not only does there seem 
to be a need for belonging, but just as much, for not belonging. A wide range of 
authors declare that we ‘need’ our enemies, as they offer us a convenient ‘explanation’ 
of what is wrong with ourselves (see for example, Kohut, 1972) and further support 
the facilitation of self-definition (Robins and Post, 1997) or self-concept (Barash, 
1991). Middents (1990) agrees with this stance, and implies that enemies serve as a 
focus for aggression which would otherwise be diverted onto internal or domestic 
conflicts; internal can be understood here with respect to the person, the group, or the 
organisation. Taking this line of thought further, Gold (2010) explains that violence 
against an Other as victim has generative energy as it puts to an end the struggle of 
internal violence. Likewise, Ostroff (2000) declares that Othering is an essential part of 
self-development. Representing a political psychology perspective, Volkan (1988) 
declares that enemies are as important to human nature as are allies, and similarly 
Rozenblit (2008) points out that the feeling of connectedness among the ‘Us’ group is 
strongest in combat - when faced with the ‘Them’ group. 
With the intention of tracing back to the origins of this duality, Erlich links this 
behaviour to ‘stranger anxiety’, a phenomenon the infant develops in the eighth month 
of life and hence declares it to be “undoubtedly universal” and responsible for our adult 
inclination to treat any stranger as potential enemy (2001, p. 126; see also Ostroff, 
2000; Volkan 1988). Hence, there is believed to be a readiness in the human psyche to 
fear strangers and seek comfort in the familiar. To this Allport adds the tendency that 
“(w)hat is alien is regarded as somehow inferior, less ‘good’…” (1979, p. 42). Robins 
and Post (1997) postulate that no one is ever completely free from this paranoid 
dynamic; it is an innate human tendency. This fear of the stranger and projection of 
hatred upon the Other form the psychological foundation of the concept of enemy. 
Berman and colleagues expand on the notion of duality in ‘Us versus Them’ thinking by 
drawing reflections on identity theory into the discussion. They proclaim that one 
needs both, enemies and friends, for identification purposes, as self-identification is a 
process that occurs through meeting as well as separation and involves elements of 
‘similar to me’ as well as ‘different from me’; “It is impossible to formulate and 
delineate a distinct identity without each of these elements.” (2000, p. 69; see also 
Robins and Post, 1997). Stein summarises this very well: “We end where they begin.” 
(1987, p. 109), and Shapiro expresses the same idea in his own words: “enmity is at 
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the boundary between internal and external reality....” (1997, p. 5). Armstrong (1992) 
reports on experiences of a group relations conference during which the need for 
Otherness became very apparent through the participants’ apparent urge to preserve 
group distances and differences, and Breckler and Greenwald (1986) make sense of 
this behaviour by concluding that individuals seek to define themselves in terms of 
their relationships with Others (see also Middents, 1990). Parker (2000) agrees that 
these divisions function as a way of classifying the identity of self and Other as a 
means of grounding one’s own distinctiveness. Negative identity, Schafer (1997) 
remarks – knowing who one does not want to be – is necessary for the construction of 
oppositeness and just as important for the stability of self-identity as is positive identity 
(see also Berman et al., 2000; Erlich, 2001; Ostroff, 2000; Robbins and Krueger, 2005; 
Roberts, 1983); This notion is expressed in a similar manner by Schafer (1997) who 
states that disidentification, the process of deciding who one is not, introduces the 
construction of oppositeness. 
At this point, parallels to Winnicott’s conceptions of ‘me’ and ‘not me’ are transparent 
(1974). One could argue that although these dynamics were formulated in order to 
understand better the development of the infant’s psyche, they play a continuing role 
into adult life, where what is ‘me’ (or ‘Us’) and ‘not me’ (or ‘Them’) has to be re-
established and confirmed on a continuous basis. 
 
2.6. Drawing in Social Psychology Theory 
The body of knowledge discussed so far is exclusively drawn from a psychoanalytical 
perspective. In addition, theories from social psychology have helped support the 
argument for the innate necessity of ‘enemy-thinking’ as well articulating the duality of 
the process. Whilst applying different terminology, mainly centred on the idea of in- 
and outgroups, this literature still supports the same argumentation. Allport for 
instance, declares that “an ingroup always implies the existence of some corresponding 
outgroup” (1979, p. 41), and Hogg comments that “For group X to exist there must be 
‘not X’” (2001, p. 123). Likewise, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell come to 
the conclusion that “group formation takes place to the degree that two or more 
people come to perceive and define themselves in terms of some shared ingroup-
outgroup categorization” (1987, p.51), establishing that central throughout all these 
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sources is the ‘in-group-requires-an-out-group assumption’ (Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, and 
Oriña, 2006; see also Smith and Postmes, 2007). 
As emphasised earlier, both the psychoanalytic and the social psychology frameworks 
have shown unanimous dedication to the belief that there is an innate need for 
enemies, or in other words, for an outgroup that can be viewed in a derogative sense 
and made the target of animosity. Throughout my intense reviewing of the literature, I 
have only come across two sources that cast doubt on this innateness of need. 
Gaertner et al. (2006) challenge the long established ‘ingroup-requires-an-outgroup 
assumption’ and argue that such a stance does not explain group formation in the 
absence of opportunities for comparison. Although initially excited to have found a 
source that could counter-balance the one-sided view of the literature on innateness, 
unfortunately I found myself compelled to reject their contribution. The authors’ 
interpretation of ‘absence’ itself is problematic, as they restrict it to physical absence 
and base their conclusions on an experiment whereby participants are placed in 
separate cubicles and therefore no other aggregate of people – no outgroup – is 
visible. Comparison, so the authors claim, is hence not possible. However, I find this is 
a very restricted interpretation of ‘presence of the Other’, as it does not take into 
account the ‘Other-in-the-mind’; I postulate that Othering goes beyond the visual 
senses.  
 
Brewer (1999) reviews contributions from laboratory experiments and challenges the 
inevitability of hostility towards an outgroup by questioning the duality between 
ingroup love and outgroup hate. He claims that “ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
prejudice are separable phenomena and that the origin of identification and 
attachment to ingroups is independent of intergroup conflict.” (1999, p. 430). 
However, given the construction of my own argument based on the psychoanalytical 
concept of splitting into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ introduced in the following sections, I disagree 
with his efforts to separate these two dynamics. 
 
2.7. The Social Construction of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ Groups 
Another possibility for finding an alternative voice to the innateness of ‘enemy-thinking’ 
is to summarise those literature sources that have explored the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality as the outcome of a social construction process.  
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Volkan, for example, proclaims that “ethnicity, nationality, and similar abstractions are 
creations of our own psyche and thus it is reasonable to regard the psyche as the 
creator of the concept of the enemy.” (1985, p. 243). Similarly, Spears, Gordijn, 
Dijksterhuis and Stapel (2004) derive from their own research that when ‘Us versus 
Them’ dynamics are drawn attention to, members tend to perceive greater differences 
between their own and the Other group. Additionally, Riketta and Sacramento (2008) 
conclude that images of ‘the Other side’ tend to emphasise, exaggerate and even 
create negative traits, and therefore ‘dehumanise’ the opponent – a dynamic also 
known as the ‘devil shift’ (Sabatier, Hunter, and McLaughlin, 1987). In a similar 
manner, Freud (1917) portrayed ‘the narcissism of minor differences’ as the tendency 
of people to focus on small features that distinguish them from the Other, and in line 
with this, to exaggerate the size and power of the enemy (Robins and Post, 1997).  
Even more critical of the idea of innateness of enemy-making is Abecassis (2003), who 
detected that enemy development is uncommon among pre-school and young school-
age children and becomes more common among middle school children and 
adolescents; a finding which opposes the idea that humans are born with an innate 
need for enemies, and especially contradicts the findings of the Robbers Cave 
Experiment (Sherif et al., 1961). The development of enemy relationships, so 
Abecassis adds, is likely to depend on several attainments, including a cognitive 
understanding of what an enemy is, exposure to enemies or enemy images in the 
media, and general changes in cognitive development that affect the development of 
peer relationships and expectations of these relationships, such as decreased 
egocentrism,  perspective taking abilities, and development of one’s self-concept; all 
attributes that can be derived from the socially constructed cultural environment. 
 
Additionally, there are several sources looking at the creation and maintenance of the 
divide between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ groups from a discourse perspective and further 
supporting the point of view that such dynamics might be socially constructed. 
Coupland, Blyton and Bacon (2005), for example, have studied the management 
rhetoric around expressions of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in industry and have found these to be 
responsible for the great divide among shop floor workers. Likewise, Dobson (2000) 
has concluded that terms that aid categorisation, such as ‘non-academic staff’ can 
provoke ‘Us versus Them’ thinking. Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman and Tyler (1990) make 
the potential of language to influence group dynamics even more clear. They explicate 
that it is the use of words such as ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ alone that can lead to in-
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group/outgroup bias not the other way around (see also Gillispie and Chrispeels, 
2008). Leudar, Masland and Vapil (2004) go yet a step further and talk about ‘the 
making of the enemy’ via strategic discourse. 
 
2.8. ‘Us versus Them’ – Social Construct or Innate Need? 
After having presented key sources from both stances, one promoting the universality 
and innateness of the need for enemies, the other one advancing an understanding for 
the social construct of the phenomenon, the next logical step in the literature review 
would be to exhibit my own commitment to one of them. Portraying ‘Us versus Them’ 
as either innate need or social construct is in so far important as it approximates an 
answer to the question whether enemy-thinking is innate or not. 
However, I will proceed by arguing that these two positions are complementary, not 
contradictory in nature. In line with this assertion, Robins and Post postulate that  
“to say that a behaviour is solely a product of social conditioning and individual 
choice would be to deny much of what we know about evolutionary biology ... 
But to attribute complex psychological reactions, such as paranoia, solely to 
evolutionary psychology is to deny what is uniquely human”. (1997, p. 69).  
I am hence concluding that the observable manifestations of the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality might indeed be discernible as a construct of social interaction; however, one 
needs to enquire what makes such constructions necessary in the first place. A certain 
sense of identity might indeed be socially constructed, such as for example nationality 
or profession (Talbot, 2008); the need to have identity in itself is innate. Along with 
that, I assume the following thought experiment: categorisations of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ are 
commonly centred around characteristics such as shared nationality, history, language, 
religion, age, gender or occupation, only to name a few, or any other characteristic 
that makes comparing and contrasting possible. I hold the opinion that even if these 
could be eliminated so as to create a homogeneous group, the innate need for 
opposition would still lead to the splitting of that group into in- and outgroups, even if 
differences have to be invented. In agreement, Chang notes that “human beings have 
always developed mental and social mechanisms to differentiate “us” from “them”. In 
the process, they develop criteria for other.” (2008, p. 26), and similar to Parker 
(2000), Diamond and Allcorn (2006) list as examples of such criteria younger versus 
older, profession versus profession, men versus women, workers versus managers, 
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and department versus department. This is not to say that any resulting division is 
‘real’ or objectively independent from their creators, but what I perceive as ‘real’ 
indeed is the underlying effort to create and maintain it. And this effort “predates 
contents, opinions, and ideologies and is impulsive and unconscious in character” 
(Berman et al., 2000, p. 53). Therefore I agree with the majority of literature subject 
to this review in their consensus to describe an innate, biologically determined 
universal need that social constructs are targeted at satisfying – through enemies and 
allies.  
Berman et al.’s experiment (2000) is a striking example in support of this conclusion. A 
prompt of different coloured pieces of paper (blue and red, no writing on it) randomly 
distributed among participants of a large group conference was sufficient to trigger 
their resignation from a life-long established political animosity only to form new group 
identities based on the colour of those papers. Unprompted, the members reinforced 
their recalibrated ‘Us versus Them’ mentality by creating powerful slogans, symbols 
and metaphors according to the colour of their paper, and eventually even constructed 
group narratives around it (for example, blue became the symbol of tradition, red that 
of humanitarianism). Based on the intensity with which these dynamics unfolded, the 
authors conclude that “the division into two opposing groups precedes the cognitive 
content that follows it; in other words, ideology and rational discourse are 
superimposed on this process rather than causing it.” (Berman et al., 2000, p. 73). 
 
2.9. Psychoanalysis – Taking ‘Us versus Them’ Underneath the Surface 
Having presented an extensive debate on the innateness of the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality, I will now proceed to discuss the intra-psychic dynamics that I and other 
authors believe to be underlying it (see for example Abecassis, 2003; Barash, 1991; 
Bryce, 1986; Erlich, 2001; Klein, 1959; Middents, 1990; Robins and Post, 1997; 
Ostroff, 2000; Volkan, 1988). I do so following Frosh’s (2003) notion that the outer 
world is a mirror image of the inner world, and that to understand this outer world, we 
have to understand our inner psyche first. Perceiving ‘Us versus Them’ thinking as a 
consequence of inner psychic dynamics, I have found it most useful to link back to 
Kleinian theories of splitting and projection. The remainder of the discussion will 
elaborate on these concepts, before establishing their relevance for interpersonal and 
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intergroup dynamics. Eventually, theories on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects, as well as the 
Paranoid-Schizoid and Depressive positions will be drawn into the proposed argument. 
2.9.1. Splitting ‘Good’ from ‘Bad’ and Getting Rid of ‘Bad’ 
Within the British school of object relations, Klein explains that the infant is born 
without the cognitive ability to perceive its physical distinctiveness from its mother, nor 
make sense of its own emotions (Spillius, Milton, Garvey, Couve and Steiner, 2011). So 
for example, when the infant feels hunger, it does not know how to find relief and 
feels threatened in its very existence. This fear of annihilation causes it great distress, 
for which reason one of the earliest defence mechanisms is brought into action: The 
baby splits off these negative emotions and projects them away from itself, onto an 
external source, which is then believed to be the cause for its despair (Hinshelwood, 
Robinson, Zarate and Appignanesi, 2006). ‘Out there’, these feelings are easier to 
process, as the illusion is created that the infant can escape them (Quinodoz, 2005). 
The mechanisms of splitting and projection are taking place simultaneously as two 
sides of the same coin; one does not precede the other, but they are a cause and 
simultaneously consequence of each other. 
Elaborating on the concept of splitting was one of Melanie Klein’s leading contributions 
to psychoanalytic theory (1946, 1952, 1959), although it had been considered 
previously by Freud. For Freud, psychoanalysis in general was a conflict theory of the 
mind. He referred to splitting as a means for resolving ambivalence “by splitting the 
contradictory feelings so that one person is only loved, another one only hated (like) 
the good mother and the wicked stepmother in fairy tales” (Fenichel, 1999, p. 157). It 
is important to note that psychoanalytic thought as developed by Freud was, due to his 
profession as a doctor, focused on patients with some form of pathology. He was 
looking at psychologically ‘ill’ people, such as patients diagnosed with neurosis or 
psychosis. Hence one might be in danger to perceive splitting as being unhealthy; in 
one of his older uses, Freud even describes splitting as the “pathological counterpart of 
synthesis” (Lichtenberg and Slap, 1973, p. 772).  
On the contrary, I agree with Klein, who interprets splitting as a ‘normal’ psychic 
function, an organising function, through which the human being perceives and 
understands his or her environment – even if it does lead to a distortion of reality 
(Segal, 1992). “It is the splitting which allows the ego to merge out of chaos and to 
order its experiences....” (Segal, 1988, p.35), and enables the child to internalise and 
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maintain enough initial ‘good’ experiences to serve as a core around which integration 
of contrasting aspects of objects and self can be established (Spillius et al., 2011). Bion 
(1959, cited by Spillius et al., 2011) adds to the differentiation between ‘normal’ and 
‘pathological’ splitting and explains that the latter is performed with omnipotence and 
violence and a resulting loss of sense of internal and external reality.  
Likewise, projection, the counterpart of splitting cannot be defined as being purely 
pathological, but “makes its appearance … under other psychological conditions as 
well, and in fact it has a regular share assigned to it in our attitude toward the external 
world.” (Freud, 1958). This thesis though concentrates on that aspect of projection “by 
which we attribute our own shortcomings to others as a means of protecting ourselves 
from threat” (Sherwood, 1979, p. 635). The foundation of this dynamic according to 
Lewis et al is then a negative self-judgement which is perceived as stemming from an 
external source, rather than from within the individual. Along with that, the individual 
unconsciously defends against aversive self-knowledge and psychologically distances 
him/herself from it, allowing it to remain unacknowledged. 
Next to providing an explanatory framework that suggests a primary splitting and 
projection process, the British school of object relations also offers insight into the 
infant’s ability to perceive whole objects. Recalling that the infant is not yet able to 
grasp its separateness from the mother, it can also not appreciate yet that the mother 
is a whole ‘unit’ in her own right. Hence, it does not project the above described ‘bad’ 
feelings onto a whole person, but rather, on parts of it. Klein explains the first object of 
splitting to be the mother’s breast; the most important object in an infant’s life after 
birth as it provides food and hence the only object with which relationship formation is 
possible (Bokanowski and Lewkowicz, 2009). Due to the baby’s underdeveloped 
emotional apparatus, or in other words, the incapacity for ambivalence, it is not able to 
make sense out of the fact that one object can simultaneously bring comfort, be 
‘good’, i.e. the breast is there to give milk, on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
bring discomfort, be ‘bad’, i.e. the breast is not there (in time) to give milk.  
Consequently, for the baby there are two objects; one it wishes to introject, and one it 
wishes to reject. One can say that the baby perceives the same breast as two separate 
objects – it is represented in two parts (Moore and Fine, 1990), the ‘good’ object and 
the ‘bad’ object. The term part-object was introduced by Abraham (1909, cited by 
Hilda and Abraham, 1955) and has been assigned a leading role in object-relations 
theory by Klein. This means that every purely ‘good’ or ‘bad’ object is always only a 
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part object, and hence splitting is the psychic action of a human being who is 
struggling to understand the whole; a notion which will become important again in the 
discussion chapter. Eventually though, this process assists in the development of a 
boundary with regards to the infant’s understanding of who it is and who it is not. 
Out of this primary behaviour, the dualistic world of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is provoked, with 
pleasant feelings sought after and internalised, and ‘bad’, unpleasant feelings disowned 
and projected onto an outside object. It also seems plausible to me to draw parallels 
between splitting and the tendency to dichotomise into absolute forms, whereby ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ objects are artificially held apart. The two currents of strong feelings which, if 
experienced together, would result in the anxiety-provoking chaos detailed earlier are 
separated. As a result, later on in life, an important step in development is their 
gradual depolarization and replacement with an integrated image that conforms more 
closely to actual ‘reality’ (Lichtenberg and Slap, 1973). However, the splitting process 
will continue in ‘milder’ form throughout adult life (Segal, 1988).  
Dartington expresses this notion in his own terms and emphasises the link to enemy-
thinking: 
“So we begin to build an inner world that relates to but not equates with an 
external world of good and bad objects, that seem to make for delight and 
frustration, for love and for envy and hate. And then it is a task for the rest of 
our lives to reconcile these inner and outer worlds. It is in our nature to make 
this separation of what is I and not-I, what belongs and what does not, and, 
like the babies we were in our cots, to hold close what is at that moment 
pleasurable and loveable and to throw out what is to be despised, destroyed, 
the hated objects to which we have ascribed such awesome power that we are 
fearful of their revenge.” (2010, pp. 31-32). 
 
2.9.2. Linking Back to ‘Us versus Them’ 
At this point parallels between the splitting and projection of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects 
and ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics transpire. I will henceforth make these explicit. The 
intra-psychic splitting process can be applied to the group level in order to make sense 
of the splitting process into ‘Us’, the ‘good’ group and ‘Them’, the ‘bad’ group. Erlich 
explains that accumulated negativity is not released through a conscious process, but 
via projection onto the other group, which he refers to as a ‘self-cleansing’ process. As 
such, “the ‘enemy’ is nothing more than a paranoid definition of the Other, who can 
then carry all badness after we have evacuated these parts of ourselves and projected 
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them onto him” (Erlich, 1997, p. 116). Thus, in encounters with the external world, 
people are really meeting hidden dimensions of themselves, supporting the notion that 
the Other as ‘enemy’ exists in both, the inner (the self) and the outer world (the 
Other), and represents a bridge between the two (Erlich, 1997). This suggests that one 
possible understanding of hatred against Otherness is that it is a consequence of the 
failure to cope with one’s own split off and projected ‘bad’ parts. 
While discussing object relations theory, Klein also refers to the term ‘ideal object’ 
(Hinshelwood, 1991), an idea which further supports the interpretation of ‘Us’ as the 
‘good’ group. This terminology emphasises the illusory character of the ‘good’ object, 
as in order for its perception to remain ‘good’, idealisation, the purification from the 
‘bad’, has to take place, giving the impression of perfection. In order to maintain the 
myth, the self has to ‘protect’ it from ‘bad’ characteristics that could lead to the loss of 
the ‘good’ object. The use of the omnipotent mechanisms of idealisation and denial are 
the primary drivers of these strong splits (Spillius et al., 2011) and persist beyond 
infancy. An idealised object of this kind inevitable brings with it the constant fear of a 
sudden reappearance of a ‘bad’ object ‘out there’ which threatens to stain its purity. 
The presence of this unavoidable anxiety also serves to explain paranoid ‘enemy-
thinking’.  
This line of thought can then be brought into conjunction with social psychology theory 
on in- and outgroup bias in order to understand the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality better. 
The purified ingroup has become the ideal object of all its members, leaving the task of 
container for ‘bad’ characteristics to the outgroup. The use of the term bias in social 
psychology then expresses the distortion of reality caused by the investment of effort 
to maintain the illusory ideal object, the ingroup.  
An important additional feature to note here is that the rejection of unwanted feelings 
alone is not enough; unwanted attributes cannot just be ‘disowned’, expelled away 
from the self – they need to find a ‘new owner’, and hence be projected into 
something or someone. (Spillius, 1988). This externalisation allows an individual or 
group to disown responsibility and to feel an illusory sense of mastery over its 
unwanted impulses, or in other words, to blame somebody else for one’s own misery 
(Bateman and Holmes, 1995). This necessity to identify a suitable container for 
unwanted attributes could give further justification for the need to have enemies, or at 
least explain the relationship of co-dependency between self and Other – as those 
negative aspects that one comes to recognise in the Other, are one’s own; they are 
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aspects of one’s own identity that are experienced as negative. In other words, they 
constitute one’s self’s negative identity.  
2.9.3. Kleinian Positions 
Klein sees these paranoid behaviours as characteristics of the Paranoid-Schizoid 
position, which she portrays as a developmental state of the immature ego (Klein, 
1946). Here, the negative and destructive feelings of sources from within that have 
been directed against an outside object (the schizoid element) still pose a threat to the 
self; they might ‘come back’ (Craib, 2001) – as described above. Klein explains that 
such destructive sources are caused by the so called “death instinct”, which forms the 
prototype for hostile object relations. Simultaneously, the self comprises the so called 
“life instinct”, which is the parallel primitive source of love and the prototype for loving 
object relations (Steiner, 1993). It is a typical characteristic of the Paranoid-Schizoid 
position that these two types of relating of self to other are kept strictly separate; i.e. 
one object can only be either loved or hated. Based upon this strictly split perception, 
Spillius (1988a) adds that the features of the Paranoid-Schizoid position comprise the 
difficulty of achieving a sense of reality, and a potentially narcissistic personality 
structure. This insight might deliver an explanation for the feeling of superiority of ‘Us’ 
in comparison to ‘Them’. Because the self’s own destructive drives are being projected 
to the outside world, it perceives the created threat as being directly targeted against it 
(the paranoid element) and as a consequence, objects are not reintegrated into the 
ego, but defended against (Craib, 2001).  
In addition to the Paranoid-Schizoid position, Klein also presents the Depressive 
position, which she describes as being developmentally more advanced (Segal, 1988). 
Characteristically, the self in this state of mind is able to recognise the Other as a 
separate object and is able to relate to it as a whole, not only either to its ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ attributes. This is accompanied by the development of the ability to tolerate 
ambivalence; both love and hate towards the same object can be felt simultaneously. 
Consequently, the world is more richly and realistically perceived, with the interplay 
between phantasy and reality being balanced (Spillius et al., 2011).  
Steiner (1993) explains the core difference between the Paranoid-Schizoid and the 
Depressive positions to be this degree of integration which enables the self to 
experience wholeness in both the self and the object. The self is now also comfortable 
with accepting its own failure to be purely ‘good’; a realisation which is referred to as 
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the loss of the idealised object (Craib, 2001). The accompanying depressive anxiety 
results from the fear of one’s ability to destroy the loved object due to the realisation 
that both instincts, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ originate within oneself and are directed towards 
the same object (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1985). It is different from paranoid anxiety, 
which is a concern for the safety of the ego, not the object. Feelings of guilt are a 
necessary response to depressive anxiety and their recognition helps the self to repair 
(Craib, 2001). This is accompanied by a shift of the self’s primary concern away from 
protection and survival in the Paranoid-Schizoid position, towards an interest in the 
object and the acknowledgement of its co-dependency on it in the Depressive position. 
Since Klein’s contribution of these two concepts from 1935 onwards into the 
psychoanalytic body of knowledge, many authors have explored on the dynamic 
relationship between the Paranoid-Schizoid and the Depressive positions (see for 
example, Bion, 1963; Joseph, 1983; Segal, 1983; Spillius et al., 2011) which remains 
as a tension throughout life. From this point of view, the Depressive position is not 
perceived as indicating a more developed mind set in comparison to the Paranoid-
Schizoid position; rather, there is a continuous, lifelong, oscillating regression between 
the two of them (Britton, 1998), in childhood as much as in adulthood, as part of 
normal psychic development. The oscillating nature of the relationship between these 
positions will be the subject of investigation again in the data analysis of this research. 
2.9.4. Insights from the Intrapersonal Perspective for Groups 
After indicating the dominance of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality in social settings, this 
literature review has predominantly concentrated on the psychoanalytic theories of 
splitting, projection and the Kleinian positions in order to gain deeper understanding of 
the intrapsychic predecessors of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. I have thereafter 
shown how these intrapersonal theories are indeed applicable to the interpersonal and 
intergroup dynamics that can lead to related concepts of in- and outgroup bias.  
Diamond and Allcorn support this development of thought by pointing out that 
“(d)ysfunction and conflict within organizations are frequently manifested in defensive 
splits and black and white categorizations, leading to polarizations between groups and 
their members” (2006, p. 62). Daum (2002) follows the same principle, and next to 
presenting his own case study, he points out that such application of Kleinian thought 
to group phenomena has been widely documented, as for example by Jaques (1955), 
Menzies Lyth (1960), Bion (1961), Alford (1989), Gould, (1998) as well as Gould, Ebers 
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and Clinchy (1999). Further supporting my own argument, after applying the Kleinian 
theories of splitting and projection to their own case studies, Roberts (1994) and 
Lazaar (2004) point out that the efforts for the preservation of self on the group level 
can fuel suspicion, prejudice, discrimination and generally increase hostility between 
teams, departments or organisations alike. 
I will now use the remainder of the literature review to elaborate more explicitly on this 
link between the intrapersonal, interpersonal and intergroup realm of enquiry in order 
to recognise how the discussed theories from the intrapsychic level apply to the latter. 
In support of this I will draw on the social psychology theories of social comparison 
and social identity.  
Social comparison theory (Goethals and Darley, 1987) exerts that people strive to 
compare their opinions to similar Others, so as to arrive at the conclusion that their 
opinion is correct, or true. This theory therefore contributes to the explanation of the 
occurrence of group cohesion: people feel attracted to groups that confirm their own 
opinion so that they can evaluate their own view on the world as being correct, as 
being reality. Attitude certainty (Brown and Abrams, 1986), a concept that explains the 
same inclination, refers to the subjective sense that one’s opinion represents an 
accurate construal of reality. Similarly, feelings of belongingness and the perception 
that group members agree with one’s attitude confer certainty about the correctness of 
those positions (Holtz, 2003). According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 
1986), knowing that one’s own view on the world is correct or true, enforces positive 
identity and leads to emotions of satisfaction and completeness. This kind of ‘positive 
projection’ within the group, or onto the ‘in-group’, leads to a new group entity (Erlich, 
1997).  
The concept of ‘positive projection’, in psychoanalysis referred to as introjection, has to 
be clarified in more detail. Introjection, a process closely related to identification was 
first introduced by Ferenczi in 1909 (cited by Laplanche and Pontalis, 1985) and 
describes the process of ‘taking in’ a part of the outside world (objects). Along with 
this, it can be understood as the mirror-process to projection, which is also inseparable 
from splitting; qualities, feelings, wishes or objects, are not rejected and expelled by 
the individual, but taken in and integrated into the self-concept; they are identified 
with. As such, introjection and projection can be seen as the two co-dependent 
mechanisms of splitting. This reasoning can help to understand the expansion of the 
self-concept to include not only one’s own body, but also the so called ingroup. ‘In-‘ in 
32 
 
this case can be perceived to refer to other members of the group that have been 
introjected by the individual. It is important to note this understanding of self as going 
beyond a person’s body. In the argumentation of this thesis, ‘self’ can consequently 
either refer to an individual or to an ingroup, dependent on the level of inquiry. 
Likewise, the concept of Other can be applied to an individual or an outgroup, 
depending on the level of opposition that is being discussed. Bowles (1991) for 
example follows this principle by using Denhardt’s 1989 metaphor of ‘Organization 
Shadow’ which describes the body of facts that organisations wish to deny and project 
onto Others so as to maintain a positive self-image towards themselves and others. 
In line with this thought, social identity theory explains that one does not only derive 
identity from within the self as an individual, but also from group membership; it is 
that part of the self-concept which is based on comparison with other people and 
relevant to social interaction (Turner et al., 1987). Maslach (cited by Diener, 1980) 
adds that in so doing, the individual gains a new sense of self, a new identity rooted in 
the group, replacing their personal identity. Closely related are feelings of strong group 
unity and perceived similarity to other group members, linking back to social 
comparison theory. To this notion Singer (1965) adds that lessened individuality within 
a group is associated with greater liking for the group. This sense of belonging, in turn, 
justifies ingroup favouritism (Otten and Mummendey, 2000). In other words, people 
choose to belong to a group that they identify with and that they can introject. It 
becomes clear at this point that the concept of identification in the framework of social 
psychology complements the concept of introjection with regards to psychoanalysis: 
the individual identifies with the group because (s)he has introjected it1.  
Moving onto the intergroup level, the implications for organisational life are evident: 
organisations are an endless process of identifications and divisions (Parker, 2000). 
Early Kleinian psychoanalysts, such as Jaques (1955, cited by De Board, 1990) have 
identified projective and introjective identification as the two primary mechanisms 
operating in groups and organisations. In large group dynamics, enmity plays a central 
role and is the cause for the split into many subgroups; the fragmentation of the whole 
(Erlich, 1997). 
                                                          
1 The question is whether the group is similar to the individual because (s)he has introjected it, 
or vice versa; attempting an answer would at this stage distract from the main argument and 
will therefore be left for the discussion chapter. 
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This group introjection process has consequences on projection dynamics important to 
this research. As the group, which one claims membership for, becomes part of one’s 
own identity, projection onto that group in the form of, for example, blame, would 
resemble projection onto the self. The resulting need for an external ‘owner’ within the 
organisational setting can hence only be satisfied by an individual outside the group or 
even another group, the so called outgroup. Other researchers go a step further and 
claim the necessity of maintaining a derogative image about the outgroup. So for 
example, social identity theory explicates the “nearly automatic tendency to 
discriminate against people who can be regarded as belonging to outgroups.” (Capozza 
and Brown, 2000, p. 85). Turner et al. add to the discussion by elaborating on the 
provocation of ingroup favouritism:  
“Situationally dominant self-categorisations enforce the perception of intragroup 
similarity and intergroup differences. These circumstances inhibit the person’s 
ability to perceive intergroup similarities and intragroup differences.” (1987, p. 
194). 
 
2.10. Own Theoretical Framework and Gaps in the Body of Knowledge 
This review of the body of knowledge relevant to the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality is 
inimitable in many aspects. This is, to my knowledge, the first compilation of literature 
that concentrates solely on shedding light onto this social phenomenon. First of all, this 
review highlights the ‘current-affairs-status’ of the topic by offering a general outline of 
its occurrence in versatile social settings. A wide range of applicable theoretical 
frameworks have been identified, and the two dominant perspectives – psychoanalysis 
and social psychology – including an emphasis on their mutually complementary 
nature, have been investigated in detail.  
Furthermore, the consensus on innateness of the ‘Us versus Them’ debate has been 
approached critically so as to present a balanced overview of contrasting perceptions. 
The Kleinian theories of splitting and projection have then brought the discussion onto 
a deeper level of inquiry, ‘underneath the surface’, so as to address possible 
intrapsychic origins for the readily observable ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. Lastly, by 
emphasising the relation between these intrapersonal theories and their expansion 
onto the interpersonal and intergroup level, the psychoanalytic principle that the outer 
world is a mirror of the inner world (Shapiro, 1997) and vice versa has been embraced. 
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Additionally, this original convergence of the literature has enabled me to recognise the 
following short-comings. To my knowledge, there are plenty of publications available 
that presume the Kleinian theory of splitting as a precursor for versatile interpersonal 
and group dynamics, and key sources have been drawn out here (see for example 
Alford, 1989; Bion, 1961; Daum, 2002; Gould et al.; 1999; Lazaar, 2004; Menzies Lyth, 
1960; Roberts, 1994). However, only a handful of authors before me (see for example 
Erlich, 2001; Gold, 2010; Ostroff, 2000; Volkan, 1988), have elaborated on the links 
between Kleinian object relations theory and enemy-thinking in this manner. Along 
with this approach I have created my own theoretical framework (figure 4). 
Moreover, despite having brought together a wide range of sources that commonly 
agree with great confidence on the proposition that the need to have enemies is innate 
and universal, I remain in doubt. One might speculate that it is my naïve hope that 
humanity can do better which drives me to look for alternative explanations. Although 
not a ‘gap’ in the body of knowledge in the strictest sense of the word (after all, an 
‘answer’ has been agreed on), I am left wondering if the need for enemies is really as 
universal and inevitable as portrayed by the body of knowledge to date. Along with 
that, the gaps in the literature to date support the case for my underlying research 
questions proposed in the introduction chapter.  
A further drawback of the body of knowledge to date is portrayed by the lack of 
primary data. Although studies on projections in organisations exist, these have either 
been gained mainly through clinical group settings, such as is the case for the 
psychoanalytic perspective (see for example Armstrong, 1992, Greene, Morrison and 
Tischler, 1979), or through the setting up of laboratory experiments, typical for the 
social psychology perspective (see for example Perdue et al., 1990; Robbins and 
Krueger, 2005). However, case studies that concentrate on the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality and collect primary data through participation in real-life, ongoing 
organisational groups from a psychoanalytical perspective remain rare (see for 
example Coupland, Blyton and Bacon, 2005; Daum, 2002; Gillispie and Chrispeels, 
2008; Gould et al., 1999; Roberts, 1994). 
During data analysis, I will be drawing into the discussion yet another strand of 
psychoanalytic literature, which supports my inclination to doubt the ‘no-choice-but-to-
have-an-enemy’ assumption suggested so far. It is of note, however, that at the time 
of reviewing the literature, I was convinced that enemy-thinking, and hence the 
development of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality is unavoidable – after all, the literature 
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Figure 4: Diagram of own Theoretical Framework 
that I had studied for approximately one year at that time explicitly taught me so. This 
might not be explicitly recognisable anymore, as the literature review evolved during 
the three year research period. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
The literature review has enabled me to construct a theoretical framework to explain 
the intrapsychic and unconscious dynamics of splitting and projection that were 
depicted as preceding the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. This chapter describes the 
research design and methodology that has allowed the exploration of these ideas on 
the interpersonal and intergroup level in three organisational settings (figure 5). 
I chose a case study approach (Yin, 2003) as the literature review identifies a lack of 
data gained from real-life organisational settings as opposed to laboratory experiments 
(section 2.10). This practical investigation thus makes a significant contribution to the 
body of knowledge in reference to the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. Further, the 
introductory chapter expresses interest in understanding better the origins and 
consequences of the phenomenon, for which reason I chose to study it in more detail 
in its ‘naturally’ occurring forms in and between ongoing, organisational groups. In 
approaching it in this way I hope that by observing and experiencing the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality first hand, as well as talking to and working with other individuals who 
were subjected to it, I would be able to formulate well-informed answers to my first 
three research questions. In so doing, I pay attention to the differences with which 
individuals in each case study relate to their groups of belonging and not belonging so 
as to establish possible links to the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality in light of research 
questions four to six.  
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This chapter will be structured as follows. First of all, a summative overview of all three 
case studies and their relationship to each other will be discussed in section 3.1. 
Thereafter, each case study setting and my role as researcher within it will be 
presented in more detail, including an outline of the methods applied, as well as a brief 
illustration of their advantages and disadvantages for this research (sections 3.2. to 
3.4.).  
The focus will then shift to a methodological reflection of the underlying approach of 
ethnography, also treating the question of validity and my own philosophical view on 
reality (section 3.5.). I am aware that it is more conventional to scrutinise research 
philosophy first and answer ‘the big question’ of which paradigm one is committed to. 
However, this proved to be one of the most difficult stages of the research project for 
me, and after a year of intense study of versatile philosophical debates I still remained 
indecisive, for which reason I have chosen a different approach. I carefully determined 
the most suitable research methods for answering my research questions first, and 
then reviewed their underlying philosophical stance in the literature. The structure of 
this chapter reflects this development.  
Lastly, section 3.6. applies the established methodological principles to a suitable 
strategy for data analysis. 
 
3.1. Overall Research Design 
Three case studies were chosen to explore ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics in progress in 
very different organisational settings. Case study one treats data gathered during my 
employment with FutureCo prior to commencement of my academic career (2001-4) as 
well as during participant observation undertaken in the company for my 
undergraduate degree (2008). The data for case studies two and three was gathered 
during my Ph.D. studies in the period 2009-11. 
This is a multi-method qualitative research approach (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2008) rather than a mono-method approach. Among others, Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(2003) are advocates of this strategy and explain that the applied methods can 
counteract one another’s’ limitations; they can cancel out the so called ‘method effect’ 
by testing out and hence supporting each other’s findings (Curran and Blackburn, 
2001; Saunders et al., 2008).  Moreover, this strategy enables me to combine the 
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three very different case studies into one consistent research argument, expressed by 
the areas of overlap in figure six. These ‘spaces’ symbolise the communality of all three 
case studies, namely the underlying methodological approach of ethnography of the 
research encounter. 
    
 
In the following discussion I describe the settings of the three case studies in detail 
and present the research methods used for each of them. Despite the diversity of 
methods applied, my personal underlying research philosophy informed all of them 
equally, and will therefore also be explored. 
 
3.2. Case Study 1: “FutureCo” 
The first case study, FutureCo, was chosen due to the experiences I had as a member 
of staff in this company which eventually gave rise to my research interest. As these 
experiences of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality were very negative, I started the 
Case Study 1 
FutureCars 
(competitive industry, profit-
driven) 
-> Memoires & unstructured 
Interview 
Case Study 3 
The Convent 
(voluntary religious 
community) 
-> Participant Observation 
& the Social Photo Matrix 
Case Study 2 
The Childrens' Charities 
(beneficiary & service 
orientated, not-for-profit) 
-> Observations, semi-
structured Interviews & 
the Social Photo Matrix 
Figure 6: Diagram of case studies and applied methods 
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practical part of my research enquiry with the aim of finding out what provokes it and 
if it could possibly be avoided.  
3.2.1. The Organisation and My Role 
FutureCo is a German car manufacturing plant of a multinational business with a man 
power of approximately 14,000 (in 2008) employees. Out of these, 10,000 jobs are 
manufacturing related, and 4,000 are administrative and managerial roles.  
My relationship to this organisation has developed over time. After a two and a half 
year on-the-job training in the offices of various departments, where I was trained for 
versatile clerical jobs, I was offered a position in the public relations department as a 
PR assistant. I worked there for another six months prior to starting university in 2004.  
3.2.2. Data Collection Methods: Memoires and Unstructured Interview 
Memoirs: Interest in studying self-narratives as part of the broader trend of the 
“narrative inquiry” has grown in humanities and social sciences (e.g. Clandinin and 
Connelly, 2000; Ellis and Bochner, 2000), and within that, memoir writing has 
increased, too (e.g. Baker, 1982; De Beauvoir, 2005; Lamott, 2000). Phifer (2002) 
explains that memoirs focus on the most important moments in our lives and that this 
selectiveness makes them different from autobiographies or journal entries.  
I present my memoirs in a predominantly descriptive way, focusing on those passages 
that offer the deepest insights into my experiences of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality 
at FutureCo. Although, according to Chang (2008), an entire self-narrative is rarely 
fixed by only one style, my own personal writing style is rather analytic and 
interpretive. I treat some of these vignettes (Humphreys, 2005) as materials to analyse 
rather than as a centrepiece to appreciate.  
Limitations: No fieldnotes had been taken that could support the memoirs. This is 
disadvantageous in so far as memoirs can reveal only partial truths as they focus only 
on certain aspects of an experience. Likewise, memory selects, shapes, limits and 
distorts the past (Chang, 2008) and reconstructing detail, I can confirm, proved to be 
very difficult. However, Clandinin and Connelly argue that time passed between an 
event and the memoir being shaped helps to “smooth out details, leaving a kind of 
schematic landscape outline” (2000, p. 83). One could also say that given the fact that 
I remember certain events from my time at FutureCo over others renders them 
significant to my research, and since I am not intending to present the past as ‘truth’, 
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but rather welcome the distortion of the past as valuable insight, this limitation is not a 
matter of concern for my own research design. Moreover, I have chosen to conduct an 
unstructured interview with another former member of staff of FutureCo so as to 
compare and contrast my own memories with his. 
Unstructured interview: The second set of primary data for case study one was derived 
from an hour long, non-directive informant interview (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). 
The respondent, who is a close friend of mine and who has been working for FutureCo 
for more than five years as an electro-technician, was prompted to share with me his 
past experiences of the ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics from his perspective.  
This approach to interviewing fits the exploratory nature of the research design and 
enabled me to “find out what is happening [and] to seek new insights.” (Robson, 2002, 
p. 59), and it allowed me to ask the respondent to build on responses. Especially in 
this case, it helped me to ‘probe’ and compare my own memoirs with those of my 
friend. This was important for the rigour of case study one, as my memoris are only 
written from the ‘Us’-perspective at FutureCo. My friend on the other hand, was at the 
time of employment one of ‘Them’ to me. Therefore, by offering the reader insight into 
the organisation from both ‘sides’, I portray a more balanced view of what ‘really’ went 
on between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Interviewing one of ‘Them’ certainly led me to adopt a 
more balanced view, as I learnt about aspects of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality at 
FutureCo that were completely unknown to me before. My being surprised can itself be 
treated as important information for primary data, as it shows just how big the lack of 
understanding was between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. 
Limitations:  As the findings of case study one are solely based on the insights of two 
individuals, a question of reliability (Marshall and Rossman, 1999) would be concerned 
with the representativeness of these findings of the entire manpower of FutureCo. 
However, taking the theory of the Oneness group into account which will be 
established in chapter seven, one can indeed assume that the voice of one individual is 
representative of the group in question. Furthermore, my friendship with the 
interviewee might have influenced his responses, although I feel this was rather 
advantageous with regards to rapport and trust (Robson, 2002) that had already 
existed between us. 
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3.2.3. Ethical Concerns 
The interviewee was informed about my research intentions and confidentiality was 
guaranteed. However, both our contributions are portrayed here without the consent 
of the organisation in question. As a consequence the name of the organisation and 
pertinent details have been modified so as to make identification difficult.  
 
3.3. Case Study 2: “The Children’s’ Charities” 
The second case study based on the joint work of two charities gives insight into the 
phenomenon under investigation in a rather different business environment, namely 
that of not-for-profit organisations. Here, strong consistency between organisational 
ideologies and the personal values of staff, as well as the emphasis placed on 
collaborative working rather than competing constitutes a very different stage for ‘Us 
versus Them’ dynamics to appear on. 
3.3.1. The Charities and My Role 
Two charities, one local (The Fun Trust), one national (The Play Trust), both providing 
palliative care to children with a life-threatening illness and their families, were 
investigating the possibility to collaborate. The Fun Trust employs 22 qualified nurses 
and children’s nurses, as well as 6 administrative staff. That local team of The Play 
Trust which would be affected by the suggested collaboration consists of 6 social 
workers. 
I was involved with both organisations during a ten-week full-time research project in 
spring 2011 as a member of staff representing my university. The project objective, 
according to the contract was: “To conduct an applied research project which will 
result in the development of an organisational plan for a single model of support to 
families from the two models currently operated by (The Fun Trust) and (The Play 
Trust) in partnership with other service providers.” Based on my collected primary 
data, I was asked to evaluate whether or not the organisational cultures of the two 
charities would make for a good collaboration. 
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3.3.2. Data Collection Methods: Observations, Semi-structured Interviews and the 
SPM 
Observations: I sat in two team meetings held by the practitioners of each charity and 
collected fieldnotes based on my observations of these. Likewise, I accompanied 
practitioners of both charities on half-day home visits and had again the opportunity to 
observe work habits and procedures and took notes. The families were chosen and 
approached by the charities themselves in order to gain their consent. My adapted role 
in this case was an ‘observer as participant’ (Gill and Johnson, 2002), which in simple 
terms describes participation in a passive function as spectator without involvement, 
but with my research intentions clear to all involved. 
Limitations: the data gathered was solely based on my own impressions. Due to my 
non-participating role this meant that my ability to understand how it really ‘felt’ to 
work with the clients was restricted (Jorgensen, 1989). Likewise, arranging a further 
appointment with the practitioners to probe my own impressions proved difficult. The 
interviews were therefore a valuable means for cross-referencing, and the Social Photo 
Matrix discussed below was of greater help for probing my impressions. Furthermore, 
despite no interaction with the practitioners nor the clients during home visits, my 
mere presence might have influenced their routine procedures.  
Interviews: I conducted 16 semi-structured interviews of approximately one hour with 
members of both charities. The interviews were conducted and recorded in the 
premises of the respective charity and thereafter transcribed. Confidentiality was 
guaranteed at all times and consent forms signed by each participant beforehand.  
Limitations: The research took place within the frame of a paid, applied project. 
Therefore, the interviews had a strong focus on results and questions were aimed at 
certain dynamics that had already been determined by the gatekeeper in advance. 
Since that gatekeeper was the client to the project and simultaneously the CEO of one 
of the charities, I was introduced to members of staff as the researcher who would 
look into a possible collaboration with the other organisation. As such, members of 
staff might have been suspicious towards me, as they might have perceived me as 
acting in the interest of the CEO and not as an independent researcher. For the same 
reason, subjects might not have felt comfortable to disclose information about 
themselves, which is described by Hollway and Jefferson as the problem of the 
‘defended’ subject (Hollway and Jefferson, 2001).  
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Not considering these dynamics disregards the importance of rapport and its possible 
affects on the research outcome (Robson, 2002) and its lack could lead to a commonly 
known problem whereby subjects give the answers they think the researcher would 
like to hear (Bryman, 2008). I tried to counteract such pitfalls by ensuring that each 
participant is fully informed about the nature of my research and gave them the 
opportunity to ask further questions prior to the commencement of the recording. 
During the interviews I gained the impression that trust had indeed been established 
between me and the participants, as most of them spoke their opinions very freely 
with remarks such as ‘this is completely confidential, but…’. 
Workshops:  Two workshops were held with members of both charities. In the first 
one, a Social Photo Matrix (SPM) was conducted with 14 participants, and although the 
second workshop was reserved for presenting the project report, data was gathered 
here too and contributed to the primary data pool. 
The SPM, in addition to incorporating the richness of contemporary visual methods, 
also entails a psychoanalytical perspective on doing research (Sievers, 2008). 
Borrowing from Stein’s account on organisational consultancy, many workplace 
phenomena most often exist outside of the immediate awareness of organisational 
participants: “The surface picture presented to the consultant often is a symptom and 
symbol (...). Client organizations often do not know what they, at some unrecognized 
level, already know too well.” (1994, pp. 8-9). Hollway and Jefferson (2001) have 
referred to this drawback as “the transparent self problem”. Furthermore, Crociani-
Windland (2009) comments that not all experiences can be put into words and Hymes 
(1996) points out that not all can be found out by asking so that images often provide 
useful prompts for the ‘unknown known’ (Bollas, 1987). All these points of critique 
support the SPM as alternative research tool. 
Given the novelty of this method, I include an elongated discussion on its design, 
philosophy, strengths and weaknesses in appendix one. Here, I will only give a brief 
overview. Before the SPM, participants are given a theme and are invited to take 
photographs of any object they associate with it. A random selection of these photos is 
then projected in a 60 minute session. By coming together in a matrix, “out of which 
something new can grow as in a uterus” (Lawrence, 2005), participants are invited to 
share their free associations, amplifications and link without boundaries, what comes 
into their minds in view of the photographs (Sievers, 2008). The aim is to expand their 
thinking, as the photographs capture both, a direct object as well as a memory of 
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experience (Reynolds and Vince, 2007). The SPM proved to be the dominant tool for 
confirming interpretations made during observations and the fieldwork of this case 
study. 
Limitations: The concept of free association refers to “the mental process of making 
associations which the reason does not order, repress, or control (...) in order to gain 
insight into subconscious processes” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010). It is 
questionable whether individuals are able to ‘switch off’ reasoning in such manner, and 
Bollas remarks that “(e)ven today, many analysts regard free association as a distant 
and unrealisable ideal.” (2002, p. 9). Similarly, social pressures from other participants 
might inhibit participants’ confidence to associate freely, despite the efforts of the 
SPM’s physical set up to overcome these (Warren, 2012). Likewise, collective 
unconscious defence mechanisms (Bion, 1961) can prevent the flow of free 
associations.  
With regards to the analysis of the SPM, no suggested procedure exists to date. With 
the creation of a summative framework, Redding Mersky (2012) suggests a process by 
which participants can find closure; however, no suggestions to theory development 
are made. From my own research experience I find that free associations cannot be 
interpreted independently from the photographs that provoked them, making the 
moving away from these towards a more concluding stage of analysis difficult. 
Therefore, interpretation beyond conjectures together with theory building derived 
from it remains highly tentative and is in danger of falling subject to ‘wild analysis’ 
which Shafer explains occurs when “what could be the case is taken as what is the 
case.” (1985, p. 281, emphasis original). This latter limitation is counteracted, as 
explained previously, by the overall multi-method approach to data gathering. As such, 
the findings from the SPM do not stand alone but are aligned to former, more rigour 
outcomes of other research tools. 
3.3.3. Ethical Concerns 
I was in touch with vulnerable children for which I needed a CRB certificate. I also had 
to take care to appreciate the trust and confidentiality that was offered to me from the 
charities and the parents when I was invited into their home to observe practitioners’ 
visits. 
Although each interviewee signed a consent form expressing their voluntary 
participation, further ethical concerns arise when taking into account that they were 
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selected and directly approached by the CEO of The Fun Trust and a similarly 
authoritative figure within the hierarchy of The Play Trust. I do not know whether 
there were internal political dynamics compromising the staff’s voluntary participation. 
Permission to use the data gathered during the project for this research was granted 
by the CEO of the Fun Trust and the corresponding project manager at the Play Trust. 
Additionally, all participants were informed that data will also be used for the PhD 
thesis prior to their involvement in the project. Insight into the research outcome other 
than the detailed report produced for the two charities was offered at any time but 
never requested to date. 
 
3.4. Case Study 3: “The Convent” 
The setting of the third case study was selected due to my wish to study people who 
remained permanently in their constellation. I wanted to experience the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality of a group who did not come together only Monday to Friday, nine to 
five, but is permanently bound together. Underlying this choice was the assumption 
that certainly I would find the dynamic playing an important role in such setting, too, 
and hence I could further support my conclusion from the literature review that 
enemy-thinking is innate. I could not think of any such existing group apart from an 
exotic ancient tribe or a monastic community. For practical purposes, it was decided to 
try and gain access to the latter. Additionally, the opportunity to study the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality in an environment that was in itself created for the very purpose of 
forming union, which directly opposes enemy-thinking, was intriguing. 
Suggestions for suitable communities were made by the university’s chaplain and 
access was enquired via letter to six convents, but only the one described here 
accepted. All research intentions were explained via letter correspondence prior to my 
entry (appendix 2). 
3.4.1. The Convent and My Role 
Five weeks participant observation took place in an enclosed and silent, UK based, 
female convent with a community of 22 professed Sisters. The convent community 
itself did not ask me any further questions before my arrival but asked that once I 
enter the enclosure I should remain in it for the duration of my stay. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in the data analysis chapter, my role in the community was 
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treated as that of a postulant, a nun in her first year of formation, for which I was 
assigned a personal mentor. 
3.4.2. Data Collection Methods: Participant Observation and the SPM 
Participant Observation: I took on my role as complete and overt participant observer 
(Saunders et al., 2008) and produced primary data in the form of fieldnotes from 
observations and reflections on these and other experiences, as well as informal 
conversations that happened spontaneously and irregularly during my stay with various 
members of the community, despite the order being in principle silent. Kaghan, Strauss 
and Barley et al. (1999) comment that conversations during participant observation are 
like an ongoing interview. The relevance and authenticity of data gathered during 
these is further supported by the fact that in such naturally developing conversation, it 
is the subjects who decide upon the contents of the ‘interview’. 
During my fieldwork, two Social Photo Matrix sessions were conducted with 12 sisters . 
Secondary data, such as historical information, brochures, prayer books and guidelines 
about the convent life were also investigated. 
Participant observation is a research method that generates interpretative theory 
grounded in the realities of the here and now of daily human existence (Agar, 1986; 
Delamount, 2004; Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002). It entails a strategy for gaining access to 
otherwise inaccessible dimensions of human life and experience and as such enables 
the researcher to immerse into the social environment of participants, from where it is 
possible to understand the world from their frame of reference; a state Cooley refers 
to as ‘sympathetic introspection’ (1969).  
Hence, it is a method that brings the researcher closer to the subject’s view on reality, 
that enables – as best as possible – to gain insight into and from the perspective of the 
subjects, to see with their eyes, to feel from their point of view, to understand their 
line of thoughts. The task of interpreting that world, as argued by Manis and Meltzer 
(1967), can only be achieved through participation with those involved, and only if the 
language that is used to communicate its meaning is understood (Hall, 1976).  
Along with that, one of the core strengths of this method includes its ability to unveil 
the meanings that people attach to their actions (Delamount, 2004; Diamond and 
Allcorn, 2003; Waddington, 2004). Likewise, Smith (1981) proclaims that the 
participant observer can gain further insight into the underlying motives of people’s 
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actions, because (s)he can ‘feel’ from the standpoint of an insider and explain the 
subjects’ world of reality, or, in other words, one can understand the frame of 
reference of the participant in action (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
During note taking I was also concerned with transparency issues, as I wanted to 
enable the readers of this research account to reconstruct my line of thought during 
data interpretation and also to come to their own conclusions. Hence, real time 
documentation of descriptive observations, known as ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973), 
as well as narrative accounts of my own emotional state, namely experiential 
observations, was essential. 
Limitations:  On the one hand, my being treated by the community as a postulant was 
a ‘real’ role, showing further the high degree of integration I enjoyed in my research 
setting. On the other hand, a postulant does not have as many rights in the community 
as does a professed sister after seven years of formation; so for example, I was not 
able to attend the weekly community meetings. Whether these weekly meetings would 
have been a fruitful source for more data gathering I do not know.  
Furthermore, being given a mentor had positive and negative effects on my data 
gathering. On the one hand, I was able to ask questions or clarify my interpretations 
whenever needed. This gave me ample opportunity to ‘test’ my own interpretations 
with the subjects, which is suggested by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) to 
strengthen the validity of an ethnographic finding. However, my mentor also acted as a 
‘gatekeepter’ – literally letting me in, but also keeping me out. In the first week or so, 
some of the other sisters did not talk to me directly, of which I will give a detailed 
example in the data chapter of case study three. 
3.4.3. Ethical Concerns 
During my stay with the community, each sister was permanently subject to my 
primary data gathering. Their participation was in so far voluntary as the community as 
a whole had decided to accept my request of allowing me into their home for five 
weeks. However, as I learnt two weeks into my stay, there were four sisters who were 
opposed to my entering. Nevertheless, due to the community’s principle of obedience, 
once the decision had been made to grant me access, it was supported by all members 
as though it were their own. Therefore, I never learnt who these four sisters might 
have been, but one needs to keep in mind that even they were subjected to my 
observations and data gathering. Moreover, had any of the sisters wanted to withdraw 
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from the research, this would not have been possible, because there was literally 
nowhere else for them to go; I was a constant present in their own home. The only 
place where I could not observe the sisters was in their own private ‘cells’, as it is a 
rule of the convent life that sisters are not allowed to visit each other in the cells. 
I was aware of the potential for my presence to interrupt the order and calmness of 
the convent life . This was a cause of concern because the nuns’ spiritual life is centred 
around the stability of a strict routine and the management of daily tasks with great 
calmness, efficiency and discipline. It stands out rather drastically if any one member 
of the community does not ‘pull their weight’, as it would affect, not to say even upset, 
the functioning of the whole community. 
 
3.5. Ethnography 
3.5.1. The Underlying Research Approach 
Above, I have presented each applied research method in detail for the three case 
studies. I will now turn to discussing the underlying approach into which these 
methods can be summarised, namely ethnographic research. This is advantageous for 
emphasising the underlying methodological consistency throughout the entire research 
design. In the frame of the ethnographic approach to my research, I am going to 
discuss the relevant concepts of Verstehen, countertransference and affect, 
intersubjectivity and ‘going native’, thereby paying particular attention to the 
relationship between the researcher and ‘the researched’, as well as the mode of 
reflexivity that comes with this relationship. 
Verstehen, empathetic understanding & Nacherleben. I feel that adding principles of 
Verstehen to the discussion will help clarify my personal methodological stance that 
has shaped my research practice. Primarily, Verstehen has a concern for the subjective 
state of human kind and how people in life give meaning to the social world around 
them (Weber, 1962). It is the process of interpretive understanding through the 
empathetic examination of social phenomena, making empathy a key dynamic of the 
sense-making process. In 1924 Dilthey introduced Verstehen into sociology as a first-
person participatory perspective in the theoretical frame of hermeneutics (cited by 
Harrington, 2001) and thereby opposed the external objectifying third-person 
perspective of explanation (Erklärung). Although I am not presenting this research 
from a sociological perspective, the same principles of Verstehen and empathy pertain. 
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By applying empathetic understanding to fieldwork, Martin (1980) differentiates 
between three forms of empathy. Next to having knowledge of something (for example 
knowing that a certain ingroup is opposed to another outgroup) and adaptation of that 
knowledge (being opposed to that other group oneself), he postulates that it is 
assimilative empathy that the participant observer seeks, for if possessed, the 
researcher can “get around in the group easily, speak their language and is on joking 
terms with them...” (Martin, 1980, p. 110). He links this to a new understanding of 
‘going native’ (Becker, 1958) and explains that it is the assimilative sense of going 
native, whereby the researcher operates in the community with ease, comfort and 
familiarity, with so called ‘social know-how’, that the participant observer benefits from, 
rather than the adoptive sense. This distinction is important when understanding 
through the process of reliving (Nacherleben) (Dilthey, 1989).  
Chang (2008) adds that a true understanding of others requires empathetic 
understanding, based on principles of Verstehen. According to him, this entails an act 
of putting aside one’s own framework and “seeing others’ experiences within the 
framework of their own” (Geertz, 1984, p. 126). In the Malinowskian-Geertzian sense, 
this empathetic understanding is achieved from the ‘native’s’ point of view, and 
although ‘perfect Verstehen’ is beyond human ability, attempts to incorporate the 
underlying philosophy can prevent premature judgements about others and enhance 
rich understanding of the ‘unknown’. Therefore, Lingerfelder (1996) postulates that the 
participant observer needs to deny his/her own self so as to immerse with and in 
others. Along with that, the genuine effort to Verstehen others often engenders 
crossing between self and Other (Chang, 2008). 
In case study one, I am bringing to the fore my own Verstehen of the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality as one of ‘Us’. The fact that I am analysing my own memoirs shows that I 
cannot separate myself from the one-sided perspective given. In case study two, on 
the other hand, I am trying to achieve this sense of ‘empathetic understanding’, by 
getting to know the charities very well, getting a ‘feel’ for the way they ‘do things 
around here’ and simultaneously to get to know the Other from their perspective – in 
contrast to case study one, it is their Other that I am investigating, not mine. 
Countertransference & affect. In line with the above principle of Verstehen, 
psychoanalytical thinking does not only outline a theoretical framework through which 
the human world can be understood, but also its own methodological approach 
through which such a world can be investigated. Transference and countertransference 
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constitutes the notion that an individual does not exist in emotional isolation; rather, 
emotions experienced by one individual are the result of dynamics caused by one or 
more other individuals.  
Hinshelwood and Skogstad (2000) refer to countertransference as the process of the 
researcher becoming a subject to their own studies, and proclaim that this is in so far 
advantageous as their own emotional reactions can now be investigated to gain 
understanding of the situation. Schwartz and Schwartz (1955) refer to this dynamic as 
‘sympathetic identification’ and add that “since the investigator has control neither over 
his affective responses nor their effects on this observations, he must contend with his 
feelings as part of his data”(p. 99). Again, it will become evident during data 
presentation that I did indeed gain insight from such dynamics. 
As Hinshelwood (1991) states, it is unavoidable to be emotionally involved in a 
participative study (see also Schwartz and Schwartz, 1995). Linking this back to the 
concept of transference and countertransference, it is these projections which are seen 
as a means of communication on a non-verbal, emotional level, whereby the 
researcher introjectively identifies with the subjects (Hinshelwood, 1991). In other 
words, the emotional state of the researcher, the countertransference, can be 
understood as a reaction to the subjects’ transferences (Diamond and Allcorn, 2003). 
In reference to this notion goes the psychoanalytical understanding of empathy (Bion, 
1963), and Van Maanen (2011) stresses that this is a special personal quality of the 
ethnographer. 
Taking an empathetic stance is one of the core elements of psychoanalytically 
informed research, and the investigator’s self-awareness becomes a means for 
interpreting transferences and countertransferences, “revealing the subjective and 
intersubjective world of work” (Diamond and Allcorn, 2003; 496). 
The implications for my primary research were the acknowledgement that I was not 
separable from the subjects of my studies but inescapably became part of it, making 
the crossing between self and Other as described by Chang above, an emotional one. 
Considering the way I, as part of the group in all three case study organisations, was 
influenced in my emotions and thoughts then led to valuable insight into the subject 
matter under investigation. Examples of these will be given later during data 
presentation.  
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Intersubjectivity. The discussion so far leads to another relevant principle of 
participative studies, that of intersubjectivity. Benjamin (1994) defines intersubjectivity 
in terms of a relationship of mutual recognition, where each person experiences the 
Other as a ‘like subject’, another mind who can be felt with, yet has a distinct, separate 
centre of feeling and perception. It is this principle that I will now turn to in some 
detail in order to further explain my choice of research methods. 
Modern psychoanalysis has assumed individuals to be discrete entities that act 
externally upon each other (Schulte, 2000). Post-modernity, however, has witnessed a 
deconstruction of this ‘sovereign self’ (Cavell, 1991) whereby the initiative behind 
human behaviour does not solely spring from an individual’s inner world, but resides in 
a network of feelings and thoughts for ourselves and others that make it part of our 
lived social world. Along with this, Modell concludes that “psychoanalysis is 
fundamentally intersubjective.” (1997, p. 44). The post-modern development is also 
recognisable in Heidegger’s notion of Dasein and Mitsein, of ‘being-in-the-world’ with 
Others (1993). Therefore one could argue that although our inner life is subjective to 
ourselves, it also entails a public character; it was evoked by dynamics external to our 
psyche. Consequently, subjectivity shifts with context (Schulte, 2000) and the meaning 
of our behaviour is only interpretable within that context.  
Stern (1985) and Crossley (1995), for example, explain that the ‘intersubjective 
capacity’, the capacity to experience one’s self with Other is a primary, innate 
psychological need through which security and attachment needs can themselves be 
met. Consequently, intersubjective capacity requires a shared framework of meanings 
and allows the recognition that an experience can overlap with that of another person. 
In agreement with the above, Coelho and Figueiredo (2003) stress the need to 
recognise Otherness as one of the elements that constitute singular subjectivity and 
acknowledge this psychoanalytical notion as being in direct contrast to the ‘I’ as self-
constituent unit and the classical subject-object opposition of modern thought. 
As mentioned earlier, intersubjectivity helps me to understand the importance of the 
relationship between the subjects of my study and me. By recognising that research 
subjects can contribute as much value to data collection as can I, I allow for inclusion 
of their own interpretations and my ability to alter my understanding of the research 
environment according to the insight they give me. 
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Going native. The increasing consideration of intersubjectivity in social science research 
has had great implications on the objective-subjective debate of whether the 
researcher should avoid or strive towards ‘going native’.  
Advocates of the modernist school of thought have traditionally warned that 
involvement is a threat to objectivity, as the research gets contaminated by 
subjectivity. In the same line of thought Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) alert the 
researcher of not ‘succumbing to affect’; Wax (1971) in yet other words, stresses the 
importance of avoiding ‘becoming the phenomenon’. McCall and Simmons (1969) add 
accounts whereby participant observation was accused of observer bias, personal 
equations and ‘hearsay’ without rigour.  
Promoted predominantly by the Chicago School, the ‘pioneer’ of sociological 
anthropology, the researcher was encouraged to maintain a separation towards the 
observed so as to not endanger the objectivity of the scientific enterprise. Pollner and 
Emerson explicitly state that “the very notion of a science is possible only to the extent 
that these distinctions (between the observer and the observed) can be sustained” 
(1983, p. 251). Along with that, irrational feelings failed to become subjected to 
analysis. Later, symbolic interactionists acknowledged the affective role of the 
researcher, such as his/her own anxieties, confusion or loneliness, but still regarded 
these as a hindrance to unbiased data (Hunt, 1989).  
By assuming ‘neutrality’ the researcher is expected to report from an Archimedean 
standpoint of objectivity in order to preserve the validity of findings. However, this 
position does not exist but denies the very essence of being human, namely, to be 
influenced and constructed by feelings and emotions. The approach taken in this study 
is directly concerned with the interrelationship of the researcher and the researched 
and what impact the quality of this relationship can have on the entire research 
process. It is more fruitful for my own research intentions to acknowledge that the 
researcher is always within discourse and unable to escape it. There is no neutral 
ground outside it which would enable a so called meta-analysis (Fleetwood, 2005), no 
‘view from nowhere’, no ‘God’s eye view’ (Reichenbach, 1959). 
Post-modernist advocates have argued that the fantasy of an ‘objective’ stance denies 
the very fruitful source of the researcher’s own emotions as primary data. Kreb (1999) 
for example introduces the term ‘edgewalker’ to describe those researchers who have 
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significant lived experiences with different communities through which they develop 
solid cross-cultural competence while maintaining a healthy understanding of self.  
Hence, a method that brings the researcher closer to gaining insight into and from the 
perspective of the subjects, to see with their eyes, to feel from their point of view, to 
understand their line of thoughts, was sought after when deciding on an appropriate 
method for my primary data gathering. The task of interpreting that world can only be 
achieved through participation with those involved (Manis and Meltzer, 1967) and only 
if the language that is used to communicate its meaning is understood (Hall, 1976). 
Accordingly, during my research, I endeavoured to immerse myself as closely to the 
subjects’ way of life as possible. In case study one, this was easy as I am reporting 
from my own memoires. In case study two, I had to probe my interpretations of data 
on frequent occasions with the subjects, and in case study three, I strived to imitate a 
nuns’ daily life as best as I could. 
Principles of reflexivity. Having made the distinction between opinions on the 
usefulness of going native along the extremes of objectivity and subjectivity, I will align 
my position on research reflexivity within the same argument. Haynes defines 
reflexivity as  
“an awareness of the researcher’s role in the practice of research and the way 
this is influenced by the object of the research, enabling the researcher to 
acknowledge the way in which he or she affects both the research processes 
and outcomes.” (2012, p. 72).  
In agreement, Weick states that reflexivity can serve to deepen critical thinking as it 
becomes itself an additional ‘data platform’: “it is about seeing oneself in the data.” 
(2002, p. 894). 
Johnson and Duberley’s (2003) differentiation between three types of reflexivity is 
useful to make my own stance clear. Methodological reflexivity, so they state, is 
understood as a research tool that helps the management researcher to sustain 
objective inquiry (Mulkay, 1992) and to retain social and intellectual distance 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). Such attitude towards reflexivity would promote the 
earlier discussed objectivist belief that ‘going native’ is to be avoided. Hyper-reflexivity, 
on the other hand, results in a potentially endless spiral of introspective reflexive 
iterations, thereby lacking discursive closure. The repudiation of any separation of 
subject and object (Chia, 1995; Kilduff and Mehra, 1997), which is characteristic for 
this perspective on reflexivity, brings along with it the transfer of authorship and 
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control of the research away from the researcher to the researched. A complete 
immersion with the researched and the striving to ‘going native’ are promoted.  
Lastly, Johnson and Duberley (2003) introduce the term epistemic reflexivity, which I 
believe to be the closest stance to my own. Here, the major challenge remains that of 
achieving democratic co-operation between researchers and researched; however, no 
matter how much the researcher engages those being researched in writing up, his/her 
status as author is maintained, thereby engaging into a  ‘hermeneutic relationship with 
reality’ (2003, p. 1289). 
Reflexivity and autoethnography. Especially the data collection method of memoirs, 
reflections on my own feelings and reactions during fieldwork, as well as principles of 
countertransference and intersubjectivity remind strongly of the focus on self 
advocated by autoethnography, and as Humphreys points out, “the use of vignettes is 
explicitly (self-)reflexive.” (2005, p. 852).  
Along with that, my research approach does indeed contain elements of 
autoethnography, but does not adopt a sufficiently strong emphasis on introspection to 
be classed as one. Such introspection would be achieved by Johnson and Duberley’s 
above portrayed hyper-reflexivity (2003), which, in Lynch’s words, runs the danger of 
turning into a process of reflections ‘ad infinitum’, symbolised in his argument by “a 
hall of mirrors” (2000, p. 28) due to the iteration of recursive pattern (Collins and 
Yearley, 1992). Emphasising the disadvantage of such a radically introspective 
approach to reflexivity, Weick adds that the focus would be on me as researcher rather 
than on the objects under investigation, whereby “(a)ttention to self-as-theorist can 
become a drag on theory development, when that attention becomes an end in itself.” 
(2002, p. 893). Likewise, Lynch expresses the same critique in a yet stronger metaphor 
by stating that “reflexivity is (in this case) likened to a demonic machine that, once set 
in motion, devours everything in its path and then turns on itself.” (2000, p. 46).  
Further, autoethnographic reflexivity has often been criticised for assuming that by 
being reflexive, superior insight, the minimisation of bias, and consequently an 
approximation to ‘truth’ can be achieved (Lynch, 2000, May, 2000). In disagreement 
with this notion, I have presented my own researcher bias by clearly articulating in the 
introductory chapter the influence of my life experience and patterns of thinking prior 
to commencing this research on the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, which was 
predominantly based on negative experiences of group life. I argue that if one takes 
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bias out of the equation – which is of course never possible – one is left not with truth, 
but with nothing. 
3.5.2. Real Proof? Transparency, Validity and Other Concerns 
A lot of discussion around the concepts of validity, reliability and generalisability has 
been provoked by the urge to fit their positivistic definitions into a relativist social 
science (Ellis and Bochner, 2000). Lincoln and Guba (1985), for example, have tried to 
solve this problem of incompatibility of ontological presuppositions by introducing new 
alternative terms, such as trustworthiness, credibility, dependability and confirmability. 
In 1993, Lather contributed to the pool of concepts with ironic, paralogical, rhizomatic 
and voluptuous validity. Overlooking these discussions, Kvale (2002) stresses that a 
critical attitude towards knowledge claims is indeed a necessity of scientific research 
practice. However, when such a critique is extended to a sceptical level where it 
dominates research discourse, the quest for validity may prove self-defeating. Rather 
than questioning the research throughout, he recommends approaching the research 
process in such a way as to guarantee transparency of data gathering and 
interpretation procedures.  I have tried to incorporate this principle throughout this 
research by disclosing my own preconceptions of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality 
created by my rather negative past experiences of group membership. Additionally, I 
will present as much of the primary data as possible as well as creating a narrative that 
leads from preliminary reflections on that primary data through to theoretical 
conceptualisations inspired by it. 
In line with the ‘emotional turn’ in social science research (Clarke and Hoggett, 2009; 
Kets de Vries, 1995) the benchmark against which to measure validity has been 
challenged, namely objective reality. Validity, from this perspective, is not an absolute 
but relative concept, understood and adhered to in relation to the scientific paradigm 
that informs the research agenda. So, for example, Ellis and Bochner hold that for 
gaining validity, the told story needs to have verisimilitude and evoke “in the readers a 
feeling that the experience described is life-like, believable, and possible.” (2000, p. 
751). 
In addition to the demand for a new interpretation and application of validity, Bochner 
(2001) argues that reliability is anchored through a narrative that is interconnected 
with life and Denzin and Lincoln (2011) add that reliability need to reflect honesty and 
truthfulness. Likewise, Ellis and Bochner suggest that generalisability is tested by 
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Figure 7: Personal Research Philosophy (adapted from Johnson & Duberley, 2000) 
readers as they determine if the narrative ‘speaks’ to them about their experience or 
about the lives of others they know. Lastly, Stake (2005) adds that such 
generalisations carry a sense of empathetic understanding from one social world to 
another, providing a representative experience for the reader.  
McCall and Simmons (1969) on the other hand, understand ethnography as a method 
that is indeed suitable for generating new empirical generalisations. For instance, 
Suttles’ participant observation of a slum (1968) resulted in general theories of 
community behaviour. Irwin’s prison study (1970) led to a universal critique of 
contemporary prisons. Likewise, Goffman’s hospital enquiry (1961) gave birth to his 
renowned theory of ‘total institutions’.  
Postulating a more general perspective, Martin (1980) declares that the quality of a 
study is dependent on how well the researcher ‘gets on’ with the informants. Similarly, 
Tsai (in progress) introduces the term ‘relationality’ as a means to verify ethnographic 
findings and presents it as a measure of being connected to one’s informants in 
dialogue and affect. It is this kind of ‘relational validity’ that I strive to achieve. 
3.5.3. My Own View on Reality 
My research design and chosen research methods clearly fall within the paradigm of 
social constructionism (figure 7). 
 
 
Redacted due to copyright
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In order to communicate my own private views on the nature of reality and knowledge 
in more detail, I will differentiate between radical social constructionism and moderate 
social constructionism (Elder-Vass, 2012). Smith (2010) elaborates on a similar division 
and uses the terminology strong and weak social constructionism. The radical/strong 
classifications deny completely the existence of any objective reality (Gergen, 2001), 
and claims that everything that exists in the world does so depending on the way we 
think about it. Moderate/weak social constructionism, on the other hand, is more 
compatible with a realist understanding of the social world (see for example 
Nightingale and Cromby 1999; Sayer, 2000) and distinguishes between elements of the 
world which are dependent on our thinking about them, and others, which are not. 
Therefore, moderate social constructionists, to which I align myself, believe that any of 
the former elements can be socially constructed, any of the latter, however, cannot. 
My research interest in the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality makes up such a socially 
constructed element. 
I believe that the meaning of our social world is indeed the result of a human 
construct, for it is human beings who make sense of it, each individually, and 
subjectively, and sense-making can be a synonym of sense-giving. Hence, I hold the 
opinion that it is individuals’ realities, and the underlying, often unconscious reasons 
for how they were derived that are much more ‘sense-full’ and worth investigating than 
trying to ‘prove’ that a reality is objectively valid by testing its generalisability and 
universalism. This is to say that while I am convinced such objective external reality 
does exist, it will only ever be perceivable to us as human beings through the social 
construction of our own knowledge (Girod-Séville and Perret, 2001) – unfortunately, 
there is no more ‘direct route’ to it: “…the social world is already interpreted before the 
social scientist arrives.” (Blaikie, 2007, p. 36) 
Within this perspective, Girod-Séville and Perret (2001) further explicate that the social 
world is fabricated as people within it interact with each other, which brings along the 
importance of emphasis on shared meaning and intersubjectivity in research that I 
have discussed in detail: “Society is indeed built up by activity that expresses 
subjective meaning.” (Berger and Luckman, 1966, p. 18). Drawing the same 
conclusions and further supporting my research design, Weick (1995) urges that the 
intensive examination of a smaller number of cases is preferable to the selective 
examination of a larger number. 
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3.6. Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis is the process of systematically searching, arranging and 
making sense of the data (Creswell, 2002). By doing so, it became evident to me very 
quickly that it is not a distinct phase from data collection but is a simultaneous and 
continuous process (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). Miles and Huberman (1994) note 
that the act of capturing data may shape what is said and in turn influence how it is 
analysed, and following the same line of thought Richardson adds that “writing is not 
just a mopping-up activity at the end of a research project’ but ‘a way of ‘knowing’ - a 
method of discovery and analysis.” (1990, p. 516). In agreement with this notion, 
Chang points out that moving on from data collection with the aim of gaining a 
meaningful structure out of a “messy pile of fragmented bits” (2008, p. 126) is a 
difficult endeavour and requires a comprehensive approach. He also advocates that the 
commencement of data analysis and interpretation does not necessarily bring along 
the abandonment of data collection; rather, this is likely to continue when the author 
tries to fill gaps and enrich certain accounts.  
 
While the analysis of interviews of this research clearly followed after these were 
transcribed, the texts I constructed during memoire writing, observations and 
participant observation are themselves a mixture of descriptions of experiences on the 
one hand, and interpretations and analytic attempts of these on the other hand. 
Consequently, as also supported by many sources (see for example Emerson, Fretz 
and Shaw, 2001; Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Schatzmann and Strauss, 1973) data 
gathering and analysis are not separated, and neither is their representation in this 
thesis. Chang picks up on an important characteristic of this kind of approach: I as 
author of this research am simultaneously data generator, collector and interpreter. 
Consequently, the fieldwork is not left behind with a concluded narrative that can then 
be analysed using techniques such as narrative analysis. As Denzin and Lincoln 
explain: “The processes of analysis, evaluation, and interpretation are neither terminal 
nor mechanical. They are always emergent, unpredictable, and unfinished.” (1994, p. 
479). 
Van Maanen (2011) adds to this that the ethnographer’s task is to ‘recontextualise’ the 
gathered data, thereby presenting and analysing it at the same time. And even while 
still in the field, deciding on what and what not to record is a process already saturated 
with interpretation (Atkinson, 1992). Furthermore, Chang elicits that data analysis and 
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interpretation itself cannot be distinctively divided but remind more of the act of ‘gear 
shifting’ within an underlying, joint process. While analysis urges the researcher to stay 
close to the data and work with it, interpretation shifts focus to finding meaning 
beyond data (Creswell, 2002). Chang clarifies that 
 “(w)hen you classify and connect fragmented data according to themes […] you 
are still doing data analysis […]. When you search for connections between 
your data and sociocultural contexts, you have moved on to data 
interpretation.” (2008, p. 129). 
 
3.6.1. Strategies for Data Analysis 
After conclusion of the fieldwork I was faced with the task of constructing a storyline 
through the data, sufficiently rigour to replace mess (Marcus, 1994) with structure. 
However, I sought to achieve this whilst retaining the richness of my experience 
through the very same effort of constructing its authentic representation, without 
which the reader would not be able to “come away with a sense of what it must have 
felt like.” (Ellis and Bochner, 1992, p. 80).  
Determining an appropriate strategy for data analysis was consequently difficult as 
many theoretical approaches and their definitions, as well as distinctions among them 
are not commonly agreed on and often overlap in practice (Jupp, 2006). Saunders et 
al. (2009) for example, present three different approaches that contain elements 
consistent with the approach to data analysis taken in this research study:  
1. Grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 2008),  
2. Template analysis (King, 2004), 
3. Analytic induction (Yin, 2003). 
These three approaches are similar to the extent that they emphasise the 
condensation, grouping and ordering of meaning (Saunders et al., 2009). Their main 
difference lies in the degree of flexibility in their set procedure. Grounded theory, for 
example, is suitable for this research as it supports the generation of theory around a 
core theme. However, its systematic, inflexible procedure as outlined by Strauss and 
Corbin (2008) means that any deviation from it makes the results questionable. 
Template analysis is in comparison more flexible, as amendments to categories and the 
hierarchy of sub-categories is welcomed throughout data analysis (King, 2004) and has 
happened so also in this research (appendix 3). However, it assumes that there 
actually exist higher and lower order categories, restricting the possibility of 
recognising a reciprocally balanced relationship between these. Lastly, analytic 
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induction also assumes a less defined explanation of a phenomena (Yin, 2003) and 
intends, through purposefully selected cases, like in this research project, to explore 
these more. The danger of this approach is, however, to assume in general that other 
cases with the same conditions would lead to the same phenomena. 
Jupp (2006) offers a summative definition of these approaches under the term 
‘thematic analysis’. Other sources also refer to this as content analysis, although the 
latter was originally thought to be a purely quantitative method (Czarniawska, 2004). 
Accordingly, templates, or themes, denote a list of codes and categories that represent 
themes as they are revealed from the data, as well as the relationship between them. 
This method allows for a flexible approach to data analysis in the frame of 
interpretivism and induction; without assuming less analytic rigour (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996).  
Additionally, such procedure allows for a combination of induction and deduction, 
whereby the researcher has clear theoretical concepts in mind but remains open to the 
possibility that these might change. As evident in the literature review, I started the 
research with a more deductive preference, convinced that the need for enemies is 
indeed innate to human nature. It will become clear that unexpected findings have 
forced me to expose such assumptions to further, more inductive scrutiny based on 
primary observations and experiences. 
3.6.2. Chang’s Analysis and Interpretation Strategy  
After sighting of the above broad approaches to data analysis, I have chosen to 
approximate my strategy to Chang’s (2008) ten suggested steps, as his framework 
offers me a rigorous and more detailed approach to analysis. The ten steps also 
present a suitable mixture of inductive and deductive approaches, with the earlier ones 
oriented closer towards analysis and the later ones more targeted at interpretation: 
(1) Search for Recurring Topics – categorical labelling of frequent patterns 
(2) Look for Cultural Themes – identification of overarching themes 
These two steps were conducted together during the initial reading and re-reading of 
the primary data (Maxwell, 2005). I thereby kept memos of my impressions of salient 
patterns so as to code and organise my data as suggested by Chang (appendix 3). 
Eventually this led me to derive at key themes as units of further analysis. 
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(3) Identify Exceptional Occurrences – Discovering of new perspectives 
The interviewee’s use of metaphors in case study one, as well as my experiencing of 
conflict within the convent community of case study three are examples of such 
exceptional occurrences that incited me to put into question my own preconceptions 
about the phenomena under investigation. 
(4) Analyse Inclusion and Omission – questioning the absence of data 
Especially during the fieldwork for case study three I had to eventually admit that the 
reason for why I could not witness the group dynamics I was expecting to find was 
due to my inflexible understanding about the nature of the meaning of ‘group’ itself. 
(5) Connect the Present with the Past – Establishing a connection to past data 
I omitted this step. 
(6) Analyse Relationships Between Self and Others – Considering the 
interconnectivity 
This step is of importance for my approach as I have gained significant insight into the 
phenomenon under investigation due to reflection on my relationship to the subject 
groups of all three case studies. Likewise, the applied principles of Verstehen and 
intersubjectivity introduced earlier lend themselves to this step. 
(7) Compare Cases – Identification of differences and similarities 
The insights gained from all three case studies are considered together in the summary 
chapter. However, such a comparison did not take place consciously and explicitly 
during data analysis. 
(8) Contextualise Broadly – Interpretation of events within their environment 
Although I did not focus on this step in great detail during the data chapters, I did 
consider the different environments of all three case studies in the summary chapter. 
(9) Compare with social Science Constructs – Concepts to explain social 
phenomena 
(10) Frame with Theories – Establishing the theoretical framework 
These last two steps were conducted together, whereby Bion’s concept of 
groupishness offered a starting point into applicable literature, and contributions from, 
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above all, Turquet (1975, 1985) provided the main theoretical framework for this 
research. As a consequence, my theoretical understanding was mainly advanced by the 
primary data gained from case study three. However, through the establishment of this 
framework, I was then able to ‘take a second look’ at case studies one and two so as 
to gain a deeper understanding of the case materials through application of the new 
framework (see Chapter eight).  
I chose this method for the following reasons. First of all, in agreement with Chang 
(2008), I do not perceive my primary data as a finished or completed text that is 
separated from me, which I can then return to and analyse ‘from the outside’, such as 
would be the case in forms of narrative analysis that concentrate more on the ‘how’ 
than on the ‘what’ (for example a structural or somatic analysis). Rather, the reading 
of my own writing catapults me back into the field, may that be FutureCo, The Fun 
Trust or the convent, for which reason the analysis does not only grow out of the 
recorded primary data, but also out of my memories evoked by their sighting. Along 
with this line of thought, I see thematic analysis as a means to present to the reader 
the case material as it develops from its gathering, through its presentation, to its 
analysis; an approach Emerson, Fretz and Shaw refer to as ‘integrative strategy’ 
(2001). 
A thematic analysis is also useful for theorising across a number of cases (Jupp, 2006), 
such as is subject to this research project. While I do not intend to make cross-
references between the three case studies before chapter eight, this type of analysis 
will enable me to compare themes in the data gathered through different research 
methods within each case study, such as for example participant observations, 
interviews, the SPM sessions and secondary data. Therefore, I believe thematic 
analysis also to be consistent with the chosen multi-method approach of the research 
design.  
Limitations. The most dominant drawback of thematic analysis, formulated by Rorty 
(1991), is the assumption that language is an unambiguous route to meaning, and 
hence the function of representation is not challenged. In this research I address this 
issue to an extent by an awareness of ambiguity and through rigour in seeking 
transparency of my own words to myself. As explained earlier, I am not able to 
separate myself from my writing so as to analyse what hidden meaning I as author 
might have placed behind the choice of my words – this is not within the frame of the 
objectives of this research. 
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I want to avoid the impression that concentrating on the content of the narrative, 
rather than ‘how’ it is told means I am trying to represent the ‘truth’ in my fieldwork. I 
have stated in the introduction that this research is influenced by my life story, 
therefore avoiding the "It-is-true-because-I-was-there” attitude of naïve realism 
(Czarniawska, 1998), while simultaneously emphasising that it is my truth, however 
subjective or biased it may be. This stance enables me to take the written word as 
meaning and neglect its representational function, because I have written it. As 
Emmerson et al. state: “fieldnotes are selective, purposed, angled, voiced, because 
they are authored.” (2001, p. 106). Along with this, Johnson and Duberley’s (2003) 
epistemic reflexivity applied during data gathering is maintained as well throughout the 
analysis. 
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Chapter 4 : Case Study 1 Data Presentation & Preliminary Analysis 
‘Clericals’ versus ‘Industrials’ at FutureCo 
To my own astonishment, constructing and working through my memories as well as 
conducting the interview with an Industrial (a term I apply to refer to factory workers, 
one of ‘Them’), led me to insights into the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality at FutureCo that 
I had not considered before, despite my former three-year employment with the 
company. As an addition to my memoires, the interview enabled me to piece together 
a more balanced and detailed image of the dynamic that includes accounts from the 
Other’s perspective. 
The analysis will be presented in two parts. This chapter will depict accounts of two 
individuals; me on the one hand as representative of the ‘Clericals’ (a term I apply to 
refer to office workers, one of ‘Us’), and the Interviewee on the other hand as 
representative of the Industrials. My memoires will be shared in full, as this will help 
ground the reader in my experience. Extracts from the interview (appendix 4 shows 
the full transcript) with the Industrial will be added in order to support the deduction of 
the following five key themes:  
4.2. Features of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality that are readily observable, 
4.3. Task-related and physical divisions between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, 
4.4. The role of the trade union in creating and driving the split, as well as  
4.5. Management’s involvement in it.  
In a summative manner, the consequences of the dynamic will be discussed with 
regards to the severity of the animosity caused, the unconscious conforming of both 
parties (‘Us’ and ‘Them’) to it and the resulting distortion in perception of self and 
Other (section 4.6.). 
In the later chapter (“A second look at Case Study 2”), I will revisit the data at hand by 
applying a newly constructed theoretical framework. I have chosen to structure this 
research in this way, as that framework resulted directly out of the working through 
the primary data of case study three; I was therefore not knowledgeable about it at 
this stage.  
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4.1. Memoires from FutureCo – Retracing ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ 1 
‘Us versus Them’ thinking was a permanent companion of every-day life at FutureCo 2 
and of how it used to ‘feel’ working there. I can recollect plenty of concrete examples 3 
where this becomes apparent, and would like to share them here as individual 4 
memoires. 5 
 6 
Memoire 1: Lunch time in the canteen 7 
Five past twelve. I open the big double doors, and step into one of the six huge dining 8 
halls that can easily seat 300 people each. Immediately, I am greeted by a cool draft. 9 
The path runs along the middle of it, lengthwise, to meet another fire door marking the 10 
opposite end, the second entrance. Tunnel vision. The food counters are located in the 11 
centre of this hall, half way down the walkway - runway. I continue to enter, hectic as 12 
usual, picturing the huge pile of paper work awaiting me on my desk. I brace myself 13 
for choosing a dish, queuing to pay for it, finding a seat, eating and returning back to 14 
my office, all within 40 minutes (it takes five minutes to get back). Trying to breathe 15 
calmly and relax. My high heels are clicking on the concrete fast paced and determined 16 
while my gaze stares straight ahead.  17 
Despite my stubborn focus (I might be frowning), I cannot help but be distracted by 18 
the dynamics of the location, only a couple of seconds and metres into the hall. 19 
Something is tearing at my steady straight walk. To my left, I have approximately five 20 
long table rows full of (mainly) men, all dressed in the predominantly grey with bits of 21 
blue factory floor health and safety uniforms (overalls and jacket, fire proof) – like a 22 
bunch of soldiers. Some of them have newspapers resting next to their plate or are 23 
reading them – literally all the same, the ‘Bild’2, but certainly most of them are staring 24 
right at me, not necessarily into my face, and not necessarily with a smile. The way 25 
they are sitting is rather chauvinistic, portentous; certainly making me feel even more 26 
edgy, or at least uncomfortable. 27 
To my right, more people. The first few table rows empty – buffer zone -, and then, a 28 
safe distance from the Industrials, the Clericals are sitting down, many of whom I 29 
know, even if only superficially; more scattered around than the large groupings of the 30 
Industrials. No loud laughing, much more contained body language. Not only 31 
newspapers, predominantly the ‘Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung’3, but all kinds of 32 
paper work. Some with laptops, some writing, some discussing one-to-one what seems 33 
to be a business matter. There are many more women on this side. All are 34 
sophisticatedly dressed, in suits, just like me. They also seem to talk more, much more 35 
conversations going on here compared to over there among the Industrials. I certainly 36 
feel much less noticed here, at least I do not ‘feel’ any X-rays scanning me. I do not 37 
feel out of place in this part of my walk for food. Somehow I feel I belong here. Even 38 
before I get my food on a tray, I have made up my mind about where I am going to sit 39 
to consume it in a friendly environment. 40 
                                                          
2 Equivalent to ‘the Sun’ 
3 Equivalent to ‘the Times’ 
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Memoire 2: Sharing lunch with one of ‘Them’ 41 
Clericals sit on the same table row as Industrials extremely rarely, and if so, then only 42 
on either ends of the row, creating a ‘safe’ distance of a good few metres. It seems to 43 
be a very important task to do so. I am not aware of this decision but rather do so 44 
automatically, guided by some other decision-maker. The divided atmosphere in the 45 
hall is so great, I do not really have a choice – it is not a question of choice in the first 46 
place. However, there was one specific occasion when I did make a conscious choice:  47 
Coincidently, I have known one of the Industrials privately for more than 10 years; we 48 
went to school together. While I am doing an on-the-job training in the ‘office world’ of 49 
FutureCo, he is an apprentice, learning to become an electro-technician and hence 50 
wearing the factory uniform. Last weekend we made plans to meet up in the canteen, 51 
so I come looking for him. I wave at him when I spot him (is this appropriate?) and go 52 
to get my food, clicking on the concrete and all. As I return carrying my tray, aiming 53 
my movements towards my friend, I feel something really unusual, unsettling. I feel as 54 
though I am breaking some kind of rule the moment I put my tray on the table and 55 
pull the chair out – directly opposite my friend and only a few meters away from the 56 
rest of his group. We are sitting in the buffer zone, in ‘no man’s land’. It feels as 57 
though I have ‘upset the apple cart’, and as a response, the whole canteen stops 58 
talking, stops chewing, stops reading, stops breathing, and turns its frowning face at 59 
me, eyes squinted, mouths wide open in a state of horrified disbelief. 60 
 61 
Memoire 3: Food for all 62 
During primary data collection for my bachelor dissertation, I had the opportunity to 63 
‘swap sides’ and become one of ‘Them’ during eight weeks of participant observation in 64 
the production lines. 65 
For heaven’s sake, lunch break, finally. I am so bored, I actually feel depressed, numb, 66 
dumb. And damn hungry, I have been hearing my stomach rumbling for the past hour. 67 
I’m tired. Exhausted, my body is heavy. I just need some food in me. Me and my 68 
group stroll around the corner, the food shop is only a minute’s walk away. Thank 69 
goodness for that, 40 minutes are not enough to go all the way to the big canteen, 70 
queue, stuff your face, and rush back. There would not be a minute left to have a rest. 71 
I’m queuing. Four people in front of me. What am I going to have, I am wondering. I 72 
have a look along the counter, the choice is the same everyday: Fries, Frankfurter 73 
sausages, meatballs in a bun, boiled eggs, fried eggs. Very hearty dishes. Plastic 74 
bottles of ketchup and mustard on the side. A basket with bananas and apples next to 75 
the till.  76 
There are not many people around, nobody is talking really. In the background the 77 
even humming of the machinery, interrupted by an even rhythm of deep thumps, 78 
noticeable through your feet and into the hips – the press. Not much lighting, not 79 
much room, so everyone carries their food back to the group’s break room. Despite a 80 
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huge cleaning gang, dirt assembles into a place polluted by industrial repetitive noise 81 
and smell, with little day light and the domination of inhuman robotics.  82 
It’s my turn. I order a boiled egg and a sausage in a bun, pay – oh, surprisingly cheap, 83 
and squirt some mustard onto the bun. Then I carry my cardboard plate back to the 84 
group’s break room where I will try to collate some of the strength I have left over for 85 
the rest of the late shift. No one is talking. It’s 7:45pm. Another two hours. Next week 86 
is worse, night shift from 10pm - 6am before early shift again 6am-2pm the week 87 
after. I feel lethargic, got nothing to say. 88 
Portraying a typical lunch break in my usual job looks quiet different: 89 
It’s past 2pm, and I haven’t had lunch yet. I ask my colleagues if anyone is up for a 90 
bite to eat, two join me. We pace down to the canteen and get there about five 91 
minutes later, haven’t got much time though. I think to myself, well, if I am few 92 
minutes late it doesn’t really matter; at the end of the day I very often don’t take my 93 
lunch break at all, and I have long lost track of my overtime. It’s kind of an unwritten 94 
rule, and you know you are expected to work as long as it takes to get the project 95 
done. I am investigating the meal offers. A selection of sophisticated world food and 96 
delicatessen; Indian cuisine, Mexican cuisine, Thai... as well as a salad bar. It is quiet 97 
dear, but definitely worth it; I have to watch my weight. 98 
We chose a table by the great windows; day light is streaming in. Ambient music 99 
playing in the background. Time to relax with some good food. I needed that, who 100 
knows what time I will leave the office tonight. Markus starts asking me advice on his 101 
current project. 102 
 103 
Memoire 4: A trip downstairs 104 
It’s an average stressful day in the office. This morning we had an enquiry from a 105 
journalist who is interested in interviewing one of the foreman concerning leadership 106 
skills. Clearly a case for public relations. I volunteer to take care of this enquiry and my 107 
boss asks me to ‘go down and check out that foreman, make sure he’s clever enough 108 
to be ‘let loose’ on the journalist without telling stories we don’t want anyone to hear’. 109 
I grab my boss’ car keys and off I am, down the three flights of stairs – have to keep 110 
fit somehow.  111 
I do need to go by car, as it would take approximately half an hour to walk from one 112 
end of the rectangular factory floor to the other. There is a clear divide between the 113 
manufacturing halls (the factory floor) and the administrative and executive offices 114 
which run alongside the front length of the rectangle on three storeys. I believe I know 115 
where the cabin I am looking for is located, so I am driving on the main road alongside 116 
the factory and the office buildings. Right in the middle of that length, on the third 117 
level, are the offices of the executive team, surrounded by the supporting staff units, 118 
where I have just come down the stairs from. As a member of the public relations 119 
team, my office is located here, too, in the ‘brain’ of the factory, which is also referred 120 
to as “the White House”, equipped with prestigious furniture, luxurious and 121 
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Figure 8: Photograph of the FutureCo compound 
minimalistic meeting rooms. The smell of fresh coffee throughout. And apart from the 122 
occasional door opening and closing, followed by some concrete clicking, absolute 123 
silence (figure 8). 124 
 
 
Sector five, it must be here somewhere. I park the car and walk back into the building, 125 
crossing the staircase hallway that leads to the administrative offices. At the end of the 126 
corridor is a large and heavy fire door, which separates the office environment from 127 
the factory floor. ‘Swussshhhh’ – as soon as I step a foot beyond that door, I nearly 128 
get run over by a fork lifter – noise, smell, heat. It feels as though I have just entered 129 
a city within the factory complex. Bicycles, fork lifts, brand new cars and little 130 
transportation vehicles – some manoeuvred remotely, are all driving back and forth in 131 
an order that looks more like an ant’s nest to me. It’s hard to believe we are on the 132 
first floor of inside a building. 133 
Some of the Industrials are on foot, wearing the usual health and safety uniforms. 134 
Crossing my path directly. I look at them shortly, but as soon as our gazes cross, I look 135 
away again, and so do they. We don’t greet each other. I never greet an Industrial, 136 
just stare right ahead of me or look to the side, depending on where they are – it’s a 137 
bit awkward because I’m trying to make it look as though my gaze naturally falls away 138 
from them -, and they do the same to me. When I come across another Clerical 139 
though, I am quite happy to smile at them or even make sure there is appropriate eye 140 
contact to exchange greetings. I feel it has to be that way, it would be rude if I didn’t 141 
greet one of ‘Us’. 142 
Offices running alongside the entire 
front of the production halls 
The White House 
Production halls 
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Memoire 5: Twisted perceptions 143 
When working on the shop floor in the frame of participant observation for my 144 
Bachelor dissertation (the Industrials did not know about my previous ‘Clerical history’ 145 
with FutureCo) they shared one of their favourite jokes with me.  146 
We are having our lunch break in the group room, and a Clerical passes by outside the 147 
window front, staring straight ahead and not paying us any attention. One of the 148 
female Industrials of our group suddenly declares, giggling: “Look, there is another 149 
clone warrior, did he get lost down here or what?!?”. When she sees my questioning 150 
face – I obviously don’t understand the parallels between a Clerical and a clone 151 
warrior, she continues: “Well, they all look the same, don’t they – tie, black shoes and 152 
always carrying a briefcase. And as soon as one is shot down, he gets replaced by 153 
another one, you see.”  154 
I don’t believe my own ears. I smile, continue to chew on my meat ball sandwich and 155 
hide my perplexity. For me, it is exactly the other way around - for me it is the 156 
Industrials who look alike, given that they are required by company policy to wear 157 
identical uniforms, including safety shoes, occasionally gloves, and even the T-shirt 158 
underneath. And they also behave alike with their ‘Bild’ newspapers and loud-mouthed 159 
attitude. The only difference between them is the cleanliness of each overall and the 160 
different degrees to which the colours have been washed out. 161 
I ask another female colleague about the new group work programme, resulting in her 162 
face turning into stone and her talking through her teeth: “they (the management) 163 
have no idea about our (the Industrials’) job and what we actually do everyday down 164 
here. They don’t really care about us. They just sit up there in their offices and make 165 
decisions and clap themselves on the shoulder for how great they are, although what 166 
they do is not really that great for us at all. But they wouldn’t know that, would they. 167 
It’s not that they come down here and check, do they. Ah, forget it.” 168 
 169 
Memoire 6: Confronting ‘each Other’ 170 
My boss, one of the spokesmen of the organisation has asked me earlier today to 171 
accompany him to an important meeting with some other heads of departments. Now 172 
we are driving in his car on the factory premises, trying to find the building in which 173 
we are supposed to meet and which is detached from the main factory. Of course, 174 
after a few minutes, we get lost. It is a bit like a maze down here. Even after years of 175 
employment, my boss only knows about half the factory. 176 
We enter an area that, as we learn in the aftermath, is used to store crashed cars of 177 
prototype testing and is hence highly secretive. We soon notice it leads to a dead end, 178 
and as we are turning the car around, an Industrial approaches us fast paced and 179 
rudely demands to see our staff identity cards. Immediately I feel insulted and 180 
simultaneously surprised by his demand, although I should know it is perfectly 181 
genuine. Never before had an Industrial questioned my authority. I look over to my 182 
boss and notice his raised eyebrows. He raises his voice also at the man in front of us, 183 
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letting him know with gravity that he (The Industrial) certainly is not in a position to 184 
ask him (my boss) for his ID card, and ‘who would he think he is’. The Industrial looks 185 
stunned, maybe unsure of how to react; maybe a bit gutted. He tries to explain that 186 
this is a restricted area and nobody without special permission is allowed to enter, but 187 
my boss counters immediately. He knows the rules perfectly well, he shouts; after all, 188 
he is one of them who put them into place. The Industrial does not apologise, but 189 
remains standing in his spot, still startled, staring after us, as my boss continues to 190 
bring the car around and accelerates away. 191 
 192 
Memoire 7: Trade Unionism 193 
In Germany, trade union representation is not organised around profession, but 194 
depends on the industry sector the employing company is in. Therefore, 98% of all 195 
14,000 FutureCo staff are organised through the same representative body, Industrials 196 
as well as Clericals. Exempt are those members of Clericals whose salary has exceeded 197 
the negotiated pay scale between management and trade union. Every three months, 198 
the factory is put on hold for four hours, and it is officially required for all members of 199 
staff, whether member of the trade union or not, to attend these so-called ‘general 200 
assemblies’. Anybody who wishes to speak can register to do so; however, the bulk of 201 
the time is taken up by the report of the chief executive, followed by a speech of the 202 
elected head of trade union. 203 
I am sitting in the vast production hall. The ceilings are tremendously high, a cold and 204 
fierce draft is sneaking through the legs of all seated. I feel small. Intimidated. Rows 205 
and rows and rows of chairs. How many thousands are sitting here, I wonder. Behind 206 
me, at the very back of the space, some huge transportation containers. I can see a 207 
train wagon parked next to it. Of course, transport has been stopped for the general 208 
assembly, and I wonder how long it took them to get all those containers out of the 209 
way and clear the space; we are in the middle of the train loading area, the chairs 210 
partly crossing rail tracks. I learnt about all this in training, didn’t I – lean 211 
management. I don’t know what’s so lean about storing that many containers in here 212 
though. 213 
I always sit towards the front. But not the very front, I don’t feel yet entitled to, in a 214 
way. After all, I‘m not that high up in the hierarchy yet. But I know for sure I will be 215 
one day. The fist row is reserved for the executive board, but I can see them very 216 
clearly from where I sit. Admiration interweaves my gaze. Next to the stage is the 217 
massive screen, I guess people in the back want to see the speakers’ faces, too. 218 
People in the back. I know who is sitting there even before turning around. The 219 
Industrials, as always, and they don’t really need a screen as they are more interested 220 
in today’s ‘page three girl’. They are reading, chatting or simply sleeping; just rude. 221 
The chief executive is on the podium on stage. He really is such a nice person, but 222 
giving speeches is not one of his strengths. He concentrates on the performance of the 223 
factory in numbers and statistics, followed by strategic implications for the future; his 224 
monotonous voice is so boring that even I struggle staying attentive. The atmosphere 225 
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is dull. I’m sure most of us know about the organisation’s performance anyway. At 226 
least the ones in the first few rows. 227 
Next, after a ten minute interval it’s time for the head of trade union’s show. As he 228 
climbs up the steps to the stage, a roar of applause is released from the back rows. I 229 
remember my first general assembly; I was so surprised by this that I turned around 230 
hastily to see what on earth was going on. Now that I am used to it, I exchange 231 
glances with my colleagues and we roll our eyes, waiting for the show to be over. I’ve 232 
got a pile of work waiting for me at my desk. 233 
As usual, the head of the trade union endeavours to elaborately portray the board of 234 
executives and the management in general as some sort of evil, cold-blooded and 235 
greedy enemy whose only interest is their own welfare at the cost of the workers – 236 
apparently all of us - who do ‘the real work’. He frequently supports his arguments 237 
with examples of pay rise struggles, where unacceptable suggestions from 238 
management were haggled upwards by the trade union with great effort of negotiation 239 
and threats of strike. His message is clear: If it wasn’t for him and the trade union, we 240 
would all be lost. During his speech he gets louder and louder, addresses the chief 241 
executive directly by name with accusations and demands and involves more and more 242 
facial and bodily gesturing. Finally, with his index finger raised in the air, he makes 243 
some kind of climaxing demand with great skills of rhetoric and then zips at his glass of 244 
water. 245 
Behind me, I can hear a gigantic wave of roaring, applauding, feet-stamping, clapping 246 
and whistling flooding the room, in its wake releasing the built up tension of the 247 
speech. Again, we do not pay much attention to this explosion, but I remember the 248 
intimidation that creeped up in me on my first participation in these assemblies. 249 
Now, however, all I can do is roll my eyes once more and push out a sigh; for I work 250 
in the public relations department, which is also responsible for internal 251 
communications, and hence I know better. ‘It’s all fake, calm down!’ I want to exclaim. 252 
The chief executive and the head of trade union exchange their speeches weeks in 253 
advance of each assembly, so as to prepare counterarguments. No change will be 254 
made to the speeches thereafter without the consensus of the other party; and it was 255 
my department’s responsibility to make sure the chief executive won’t experience any 256 
surprises. 257 
Regardless of my background knowledge of the situation in front of me, it feels like a 258 
great stand-up between two arch-enemies sharing a long history of conflict. The head 259 
of the trade union confronts the chief executive as though he is a profit-seeking 260 
monster and the trade union the hero that leads the suffering manpower out of Egypt. 261 
I am of course also a member of the trade union – I was basically hassled into it after 262 
three visits of a trade union representative within my first month of working for 263 
FutureCo, advising me that it could have bad consequences for my career if I didn’t 264 
sign – but for some reason it feels less to me like being in Egypt, and more like being 265 
in a ‘good-enough’ Israel already. 266 
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The head of trade union typically starts a new argument with ‘My dear Comrades’, 267 
expressing great unity with all ‘his’ members. Generally, it is policy within the trade 268 
union to address each other with ‘Du’, instead of ‘Sie’, which is the informal use of 269 
‘you’ in the German language. Non-members of the trade union are addressed with the 270 
usual ‘Sie’. Most of us don’t care, we still say ‘Sie’ to him. 271 
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4.2. Artefacts of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Setting the Scene 
The primary data brings to the fore strong visible clues making ‘Us’ immediately 
distinguishable from ‘Them’. Differences in dress code stand out the most. While the 
Clericals are not officially obliged to adhere to one, formal clothing such as suits seems 
to be the standard expectation (1-35). The Industrials, on the other hand, are bound 
by strict health and safety regulations to wear fireproof factory clothing (1-22). The 
interviewee’s comments emphasise that clothing serves as an important identifier for 
‘Us’ and ‘Them’:  
“… a foreman comes through the production line and you hear: ‘There comes a 
white frock, there comes a blue frock’. Whites are the ones from R&D, and 
Blues are the foremen…” (2-31).  
“If we would do this thing like some schools in other countries, where they all 
dress the same, then it would be very different. Because then you wouldn’t 
know right from the beginning who is an Industrial and who is a Clerical…” (2-
27).  
Likewise, Industrials have given Clericals the nickname ‘Clone warriors’, as “they all 
look the same – tie, black shoes and always carrying a briefcase…” (1-152). Clothing 
seems to serve as an identifier of who is ‘Us’ and who is ‘Them’, and determines who 
Clericals and Industrials interact with each other. So the interviewee shares: “So when 
I go up there without my overalls, then they approach me completely different. All of a 
sudden they know how to greet!” (2-81). 
Additionally, artefacts such as different newspapers, with the Industrials commonly 
reading the ‘Bild’ (1-24), and the Clericals mainly reading the ‘Hannoversche 
Allgemeine Zeitung’ (1-32), as well as gender inequality (1-21, 1-34), and food choices 
(1-71,1-93) are clear demarcations of the boundary between who is ‘Us’ and who is 
‘Them’. These examples indicate that Clericals and Industrials are immediately 
recognisable to each other, as differences between the two groups are salient. 
Simultaneously, similarities among Clericals as well as among Industrials respectively, 
are elevated.  
The literature review has discussed how the salience of different characteristics of ‘Us’ 
and ‘Them’ groups, as well as similarities within each group can provoke intergroup 
bias, whereby similarities within the ingroup are emphasised and differences towards 
the outgroup exaggerated (see for example Capozza and Brown, 2000). In case of 
FutureCo it can be assumed that the visible differences in artefacts further enforced 
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the tendency towards intergroup bias. It is this permeating presence of the division 
into my entire FutureCo experience that I want to shed further light on. 
 
4.3. Task-Related and Physical Divisions between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
The distance between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ is often perceived through signs of spacial 
separation, which could be interpreted as a further artefact. The manufacturing hall is 
separated from the office buildings and is where  
“… dirt assembles into a place polluted by industrial repetitive noise and smell, 
with little day light and the domination of inhuman robotics…” (1-81),  
as opposed to the office environment that is 
“…equipped with prestigious furniture, luxurious and minimalistic meeting 
rooms. The smell of fresh coffee throughout. And apart from the occasional 
door opening and closing, followed by some concrete clicking, absolute 
silence…” (1-121). 
The divide between these two places of work is clearly described in my memoires and 
only partly task-related. While it is plausible that all manufacturing- heavy production 
line work has to be spaced together for reasons of lean management and other 
practicalities, there is no such reasoning for why all administrative and managerial 
buildings are grouped together the way they are, a great distance from the production 
halls. Additionally, the division of the nature of the task, on the one hand, manually 
building the product, and on the other hand, administering and managing that process, 
involves employing and training staff in different professions. Hence, the Industrials 
are predominantly skilled in manual professions, such as mechanics or electricians or 
are unskilled labourers. The Clericals have absolved one of two possible clerical 
trainings or hold a university degree.  
Based on his own research, Bercovitch (1983) points out that structure itself can 
trigger intergroup conflict between different task units, especially when, as is the case 
at FutureCo, physical and communicational barriers are high. Following a similar line of 
thought, Daum (2002) contributes with his own findings of a case in which a shortage 
of interaction between staff from two health care teams characterised a hostile 
relationship to each other. With a task-division as strict as at FutureCo, he describes a 
strong split between community-based service practitioners and hospital-based 
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practitioners. I find while the division of staff according to their task is plausible, this 
alone does not explain or justify in any way the hostility witnessed between them. 
More importantly it is to point out here that this physical separation contributes to a 
‘separation-in-the-mind’, of which a consequence could be the reinforcement of 
intergroup bias, or in other words, ingroup and outgroup stereotyping (Turner et al., 
1987). This becomes evident in the following extract: “…At the end of the corridor is a 
large and heavy fire door, which separates the office environment from the factory 
floor…” (1-126). I can still picture these fire doors right now, and crossing them 
invoked in me the same feeling as when I was looking across the mine field guarded 
by soldiers and watch towers that separated the East and the West of Germany. I am 
mentioning a similar borderland by the use of the words “buffer zone” and “no man’s 
land” (1-57). 
Additionally, the interviewee chose to emphasise the divide between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
with the help of metaphorical expressions: “…there was this total wall between the 
Industrials and the Clericals! It was as though one would break a taboo if one sat 
down with them…” (2-9); “...Here, two worlds crash into each other…” (2-72). This 
links in with the everyday use of language describing space in relation to ‘Us’ and 
‘Them’. The words ‘up there’ or ‘down there’ are repeated several times (1-112, 153, 
174, 176, 184; 2-46, 51, 80, 87). 
One might speculate whether group pressures to conform cause Clericals and 
Industrials alike to adhere to these divisions and reinforce them through such 
conforming behaviour. As the interviewee and I portray, both parties are voluntarily 
choosing to maintain the distance between each other: “…And then you don’t want to 
behave different from everyone else, so you stick to your own squad…” (2-18; see also 
1-28 and 2-24). I will discuss the issue of conformity in more depth shortly. 
 
4.4. Trade Unionism: ‘Us’ together against ‘Them’ 
After illustrating some examples of the manifestations of the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality at FutureCo, I will now focus on possible drivers behind it. The trade union 
seems to play a significant role in the creation of the divide, or is at least fuelling its 
maintenance. First of all, I will outline what kind of division the trade union is driving. 
As my memoire states, the trade union’s mission is to represent the interests of all 
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employees of the organisation whose salary does not exceed the negotiated pay scale 
with management. This means that the majority of the man power (98%), consisting 
of both Clericals and Industrials, is indeed registered with the trade union (In 
Germany, trade union membership depends on the industry of the employer 
organisation, not the profession of employees).  
However, the following examples suggest that the Clericals do not ‘buy into’ the trade 
union’s strategy; when reading them it has to be remembered that I perceive my own 
impressions and reactions to be representative of the Clericals’ at large:  
“…the head of the trade union endeavours to elaborately portray the board of 
executives and the management in general as some sort of evil, cold-blooded 
and greedy enemy whose only interest is their own welfare on the cost of the 
workers – apparently all of us - who do ‘the real work’…” (1-234),  
“…His message is clear: If it wasn’t for him and the work committee, we would 
all be lost…” (1-240),  
“…Now that I am used to it, I exchange glances with my colleagues and we roll 
our eyes, waiting for the show to be over…” (1-231).  
My observations of the Industrials though, portrays a more supportive response to the 
trade union leader’s speech:  
“…Behind me, I can hear a gigantic wave of roaring, applauding, feet-stamping, 
clapping and whistling flooding the room, in its wake releasing the built up 
tension of the speech…” (1-246). 
Reasons for the strong support for the trade union among the Industrials and lack of it 
among the Clericals might reside in the perceived difference in career opportunities. 
For Clericals, career paths are following a transparent and linear path towards the top 
of the hierarchy (1-214), whereas Industrials seem to perceive a ‘glass ceiling’ effect: 
“…And all the “ATler”4, they are all Clerical. You can’t become an ATler as an 
Industrial. For the Clericals, they have more open-ended opportunities towards 
the top. In order to step up, you need to wear a suit…” (2-112).  
This extract points out the Industrials’ perception that they have to become one of ‘Us’, 
or, from their perspective, one of ‘Them’ – to ally with the enemy – in order to 
progress within the company. 
                                                          
4 AT: abbreviation for ‘Auβer-tariflich’; “out of tariff” meaning those who earn so much that they 
are off the scale which has been negotiated by the trade union. 
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Along with that, the head of trade union strengthens the bonds to those parts of the 
workforce whose support he already has; those who feel unfairly treated by the system 
– the Industrials. In his speeches he constructs management as a threat, and with 
great rhetorical skills, such as the use of the word ‘Du’ to address his followers (which 
in German is usually strictly reserved for family and close friends), he creates an 
atmosphere of camaraderie against a common enemy – the management:  
“…it feels like a great stand-up between two arch-enemies sharing a long 
history of conflict. The head of the trade union confronts the Chief Executive as 
though he is a profit-seeking monster and the trade union the hero that leads 
the suffering manpower out of Egypt…”  (1-258). 
I am reporting from the actions of the trade union still in my role a one of ‘Us’, a 
Clerical. When composing my memoires, I was drawn back into my time of 
employment with FutureCo, and my past opposition towards the trade union was 
evoked anew. In order to offer a balanced discussion of possible drivers of the ‘Us 
versus Them’ mentality, I will consider the role of management as counterpart to the 
trade union in the following section. 
 
4.5. Management’s Unwritten Rules: Invisible Control 
Considering management, a sub-group of ‘Us’, as a possible diver of or contributor to 
the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality required me to view the case material in a new light. I 
experienced greater difficulties constructing this part of the argument, as despite 
suspecting that there is some deeper meaning behind ‘Our’ and ‘Their’ conforming 
behaviour, I could not quite ‘put my finger on’ what that was. When writing and 
reading my own memoires and comparing them with the Interviewee’s response, I 
kept asking myself “Who told ‘Us’ not to talk to ‘Them’?” (1-136). “How did ‘We’ know 
to keep some distance between where ‘They’ sit and where ‘We’ sit?” (1-42). “Where 
did this agreement on some sort of unwritten rules come from?” The interviewee 
shared this perplexity when stating: “But they are normal codes of conduct there. No 
idea where they come from, it’s like Loch Ness- no one’s ever seen it, but everyone 
believes in it…”  (2-90). 
I started my memoire with an indication of how deeply embedded the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality had become at FutureCo:“…‘Us’ and ‘Them’ thinking was a permanent 
companion of every-day life at FutureCo and of how it used to ‘feel’ working here…” 
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(1-2). That this conforming behaviour is somewhat unconscious but yet persuasive 
becomes apparent in the following extract:  
“…I am not aware of this decision but rather do so automatically, guided by 
some other decision-maker. The divided atmosphere in the hall is so great, I do 
not really have a choice – it is not a question of choice in the first place...” (1-
44).  
Even when not conforming to these unwritten rules, the awareness of ‘doing wrong’ 
transpires: when sitting down for lunch with my friend, an Industrial,  
“…I feel something really unusual, unsettling. I feel as though I am breaking 
some kind of rule the moment I put my tray on the table and pull the chair out 
– directly opposite my friend and only a few meters away from the rest of his 
group. It feels as though I have ‘upset the apple cart’, and as a response, the 
whole canteen stops talking, stops chewing, stops reading, stops reading and 
turns its frowning face at me, eyes squinted, mouths wide open in a state of 
horrified disbelief…” (1-54).  
The interviewee confirms the same feeling of discomfort: 
“…it was as though one would break a taboo if one sat down with the 
Clericals…” (2-10).  
It transpires that these ‘unwritten rules’ reinforce the division between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
and that the adherence to these rules is vital: “…once I was on a training course in the 
IT department, and there we learnt together with the Clericals. But we were not even 
allowed to take off our overalls!...” (2-14). Here, the concept of positive and negative 
identity (see for example Berman et al., 2000; Erlich, 2001; Ostroff, 2000; Robbins and 
Krueger, 2005; Roberts, 1983), which was explained in the literature review helps to 
clarify this irrational behaviour. Given that the Industrials in this incident were on an 
all-day IT training course in the office building, no rationally justifiable reason existed 
to be forced to remain in health and safety uniform, especially given that the Clericals 
participating in this training were dressed ‘normally’. This might suggest an investment 
of effort into preserving clear self-boundaries that span the ingroup. To maintain the 
clear visual distinction that clothing guaranteed between Industrials and Clericals can 
be understood through Winnicott’s notion of the duality of ‘Me’ (Us) and ‘not Me’ (not 
Us) for the concept of self: “We end where they begin” (Stein, 1987, p. 109). 
At this point, the theoretical concepts of unconscious assumptions help to understand 
why I was not able to explain the reasoning behind my own behaviour. Schein (2010) 
states that our basic underlying assumptions gradually come to be treated as an 
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unquestioned reality. Because of their taken for granted nature and, for this case study 
especially important, because of their being shared between all members of the same 
‘social unit’ (in this case Clericals or Industrials), opportunities for reality testing 
become unlikely. “Basic assumptions (…) tend to be nonconfrontable and 
nondebatable, and hence are extremely difficult to change.” (Schein, 2010, p. 28). 
Morgan (2006) adds that due to the lack of questioning of underlying assumptions, 
humans get trapped in shared constructions of reality that give them a skewed grasp 
on their environment. 
While offering a suggestion for why neither the interviewee nor I could explain our 
own behaviour, the discussion so far is still to make clear who caused these 
behavioural patterns in the first place. Freud explicates that the super-ego holds the 
role of censor or judge of our behaviour through the internalisation of figures of 
authority (1986). It is possible that management has been internalised, making the 
following of its rules unconscious; it looks like an automated behaviour. The separation 
of the work force into opposing ‘camps’, however, is not in the interests of 
management. As described in the introductory chapter, ‘Us versus Them’ thinking can 
melt the ‘glue’ that supposedly holds an organisation together (Parker, 2000), leading 
to a distortion of the overall organisational goal, as it is replaced by a drive to oppose 
whatever the goal of the Other is. I therefore propose that not only the learning of 
unwritten rules by the manpower, but also the creation of them by management is 
driven unconsciously. 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1929-35, cited by Alvesson and Deetz, 2005), or 
cultural hegemony, as Connell (1976) calls it, supports this argument. Hegemony can 
be defined as a “web of conceptual and material arrangements producing the very 
fabric of everyday life.” (Alvesson and Deetz, 2005, p. 77), which links to Schein’s 
notion of reality construction (2010). In conjunction with the psychoanalytic theory of 
unconscious dynamics, the concept of hegemony helps indeed to further understand 
what went on at FutureCo. Angus (1992), for example, states that the activity of 
hegemony is based on both, dominant and dominated parties to produce some sort of 
consent – a process which is unconscious in its nature. Clegg adds that “paradoxically, 
(individuals) know not to want to act (….)” (1989, p. 29). But since the spreading of 
hegemony also involves the dominated party’s compliance, many authors (see for 
example, Burawoy 1985, Deetz, 1995 and 1998, Willmott, 1993) emphasise that 
employees initiate their own subordination and therefore support the dominant system, 
80 
 
despite this being against their own interest. Lukes comes to a similar conclusion when 
he states that “perceptions, cognitions, and preferences (are shaped) in such a way 
that (people) accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can 
see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they view it as natural and 
unchangeable…” (1974, p. 24). These processes are, in my view, motivated 
unconsciously. 
Clegg and Hardy (1999) further add that such hegemonic tendencies can even be 
embedded in the historically grown organisational structure itself, according to which 
hegemony could be interpreted as being responsible for the strict structural divisions 
kept between Industrials and Clericals. Whilst the explanation I gave in my memoires, 
namely, that the machine cycles determine the work patterns of the factory, sounded 
realistic at the time, I am now wondering if it was not the unconscious anxieties of 
management of losing control over organisational processes that provoked this 
hegemonic structure. After all, Clegg, Kornberger and Pitsis (2005) identify hegemony 
as a form of ‘soft domination’. This notion could also explain my perception of not 
having a choice of where to sit in the canteen. In his elite model of the relationship 
between power and structure, Clegg tellingly formulates that  
“Free to choose they may be, but what they can choose from is already chosen: 
Not specifically by anyone but by default…” (1989, p. 29).  
One point of disagreement that I have with Clegg here is that he believes this 
restriction and domination of choice to be a conscious decision of the dominant group 
– in this case management, whereas argue for the unconscious nature of such 
dynamics supported by a psychoanalytic perspective. 
 
4.6. Consequences on the Relationship between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
4.6.1. The Distorted Perception of Self and Other 
Part of the alteration of perception of reality that hegemony evokes is the distortion of 
how Clericals and Industrials alike perceive themselves as a group and the other 
group. The interviewee’s responses insinuate on a number of occasions his feeling 
inferior to the Clericals. His comparison of the relationship between Industrials and 
Clericals to that between the Chinese and the Americans during the time of railway 
construction emphasises this: 
81 
 
“… Like in America, where all the Chinese were let down in baskets into the 
tunnels, and if the people on top didn’t pull fast enough, then those down there 
exploded along with the bombs…” (2-79).  
Along with this, he does not only classify his own profession as ‘lower’, or as being of 
less value than that of the Clericals – he does this again when stating “…It is where 
dirty meets clean…” (2-78) - but also expresses the sense of being surrendered to the 
mercy of the Clericals with no other option than to comply.   
It seems as though the interviewee’s self-esteem has been lowered as a consequence 
of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, too. So he reported with astonishment about his 
exceptional treatment by a Clerical and shows great appreciation for it: “…that was 
quite something, if someone in a suit shakes your hand (…) I thought that was 
awesome…” (2-88). This gives the impression that he did not see himself worthy of a 
Clerical’s handshake while simultaneously placing so much importance on the fact that 
his hands were dirty (2-95). I am sure that the interviewee would not have shown the 
same degree of astonishment and gratitude had he met an individual in a suit outside 
of the FutureCo environment who wanted to shake his hand. In fact, as a friend I can 
confirm that he is a very confident person with high self-esteem outside the company. 
In line with his self-perception of inferiority comes the idealisation of the Clericals: 
“…Oh look, he is wearing a tie, he made it…” (2-110). No further thought is given for 
the actual hierarchical positioning of a Clerical within the wider organisation – he or 
she has made it, simply by adapting the outer appearance of a Clerical. I wore a suit 
from the very beginning of my employment at FutureCo. I was clearly a Clerical; 
however, at the beginning of my career, I was predominantly occupied with making 
photocopies and adjusting my coffee making skills to the preferences of my superiors. 
How this fits into the general perception of the Industrials that ‘I had made it’ I do not 
know, and I certainly earned far less than the average Industrial. But according to the 
data at hand, I was still treated as ‘something better’ by the Industrials, for no other 
reason but being a Clerical. 
The distortion of perception of self and Other is also denoted in the case material from 
the side of the Clericals. My line manager’s and my feeling insulted when requested by 
an Industrial to show our staff cards makes that clear, especially given the fact that the 
Industrial acted according to official rules:  
“…Immediately I feel insulted (…) by his demand (…). Never before had an 
Industrial questioned my authority. I look over to my boss and notice his raised 
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eyebrows. He also raises his voice at the man in front of us, letting him know 
with gravity that he (the Industrial) certainly is not in a position to ask him (my 
boss) for his ID card, and ‘who would he think he is’…” (1-180). 
Furthermore, my thoughts written down during the general assembly show a certain 
tendency to devalue Industrials: 
“…People in the back. I know who is sitting there even before turning around. 
The Industrials, as always, and they don’t really need a screen as they are 
more interested in today’s ‘page three girl’. They are reading, chatting or simply 
sleeping; just rude…”  (1-219).  
As illustrated in the literature review, Riketta and Sacramento (2008) conclude that 
images of ‘the Other side’ tend to emphasise, exaggerate and even create negative 
traits, and therefore ‘dehumanise’ the opponent, which might explain my tendency to 
devalue the Other which in this case is embodied by the Industrials as the outgroup. 
In fact, the described hegemony seemed to distort reality perception of Industrials and 
Clericals so successfully, that it even overrode my friendship with the interviewee. 
Thinking back of the lunch we had together (1-48), I did feel reluctant to sit with my 
friend, and it cost me some determination to overcome the described feeling of 
awkwardness. I suddenly felt superior to him because I wore a suit whereas he had to 
wear overalls. The question is here whether we were ‘taken out’ of our roles as friends 
and ‘put into’ the roles of representing the collective ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ respectively? I will 
come back to a deeper analysis of this kind of ‘group mind’ in the chapter “A second 
look at case study 1”.  
Reflecting on why I had difficulties in composing this section provides further insight 
into the gravity of hegemony’s effectiveness: until commencement of this data 
analysis, I was firmly convinced of the trade union being the source of the division. 
Despite having parted from FutureCo more than eight years ago, it still took my 
supervisor three meetings to persuade me to at least consider the possibility that 
management – one of ‘Us’ - could have contributed to the situation. My reluctance to 
regard management to be possibly ‘at fault’ can be interpreted as a result out of my 
still being influenced by this hegemony, with my perception of ‘how things really were’ 
still heavily determined by my being part of ‘Us’. Being able to acknowledge 
management’s role in the creation and upholding of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, 
proved to be a real epiphany. It felt as though my thoughts had been untied, but little 
did I know that they were tied down in the first place. I will come back to this self-
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reflection in the chapter ‘A second look’ in association with the new theoretical 
framework from case study three. 
4.6.2. ‘Us versus Them’: Animosity 
I want to finish this chapter outlining the striking animosity between Clericals and 
Industrials permeating daily work at FutureCo as a consequence of the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality. An Industrial made this clear:  
“…they have no idea about our job and what we actually do everyday down 
here. They don’t really care about us. They just sit up there in their offices and 
make decisions and clap themselves on the shoulder for how great they are, 
although what they do is not really that great for us at all. But they wouldn’t 
know that, would they. It’s not that they come down here and check, do they. 
Ah, forget it…” (1-163).  
The interviewee accounts of incidents that suggest hostility between Clericals and 
Industrials:  
“…you also hear things like “Hey, he is cheating” (…) if you do get a job up 
there, or you are asked ‘what do you want up there?’ That is the general 
perception…” (2-46).  
Cheating is a severe accusation of breaking a trust relationship, being disloyal and 
unfaithful. It inflicts in the ‘cheater’ the feeling of having let the ingroup down like a 
traitor. It also might lead to a sense of confused identity. Having learnt to hate the 
enemy, one is now being forced to become one of the enemy. Likewise, the humorous 
nicknames for Clericals such as “Schlipstraeger” (2-109) are derogative in nature. 
Such traces of hostility, it has to be pointed out, were not only identifiable from sides 
of the Industrials, but also from sides of the Clericals. For instance, I describe in my 
memoires my unwillingness to greet any of ‘Them’ (1-136). The exchange my line 
manager and I had with an Industrial foreman shows these dynamics, as our over-
reaction is somewhat hostile, too. Unfortunately, such strong antipathy against each 
other created a distance so great between Industrials and Clericals that the two sides 
rarely met. This remoteness comes to the fore when considering, for example, the use 
of the word ‘alien’ to describe a Clerical sighted along the productions lines (2-24), and 
more strikingly, the interviewee’s astonishment about the ‘normality’ of interaction 
possible when encountering a Clerical: 
 “The surprising thing is, if they talk to us, I experienced that myself – you can 
talk with them completely normally…” (2-80). 
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One question that I have formed while working through this data analysis is whether 
these enemy creations are based on a ‘real’ reason, something rationally justifiable, or 
whether they are constructions of myths that have ‘real’ consequences solely because 
people believe them to be ‘real’. With regards to the case study at hand, I ask myself, 
“what were the ‘real’ differences between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, such as for example, the 
divided nature of the organisation’s task of manual labour on the one hand, and 
clerical work, on the other hand?” “Were these enough to justify enemy-thinking, or 
was this mentality enforced by intrapsychic processes of splitting and projection?” I will 
come back to this reflection on myth and reality constructions in groups in the 
discussion chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Case Study 2 Data Presentation & Preliminary Analysis 
Collaboration or Competition between the ‘Fun Trust’ & the ‘Play Trust’? 
While case study one investigated the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality within an 
organisation, case study two enquires into the dynamic between two organisations. 
The interviews, SPM session and observations have revealed a diversity of factors that 
could have evoked a tendency towards ‘Us versus Them’ thinking. Following the same 
structure as case study one, this chapter will present the eight most salient themes in 
detail, before the newly constructed theoretical framework of case study three will be 
applied in the chapter “A second look at case study two”. 
In order to bring to the fore the interconnectedness of the identified themes, they will 
be presented within three ‘umbrella-topics’:  
5.1. The relationship between the Fun Trust and the Play Trust,  
5.2. Risk taking, and  
5.3. Internal traces of ‘Us versus Them’.  
The summary (section 5.4.) will draw together the main characteristics of the ‘Us 
versus Them’ mentality in this case study. Along with this composition, the mentality 
will be scrutinised on two levels: as a relationship between the two organisations on 
the one hand and as an internal dynamic within either of them on the other hand. 
 
5.1. The Relationship between the Fun Trust and the Play Trust 
Researching the organisations showed that on a few occasions, members of staff 
already had had the opportunity to work together on family visits. Additionally, the 
chief executives of both charities know each other through their roles as Trustees for 
another organisation. Apart from that, no further communication has taken place 
between the charities. The majority of interview respondents reveal concern with 
regards to a possible collaboration. Staff comments from both organisations are, for 
example:  
“I can’t see how it would all work organisationally (and) I don’t think the 
current structure is stable enough to make such a change.” (J3 169),  
“I have seen organisations who get too big for their own boots.” (J5 76), and  
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“I think there will be lots of funds spent for developing externally where there is 
a lot of need internally.” (R3 43).  
Furthermore, it transpired that while both organisations emphasise awareness of 
possible risks and difficulties that collaborating with each other entails, the Fun Trust 
indicates a more suspicious and sceptic stance towards the project than the Play Trust:  
“…So do we have two fundraising teams? What about job security?...” (J7 133),  
“…are we going to have a Fun Trust left at the end?...” (J3 183), and  
“…Who is protecting the Fun Trust that we have?...” (J7 142). 
This difference in attitude is understandable in so far as the Fun Trust takes a bigger 
risk if the collaboration plans are put into practice. As suggested in the presentation of 
the research design, only one regional team of the Play Trust, which is a nationally 
established charity, would be affected, whereas the Fun Trust, being only a small local 
charity, would invest its entire workforce into the project. If the collaboration is 
unsuccessful, this would have a grave impact on the Fun Trust’s financial resources, 
while the Play Trust has the possibility to fall back onto subsidiaries from other regions. 
Remarks from Fun Trust workers denoting an aversion to the other charity include  
“…I don’t want the quality of our service to be diluted.” (J4 65), and  
“The Play Trust stretching too thinly is a worry.” (J2 118).  
These quotes indicate a mistrust in the other charity’s capabilities which could be 
interpreted as a group projection of their own worry of not being able to deliver. Gould 
(1999) reports from his own consultancy project similar to the dynamics at hand, in 
which members of one organisation frequently made their concerns about the other 
organisation’s ability to take on such a big project heard.  Additionally, it was 
conspicuous that staff of the Play Trust felt the need to point out how professional 
they are on numerous occasions. Given that these comments were made with the 
possible collaboration in mind, they seemed somewhat defensive to me.  Such attitude 
was not mirrored by the Play Trust:  
“… We struggled and worked hard to show that we are not just a baby-sitting 
service, but professional. That still is in the memories of the care team, the 
organisation, and we have worked very very hard to come away from that 
reputation, to become professionally acknowledged…” (J1 146).  
In general, it can be observed that the Fun Trust perceives the prospect of a 
collaboration as more threatening due to higher risk it poses for them, resulting in a 
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more anxious and suspicious attitude. In a case study similarly occupied with an 
imminent collaboration, Roberts (1994) points out that the smaller organisation felt 
more vulnerable to being exploited by the larger organisation. Likewise, Terry and 
O’Brien 2001) have conducted research which shows that ‘high-status’ professionals, in 
this case the Fun Trust’s nurses, displayed more biased intergroup perceptions than did 
the ‘lower-status’ professionals, in this case the Play Trust’s social workers. In this case 
study, high-status can be understood as being derived from the fact that nurses have 
more specific medical training than social workers, and in particular reference to the 
home visits during which the two charities would collaborate, this means that nurses 
are allowed to conduct medical procedures on the children, while the social workers 
are not. Such perception of superiority and inferiority is a common problem of the 
health care sector in general. Egan and Kadushin (1995) for example, report about 
ongoing sceptical perception of nurses and social workers towards each other that 
create a relationship of competitiveness where there is sought to be alliance. Robins 
and Post (1997) describe suspicion as the hallmark of paranoia, and while calling the 
Fun Trust paranoid would be an exaggeration, the possibility of a tendency towards it 
will be kept in mind throughout this data analysis. The argument will now continue into 
a more detailed reflection on risk factors that provoke this suspicion. 
 
5.2. Risk Taking – Factors Both Organisations Face 
5.2.1. Scarcity of Resources 
Given the fierce climate for not-for-profit organisations in general, both charities are 
experiencing an economically pressing period and face a struggle for survival on a daily 
basis. All interview respondents indicate worries about financial resources and future 
uncertainty, and expose a working atmosphere of felt threat and elevated anxiety. 
Referring back to Robins and Post (1997), they argue that scarcity of resources can 
increase paranoia tendencies such as suspicion and scepticism. This is intensified by 
the fact that recently, the Fun Trust had to undergo a redundancy and the Play Trust 
had to close one of its facilities:  
"The atmosphere is not great at the moment. (…) We had a redundancy of a 
post last year and also financial pressures (...). Nobody knows what is going to 
happen – are there going to be more redundancies, etc…” (J3 119, 123, 127),  
“…And especially this year is very critical, there are concerns and nervousness, 
as we are under budget…” (J7 72),  
Redacted 
due to 
copyright
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“…The voluntary sector is much more ‘dog eat dog’, we are forced to prove 
why we are the best…” (R1 111), and  
“…The respite houses closed last year, there was a lot of frustration…” (R3 41)  
are representative extracts. 
5.2.2. Threatened Sense of Identity 
One of the most striking insights gained from the fieldwork was the great emphasis on 
pride each respondent places on their organisation and their role within it. A true sense 
of solidarity, commitment and devotion towards the organisational mission and 
personal attachment to its success transpires:  
“…I value working for the charity, I feel very proud […] It is an honour to be 
part of the Fun Trust and support the staff…” (J6 110, 162), 
“…Good nurses are artists. It is an art to provide good care…” (J6 54), 
“…I think we are a very good organisation. We give very high quality support to 
families, and I am very proud of that…” (R1 58), and  
“…we do the right thing…” (R2 33).  
Other contributions stress that the staff of the Fun Trust is still very attached to the 
organisation’s history and has a personal share in the ‘fight’ through some struggles of 
earlier years, since many members have been with the organisation since its inception 
(J1 4, J3 8, J5 22).  
Along with that, employees have developed astonishingly strong passion for their 
respective organisation with their own personal values clearly matching those of the 
organisation. In order to bring across the strength of this relationship, I am including 
several quotes from both charities here:  
“…the passion that people bring to the service and really genuinely care about 
the quality of service…” (J1 51), 
“… there is an extremely close match between my personal values and the 
organisational values…” (J1 54), 
“…My beliefs are the Fun Trust’s beliefs…” (J6 147), 
“… I am passionate about the job, and I have a belief in the cause…” (J7 44), 
“…There is a drive behind everybody to help the families…” (R3 21) and  
“…I was looking for something that I really believe in…” (R4 16). 
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The above comments show how strongly the organisational purpose is intertwined with 
the individuals’ identity, as they are identifying with what they do and therefore have a 
specially personal investment in the success of their respective organisation. It follows 
that a further risk factor causing scepticism towards collaborating is the simultaneous 
threat it poses to individuals’ well established sense of identity with regards to an 
unknown future. After conducting research into a collaborative project of three 
organisations, Gould (1999) concluded that the re-positioning of organisational 
boundaries, such as is necessary in prospect of a new collaboration, gives rise to the 
threatening possibility of losing the familiar, and along with that, one’s identity; a 
notion which will be analysed in more detail in chapter seven. 
The literature review explains how through introjection of the group of belonging, 
which in this case is either the Fun Trust or the Play Trust as a large group, self-
boundaries can extend so as to include that group of belonging (Otten and 
Mummendey, 1998). The motivation to protect one’s self concept then also includes 
the preservation of the group of belonging, or, to continue the terminology set out in 
the literature review, the ingroup (Robbins and Krueger, 2005). 
Integrating this line of thought with the previously identified suspicion of the Fun Trust 
towards the Play Trust, the discussion can now make use of intergroup bias theory 
(Perdue et al., 1990). Throughout the literature review it has become evident that as 
well as a need for distinction, there is also the tendency to view one’s own group of 
belonging in a more positive way and the ‘Other group’ in a more negative light (see 
for example Robins and Post, 1997). This often leads to a distortion of reality in so far 
as it provokes intergroup bias. Social identity theory makes this point, too, by 
emphasizing the “nearly automatic tendency to discriminate against people who can be 
regarded as belonging to outgroups.” (Capozza and Brown, 2000: 85). Hence, the Fun 
Trust’s negative perception of the Play Trust could have been provoked by the need for 
positive self-preservation of the ingroup; members of staff were clearly questioning the 
professionalism of the Play Trust. 
Additionally, a big part of the described pride is based on the assumption of 
uniqueness of the organisation and their contribution to society: “…one of the core 
values is that the Fun Trust is unique…” (J7 59), and “…we (the Play Trust) are almost 
unique…” (R1 60). The two charities have so similar mission and vision statements that 
their uniqueness is in question, and the prospect of losing this status might also be one 
of the causes of scepticism towards the collaboration. 
90 
 
5.2.3. Jeopardising Group Cohesion as Container 
Interview responses and my own observations of team meetings as well as the SPM 
session have alluded that strong group cohesion within both organisations serves as an 
informal coping mechanism for the emotionally difficult primary task. It can even be 
argued that the mutual support members of staff provide for each other is more 
effective than are the formal processes put in place, such as weekly supervision 
meetings with a clinical psychologist, as respondents explain. Assertions such as the 
following make this point clear: 
“…there is a lot of mutual care and support, people recognise if someone is 
having a rough time…” (J2 81), 
“… I feel like we have a heart, a centre, the support for each other…” (J6 171), 
 “…We often have stepped up to the mark and have become supporters for 
each other…” (J7 85), and  
“…We have got very open networking within the team. When they see a family 
which is a bit intense, they call each other…” (R2 60). 
It is suggested that the family visits, during which service delivery is taking place, are 
psychologically stressful: “…It is a very emotional place to work given the nature of the 
work…” (J2 100). Both organisations make use of war metaphors, further expressing 
the emotional strain of the task: “…as they had front line contact at the beginning…” 
(J1 7), and “…we are up for the fight, to go out there…” (R8 10) are examples. In 
addition, practitioners expressed that they often feel isolated with these emotional 
experiences during home visits: “…We are a team; but because of the nature of the 
work, we are out there on our own…” (J8 73). One can argue that the working through 
these difficult emotions happens once the ‘front line’ has been left behind, when 
practitioners come together again in the back office and can take ‘refuge’ in the safety 
of the group. Along with that, the group offers a dense support network and a holding 
environment that is, I assume, vital for the retention of the high service quality, 
without which the success of the organisations cannot be achieved.  
In her famous case study of a London teaching hospital, Menzies-Lyth (1960) 
demonstrates how an organisational system can act as a defence against anxiety. The 
strong group cohesion of the Fun Trust and the Play Trust alike can be viewed as such 
a system. However, in contrast to Menzies-Lyth’s example, the practitioners of these 
two charities could not rely on routine to provide for a suitable source of containment, 
as it is exactly their ability to flexibly respond to the needs of individual families that 
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gives them their competitive advantage. Likewise, depersonalisation, one of the core 
coping mechanisms listed by Menzies-Lyth would go directly against the Fun Trust’s 
and the Play Trust’s core values of service delivery. In light of this lack of opportunity 
to ‘use’ the overall organisational system as a means of defence or containment, the 
role of the practitioner group to take over this part becomes even more evident. 
Considering group cohesion as an important cornerstone for the effective functioning 
of both charities makes it plausible that members of staff are protective of it and 
encounter any alteration to it, such as collaboration with another group, with 
scepticism and apprehension. One contribution points out that the tender group 
dynamics can be unsettled rather easily: “…It is such a small office, so if somebody is 
coming or leaving, that can make a real difference…” (R3 26). The fusion of two 
groups of practitioners might be perceived as a threat and therefore as highly risky.  
5.2.4. Lack of Information and Uncertainty 
To my own astonishment, the interviewed practitioners of both charities revealed a 
great lack of knowledge with regards to the Other organisation and the enquiry into a 
possible collaboration itself. Most respondents explain that they have heard rumours 
about future plans, but no concrete information has been shared with them:  
“…I’m not very clear if the collaboration would only happen in the X area or 
families in Y as well? (J 166), 
“…will there be shared offices? Will there be redundancies from both 
organisations to select the best staff for the new organisation? (J3 173), 
“…I would have to ask about the Play Trust first, what do they do?...” (J5 70), 
and 
 “…I’m not 100% clear on what the Fun Trust does. I guess they are similar to 
us?...” (R4 70). 
As the literature review has investigated, uncertainty, in this case caused by missing 
information, is perceived as a possible threat (Gold, 2006) and can therefore increase 
scepticism as a form of defence. Hence, there is believed to be a readiness in the 
human psyche to fear strangers and seek comfort in the familiar (Ostroff, 2000). In 
this case study, the majority of members of the Fun Trust and the Play Trust are 
strangers to each other, and according to Bauman (1991) their presence arouses 
anxiety and hostility, because they embody uncertainty. Robins and Post (1997) add 
that no one is ever completely free from this tendency towards paranoia; hence the 
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‘unknown Other’ becomes the ‘opponent’ through the projection of our own 
assumptions about them. I will come back to this thought in the discussion chapter. 
Considering together these four factors that pose risk might offer a plausible 
explanation for why the charities and the Fun Trust in particular anticipate a possible 
collaboration with great caution. It is important to emphasise that neither the Fun 
Trust nor the Play Trust as such are the source of any of these four factors; in other 
words, scepticism is not due to any known fact about the other organisation but is an 
outcome of a defensive reaction to the perceived risk. To make the case for a rational 
argument, it needs to be taken into account that there are more families in need of the 
service offered than either organisation is able to provide for individually. Together 
with the comparison of services (appendix 6) this makes clear that the organisations 
are not in direct competition with each other, but rather complement one another. The 
breakthrough into a new area would also require both organisations alike to employ 
more staff for fundraising as well as service delivery, making redundancies highly 
unlikely. Yet, while it would be exaggerated to talk about the manifestation of an ‘Us 
versus Them’ mentality in the form of enemy-thinking, feelings of suspicion and 
scepticism towards each other have permeated the entire process of data gathering 
and indicate a relationship characterised by opposition between the Fun Trust and the 
Play Trust. 
While the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality could only be identified in very mild form as an 
interorganisational dynamic – suspicion and scepticism rather than enemy-thinking 
such as in case study one – I will now shift the focus of analysis onto another level and 
look at traces of ‘Us versus Them’ thinking within each charity. 
 
5.3. Internal Traces of ‘Us versus Them’ 
It was fascinating to learn that internally, both organisations experience the same 
splits, although their intensity might differ. These are manifested along two divisions, 
a) horizontally between strategic and operational levels of hierarchy, and b) vertically 
between the fundraising and practitioner teams. I will discuss these observations in 
depth. 
 
 
93 
 
5.3.1. The Horizontal Division between Strategy and Operations 
I perceived the first indicator of a split between strategy and operations when asking 
senior members of staff of both organisations about their opinion on a possible 
collaboration. In stark contrast to the interviewed practitioners, these were very 
positive and welcoming the plan:  
“… the services are complementary; they provide social care services, i.e. 
transport, care for siblings, we care for the sick child…” (J2 112), 
“…I think we would work together pretty well and complement each other 
beautifully…” (J6 191), and 
 “… I feel very positive towards collaborative work…” (J5 73).  
These also denote that members of staff of strategic levels of both charities are better 
informed about each other’s organisations and the advantages and disadvantages of 
working together than the operational staff. 
Reflecting on the communication flow within the hierarchy of the Fun Trust in general, 
there seems to be a certain degree of disruption between the strategic and operational 
level. The chief executive, for example, only receives information with regards to 
operational matters through the care team manager, and is usually not involved in 
day-to-day matters: “…the CEO we don’t seem to see that much, he (…) sits in that 
room…” (J3 154). I question whether the adherence to such strict procedures is 
necessary, given the relatively small size of the organisation with 22 members. 
Working through secondary data that revealed further organisational processes and 
procedures, reminds more of the bureaucracy of a medium or large sized company. 
Additionally, it transpires that the Trustees of the Fun Trust communicate regularly 
with the chief executive and the care team manager, but are unfamiliar with the 
practitioners themselves (J5 60). Again, I found this unexpected given the size and 
nature of task of the charity. 
Enquiring deeper into the history of the Fun Trust reveals possible reasons for its 
bureaucratic processes: 
“…There was a really sticky time when it became clear that we need good 
operational management; systems and processes became too much for the 
care team. That was a very challenging time (…) Then we had an operational 
manager, but the next step was clearly to address the strategic need, so a chief 
executive was employed…” (J1 89).  
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This ‘natural’ development seems to have replaced flexibility within the system with 
which communication ways can be more effective, due to the effort to create a 
structure rigour enough to support growth. Drawing back on Menzies-Lyth’s findings 
(1960), one could argue that the tendency for the Fun Trust to be more sceptical and 
anxious towards a possible collaboration than is the Play Trust corresponds well with 
their relying more on bureaucratic structure, as this is exactly what Menzies-Lyth 
indicates when presenting organisational systems as means of defence.  
The Play Trust seems to have had similar problems with such kind of horizontal 
divisions in the past, but is more actively and successfully working on abating them. 
Many intervention plans have been put into practice to bridge the gap between 
strategy and operations:  
“…I am the head of care services and head of care strategic.[…] My role was 
created because one of care needed to be on senior management level […] So 
that’s why the representation on the board was so important, it took care up to 
a more even level…” (R1 11, 20), 
“…We are trying to break down the hierarchical structure; no management in 
the ivory tower – although we have an open plan office. We are working hard 
on our open door policy and transparent decision making…” (R1 85), and  
“…It is all about listening, being inclusive. Everybody across the board knows 
where we want to go […] the management wants feedback and is very keen to 
know what works and what doesn’t…” (R4 37).  
5.3.2. The Vertical Division between Fundraisers and Practitioners 
Next to the horizontal division that was more salient in the Fun Trust, a vertical division 
within the operational level became evident between the fundraising team and the 
practitioners. Again, this dynamic is present within both charities and is the strongest 
embodiment of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. The primary data also reveals that this 
split is capable of resembling a bigger hurdle for a successful collaboration than do ‘Us 
versus Them’ dynamics between the organisations. 
First of all, given the fact that service delivery happens on home visits, fundraisers and 
practitioners rarely see each other (J7 63). However, even during office times, a 
division between the two teams is observable. One nurse explains: “… Because I have 
been here so long and done lots of things, I seem to be very interested (…), so I will 
go down to fundraising and say ‘hello’…” (J3 153). This is surprising given that the 
fundraising team sits only three metres away from the practitioners. 
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It seems that the divide is driven mainly by the importance placed on each task within 
the organisations, which in turn inflames an internal competition over the distribution 
of scarce financial resources. A member of the Fun Trust states:  
“…there was also the growing fundraising team to support the growth of the 
organisation […] there was a little tension as money was going into the 
fundraising team, when more nurses were needed – but how to get the nurses 
without the funds?...” (J1 93).  
In the Play Trust, the emphasis appears to be inverted: 
“...this is always the problem with voluntary organisations: what is more 
important, are you service-led or fundraising-led? There can be a tendency on 
the care side of the organisation that thinks fundraising is the only thing that 
matters, fundraising gets everything […] It’s down to a lack of understanding 
probably, hostility with a small h…”  (R1 15).  
It is generally recognised that one part of the organisation is not able to function 
without the other; yet, the feeling of competition and separation is more prevalent 
than an impression of collaboration and complementarity. 
Following on from this division of the primary task, is the resulting organisational 
structure which is formed in such a way as to support each aspect of that task. So for 
example, within the Fun Trust, the practitioners have their own administrative support, 
whereas the fundraising team has not. As a consequence, tendencies towards ‘Us 
versus Them’ thinking are further aggravated. This becomes evident in the following 
responses from staff: 
 “…fundraising is welcome to come [to the clinical supervision sessions], but the 
development of the core clinical team is the focus …” (J1 23), 
“…All is centred around the care team…”  (J1 27), and  
“…A lot of focus here is on what the care team needs. And not on the 
fundraising…”  (J7 105). 
Turning the focus of analysis to the Play Trust, it emerges that similar to the horizontal 
split, this charity has been more actively trying to address and overcome the divide 
between their teams of fundraisers and practitioners. Interviewees report:  
“…as the PR executive, I am responsible for the relationship between (…) 
family support workers and fundraising. (…) I make sure that all the care teams 
have an update for each other, as you don’t want there to be two sides of the 
organisation. We are all working together, so you need to know what the 
others are doing. This has improved motivation…”  (R3 14), and  
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“…We have a buddy system in place. Each member of the fundraising team is 
coupled with a member of the care team and they meet 2-4 times a year to 
catch up with what each of them is doing. So some of the fundraisers go out 
with the care team and vice versa. It means that there is not a massive gulf 
between the two teams…”  (R4 49). 
This is not to say that the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality has been eliminated completely:  
“…there is a lot of internal communication need. To communicate to work as 
ONE charity. There can be a divide between fundraising and care; the 
fundraisers sit at the desk, where as the care teams go out. I know that one 
couldn’t work without the other, but in the moment there is fundraising there 
and care here… (R3 43). 
5.3.3. Findings of the Social Photo Matrix 
Drawing in to the discussion the data of the SPM session, the strength of this split is 
further brought to the fore. Although most participants report from a split between 
service delivery and ‘back office’, the findings can be aligned to the detected vertical 
split, as fundraising is the largest part of that ‘back office’. Furthermore, in contrast to 
the interview data considered so far, the SPM indicates that the vertical split between 
fundraising and care is equally as strong in both organisations. In general the findings 
of the SPM highlight this split. 
The division is evident on two levels: firstly, in the photographs themselves; all of them 
without exception showed either a family setting, where the service was being 
delivered, or the administrative office environment, where fundraising sits (figures 9-
12). Had I not known who sent me the individual photographs, I would have not been 
able to differentiate the two organisations. The same observation was expressed by 
several participants after the free association session:  
“The photos were all in half, the first half showing the family orientation, and 
the second half showing the more business-like procedures.” “You couldn’t 
know from which organisation the photos were.” 
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Secondly, the associations made to the photographs were split along the same pattern 
(please see appendix 7 for two examples of photographs with full transcription of free 
associations). To describe the photos showing practitioners with family and/or children, 
the words most frequently evoked were:  
love – sharing – together – happy – safe – trusting – proud – patience – 
opportunity – hope – connection – fun - inclusive.  
Associations were almost exclusively referring to positive emotions. I found this rather 
unexpected, given that the reality of the task is to care for a child that is eventually 
going to die - regardless of the practitioner’s efforts. The earlier discussed function of 
the strong group cohesion of each charity might be reflected here, as practitioners 
‘hold on’ to their sadness until in the containing environment of the group in order to 
guarantee the high degree of professionalism and quality of service. 
In line with this thought, the words used to describe the photos showing administrative 
offices or work utilities were predominantly strong negative associations around feeling 
pressure at work and wishing to be able to escape:  
work (this was not even used once with the first set of photographs!) – busy – 
chaotic – regulations – empty – hectic – pressure – captive – loneliness – 
overload – trapped - stressful.  
Fig.11: e.g. SPM photo of office environment (a) 
Fig.12: e.g. SPM photo of office environment (b) 
Redacted due to copyright Redacted due to copyright
98 
 
As pointed out before, this split or opposition was presented within both organisations 
equally. However, between organisations, there was no split – they mirrored each 
other through photographs and associations alike. Indeed, participants who did not 
recognise the content of any particular photograph were unable to identify which 
organisation it represented. 
Still elaborating on the division between fundraising teams and the service delivery 
teams, the transcripts show that the different tasks also attract different types of 
personality:  
“…I represent the fundraising team, we are generally very positive and upbeat; 
it’s a different personality to the care team, the care team is sort of more 
practically orientated. We are a bit more ‘whohooo’…”  (J7 66), and  
“…The care team is very skilled and trained. Fundraisers are loud, gregarious, 
they need to be, they are not afraid to go out and talk to anyone who can give 
money. That is quiet brash. They have very different personalities…”  (R4 45). 
 
5.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has investigated the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality on two levels: externally, 
as an interorganisational dynamic between the Fun Trust and the Play Trust on the one 
hand, and as an internal dynamic within both organisations, on the other hand. The ‘Us 
versus Them’ mentality between the two charities is very weak, with a manifestation of 
scepticism and suspicion towards each other rather than enemy-thinking. However, the 
same underlying dynamics exist as in case study one, only they are weaker. Robins 
and Post’s (1997) notion of paranoia was used to explain this development of 
suspicious attitude, which was identified to be stronger within the Fun Trust than the 
Play Trust. 
The data then showed four different circumstances that can elevate the anticipation of 
risk and danger, which in turn can lead to an interpretation of suspicion as a mild 
defence mechanism. These factors were the scarcity of resources, strong identification 
with the charity of belonging, the importance of strong group cohesion to high quality 
service delivery and a great lack of information among practitioners with regards to the 
project and the proposed partner organisation. Since the Fun Trust would have a 
proportionately greater financial investment into the collaboration than has the Play 
Trust, the risk is higher for them and can explain their higher aversion to the project. 
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A surprising outcome of the data analysis is the detection of two internal divisions, with 
a horizontal split between the strategic and operational levels, as well as a vertical one 
between the fundraising and practitioner teams of both organisations. Along with that, 
strategic members of staff were more positive towards collaboration than operational 
staff, coupled with a lack of communication between them.  
The division between fundraisers and practitioners of each charity proved to be the 
strongest manifestation of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, and although talking about 
enemy-thinking would still be an exaggeration, the ‘chicken and egg’ relationship 
between the two parts of the organisation has created competitive rather than 
supportive thinking between them. The predominance of the divide is also supported 
by findings of the SPM session. 
In conclusion it is important to assert that despite the two internal splits being present 
in both organisations, the Play Trust has been trying more actively and successfully to 
overcome these, leaving them stronger within the Fun Trust due to its more rigour 
bureaucratic processes. Simultaneously, it is the Fun Trust who is more sceptical and 
hesitant about collaborating. Drawing Menzies-Lyth’s conclusions (1960) back into the 
discussion provides helpful in clarifying the link between these two findings, as she 
explains that organisational structure can serve as a defence against anxiety. With the 
Fun Trust having experienced more financial difficulties in the past, its more rigour 
structure can be interpreted as having such a defence function, especially in the face 
of expecting yet another financial threat caused by the suggested collaboration. 
Another underlying question has transpired through this data analysis: is the suspicion 
on the side of the Fun Trust based on ‘real,’ objective ‘facts’ that are logically 
comprehensible, and hence any tendencies towards ‘Us versus Them’ thinking are 
justified, or is it rather caused by intrapsychic dynamics such as irrational paranoia that 
creates opposition and aversion due to a distorted and defensive view on reality? The 
development of this line of thought links well to the first three research questions of 
this thesis (1) Is ‘enemy-thinking’ an innate characteristic of being human or do we 
have a choice other than having enemies? 2) If ‘enemy-thinking’ is not innate, what 
provokes it? 3) What needs does having an ‘enemy’ satisfy?) Questioning whether the 
enemy is ‘real’ or the result of paranoid perception has significant indications on all of 
these questions and further reflections on this relationship will be considered in the 
discussion chapter. 
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In relation to this development of thought stands the interest for the conversion of the 
‘unknown Other’ into a ‘known Other of opposition’. Inspired by this case study 
analysis, the discussion chapter will also include a reflection on the tendency to 
manage uncertainty by turning something that is unknown or strange to us into 
something certain and ‘bad’. 
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Chapter 6: Case Study 3 Data Presentation & Analysis 
‘Us’ without ‘Them’ in the Convent 
In this third case study I will present and analyse data gathered during participant 
observation in a closed and silent convent, whose community members are committed 
to a rather different purpose: being together in union. In fact, my initial efforts to find 
clear indicators of ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics failed, and I therefore had to rethink my 
very understanding of group conflict – even more, of what the term ‘group’ actually 
meant to me. In the following, I will try to communicate this development of thought 
as inspired by my experiencing and observing. The reader will soon learn that this 
chapter concentrates on the development of my own questioning, leaving the 
formation of possible answers to these questions to later chapters. 
By doing so, I will first try and reconstruct some of my initial impressions when joining 
the community, as well as what I perceived to be typical characteristics and dynamics 
of convent life. Along with this, I will concentrate on my integration into and my 
changing role within the community: 
6.1. My Welcoming and First Impressions 
6.2. The Importance of Routine and Structure  
Following this, I will present four key themes that are prominent in my fieldnotes and 
the SPM transcriptions. These are:  
6.3. Strong Individualism within group Life 
6.4. At One with Self and Group 
6.5. The Role of the ‘Other’ 
6.6. Traces of Conflict.  
Supportive examples from the SPM sessions will be illustrated in section 6.7. Lastly, in 
section 6.8.’ Me and the Group – a Case of Idealisation?’, I will shift focus to my role as 
researcher before summarising key outcomes of the analysis in section 6.9.  
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6.1. My Welcoming and First Impressions 
In the following I will present the first entry from my fieldnotes that I made one hour 
after my arrival in the convent in the hope of being able to take the reader with me 
into the strict enclosure: 
“After a two and a half hour journey, the rest of it through idyllic countryside, I 
arrive in the village. I find the convent and drive straight past it. On a nearby 
car park, I stop and collect my thoughts. I stuff the rest of the pack of my 
favourite chocolate biscuits into my mouth, take a few deep breaths and then 
head back towards the convent. Beautiful building, incredible. Looks really old, 
authentic, but well maintained and looked after. Like a fairytale building. The 
spire is disappointingly small. I step out of my car and approach what looks like 
the main entrance, a massive wooden door, three steps leading up to it. There 
is a bell, and a sign right above: ‘worry not – you cannot hear the bell, but we 
can.’ Ok then, so I ring it. Nothing indeed… …still nothing… minutes pass…I’m 
gazing around…then footsteps coming closer from beyond the wood. The door 
opens with a squeak, and I find myself staring at a nun. Oh dear. She stares 
back, mumbling a ‘good morning’. ‘Good morning’, I answer, ‘my name is 
Nadine, I’ve come to stay with you for five weeks’ (what else am I gonna say). 
‘Sorry who?’ she asks, and I repeat my name. After a few seconds of prolonged 
mutual staring, her face becomes softer, ‘oh yes, oh yes, that’s right, that’s 
right’ she mumbles. ‘Do you have a suitcase?’ I point to my car, and upon her 
request to bring my luggage, I get my two suitcases out of the boot. She pulls 
one of them, me the other. Up the three steps, through the wooden door and 
into a huge dark cold hall in which every move I make echoes with great awe. 
Another squeak, the door slams shut. Oh dear. I follow her through the hall, 
feeling small. We enter another door, ‘new parlour’, into a large room with 
plenty of chairs and tables. And a piano. Looks like a friendly place for tea and 
biscuits. That’s what the tea rings on the wood tell me. At the end another 
door, ‘No entry – enclosure’. Oh dear. The nun asks me to wait here and 
disappears. I look around and can see an inner yard. Everything looks old, but 
in a nice authentic, cute way. Lots of character, atmosphere. Kind of homey. A 
few moments later the door opens again, three other nuns emerge. ‘Good 
morning Nadine, it is so nice to meet you - we are very pleased to welcome you 
- oh you must have left very early this morning - how long did the journey take 
you - we hope it was not difficult to find us - do you have all your luggage with 
you…’ and each of them gives me a firm and long hug. I don’t know what to 
say or how to behave. I feel awkward is an understatement. In we go, each of 
the nuns grabbing a suitcase. Down another small corridor and onto a larger 
hall with a staircase. Something tells me this is quite a central place to the 
whole building. Echoes everywhere. There are lots of them whizzing about, all 
smiling at me, greeting without interrupting their calm haste. They look so 
hugely happy. One of the three nuns shows me to my room –cell they call it- I 
can’t remember any of their names anymore. There is a sign at the door 
‘Welcome Nadine’ with a picture of a flower. The room is lovely; simple, small, 
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but all I need. Comfortable single bed with two pillows, small desk with chair, 
sink in the corner with soap and cup, a cupboard with three shelves and a 
curtain covering them, a granny-style arm chair. A vase with fresh flowers on a 
bedside table together with a lamp and a kettle. I love the flowers, I’d say they 
are from their own garden…but it’s January (?). I am given half an hour to 
unpack. Then one of the nuns picks me back up and gives me a grand tour of 
the house. I can’t remember anything though, am completely lost – this place is 
huge, and it doesn’t help that there are two floors and three different ways to 
get from A to B. On our way, we meet lots of other nuns, Sr. F., the one 
showing me around, is knocking on their cell doors (they still look like normal 
cosy rooms to me, without much resemblance to a cell) and every single one of 
them comes out. They welcome me, ask me questions, tell me something about 
them, crack some jokes (witty humour, great!), some anecdotalism, and long 
and firm hugs. I just got here, but I feel as though everybody is really happy to 
have me.”  (1-1). 
The events of this first day helped to alleviate my worries about my mere presence 
being a major disruption to this community’s life. So for example, next to having my 
own cell on the corridor among the nuns, I was introduced to my weekly task router 
after dinner, which listed the contributions I had to make to the everyday running of 
the household, including cooking, gardening, and cleaning, as well as my own study 
time (figure 13). This plan had been prepared before my arrival, and since I took over 
most of the tasks of a Sister that was leaving the next day for one month on her home 
visit, I felt as though I was going to genuinely make a contribution; tasks had not just 
been ‘invented’ to keep me busy. 
Likewise, I was given my own place in the refectory and the chapel among the Sisters. 
My place in the refectory was set identically to those of others with plate, bowl, mug, 
glass and cutlery. I felt especially honoured by the seat given to me in the chapel, 
which was also fully equipped with my own cushion, kneeling stool, prayer books and 
bible. Furthermore, I joined in all community tasks, such as knitting and choir 
rehearsals, cutting vegetables, and of course, praying. 
What struck me the most was the unconditional trust I was offered by the community 
as a whole, and how quickly and thoroughly, namely from the first day onwards, the 
Sisters ‘swallowed me’, assimilated me into all aspects of their life without any signs of 
suspicion or reservation; at least they were not noticeable to me. They made me feel 
as though I was an ‘equal’ member of their community. In fact I was so integrated into 
the Sisters’ daily routine, had I not ‘pulled my weight’ appropriately, I would have 
caused a significant disturbance to their peace of mind; a responsibility I certainly felt 
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on my shoulders at all times, as peace of mind and routine seemed to be one of the 
cornerstones of the community’s spiritual life. This is not to say, of course, that I felt to 
be an equal to them – it takes seven years of formation to become a professed nun of 
this order – but I certainly felt completely accepted. It was as though I had been with 
them for several months already. 
 
 
In the remainder of this section, I will reflect on the changing nature of my role within 
the community and along with that, how my relationship to it has become stronger. As 
I learned on the second day, it had been decided by the community prior to my entry 
to treat me as a postulant, a community member in the first year of formation. 
Therefore, I was not required to wear a habit as this was only necessary from the 
second year of membership onwards, and I was not allowed to attend the weekly 
community meetings called ‘chapters’ that lasted between one and two hours. This was 
a privilege only reserved for Sisters after their first three years of formation. 
Additionally, I was given a mentor, Sr. F. who was the Sister that had shown me 
around on the first day.  
To begin with, a minority of the Sisters took this mentor role very seriously and talked 
to her if they wanted to address me. My following fieldnotes give a good example of 
the awkwardness this caused for me:  
“This morning it was my task to clean the chapel. No later than all of the Sisters 
had left after Terce, I headed towards the back room to grab the broom and 
Hoover. Sr. F. called my name just loud enough for me to hear and approached 
me to tell me that Sr. X. had requested I do not touch the organ while cleaning 
Figure 13: My weekly timetable  
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the chapel. What bizarre behaviour - Sr. X. was practically standing next to me 
only a minute ago and could have told me herself! I will just have to reluctantly 
take it as it is, saying it’s such an old rule. Luckily most of the Sisters don’t stick 
to it.” (1-27). 
Towards the end of the first week, the interpretation of my role, and hence the 
behaviour of the community towards me changed and made me feel even more 
integrated. For example, I was not asked anymore numerous times per day if I were 
OK, and I generally received less unprompted explanations about ‘the way we do 
things here’ from the Sisters. Questions were addressed directly at me, and seven of 
them let me know how well I integrated into their life without causing any disturbance. 
Such remarks of relief led me to believe that my perception of immediate acceptance 
and assimilation was the result of hard work on sides of the community to mask their 
worry about my potential to disrupt their life. They must have been anxious about my 
arrival, yet, they did not let any of it show. 
Ten days into the participant observation, my role in the community developed further. 
I had observed that next to the officially scheduled daily tasks, of which I had my own 
assignments, the Sisters were very often busy with rather ad-hoc work, or in other 
words, trouble-shooting. In these times, for example some times in the afternoon, 
when I was officially given time to study, I felt less like a useful member of the 
community. It so came then that unfortunately, Sr. X. started to suffer from intense 
back pain and needed to be driven to the doctor. Since I had travelled to the convent 
by car, I offered my services as a driver to her and some Sisters after that. Similarly, I 
was made responsible for picking up medication from the pharmacy. Most importantly, 
however, Sr. X. needed taking care of, as she was bound to her bed, which also 
offered me an opportunity to make myself more useful, by, for example, bringing her 
afternoon tea every day and keeping her company in that half hour per day in which 
talking was officially permitted. I welcomed this additional task as it meant that I could 
embody another characteristic of convent life: being constantly busy. Lastly, I was 
asked by the abbess to write the monthly community newsletter that would be sent to 
the other two convents of the order, which I interpret to be another sign of trust and 
integration. During the last week of my stay, she said to me: “We are going to miss 
you when you leave”. 
If I compare this experience of being a ‘newcomer’ in a group to those I had in the 
past, I can say that I felt much more welcomed and accepted, without any major 
adjustments on my side being necessary to ‘fit in’. The whole experience was, put in 
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simple terms, easier, and along with that went exactly against my expectations. With a 
group that is so ‘tightly knit’ together, so dependent on each other for the functioning 
of the whole, I expected it to be rather difficult to be accepted and find a role among 
them, to be truly ‘let in’. At the very least, I expected them to be more suspicious of 
me. In this respect I recalled my experience of friendship groups, who by far do not 
spend as much time with each other as do the Sisters, and also very likely do not know 
each other as well – yet, it is extremely difficult for a newcomer to break into a circle 
of friends or clique.  
On the one hand, it could be argued that my acceptance was lucky due to the norms 
and values of the community that I happened to share, as well as similarities of 
personalities. However, this was rather unlikely. On the other hand, one could look for 
reasons for my seamless assimilation among the group itself and ponder upon what it 
is that makes them different from other groups that I have become a member of – 
even if only temporarily – in the past. Alone the fact that I am a Muslim, but the sisters 
never cared to even ask me about this despite my obvious Middle-Eastern appearance, 
shows that my unproblematic assimilation did not happen thanks to our mutual 
ideologies but for reasons that are driven by the nature of this group of women itself. I 
shall come back to this reflection in the next chapter, when drawing on the theory on 
group dynamics in order to shed more light onto possible reasons for the unusually 
welcoming attitude with which this group meets outsiders. It has already become 
obvious though that I thought this group to be, in relation to my own personal 
experiences, unusual, without being able to ‘put my finger on it’ yet. 
 
6.2. The Significance of Routine and Structure 
The importance to adhere strictly to a set routine and rigorous structure of daily life 
was one of the most striking observations I made throughout my participant 
observation. I started collecting field notes on it as early as 5 hours into my stay:  
“…Everything is done with precision...before the meal we came in and stood 
behind our chairs – the tables always stay set, the seats are assigned to each 
nun every few years. A bell sounds, one nun starts speaking the first prayer 
phrase, the others join in from the second phrase. Then we sit down. Absolute 
silence. The bell rings again, five nuns get up and go behind the food counter. 
They grab a white apron each from the shelf behind and put it on. Then they 
pick out serving spoons from the trays. They come to a standstill positioned 
precisely behind the still empty placemats. In the meantime, another nun has 
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opened the heating cabinet and takes out the oversized pots and pans full of 
food, catching them vigorously with both hands, oven gloves protecting her. 
Once that’s done, she sits back down. Silence. Then the rest of us take our 
plates and queue for food. Then we sit down and eat. The bell rings again, and 
the whole routine repeats itself, this time for desert – I’ve just managed to 
finish my mains. Then the bell rings yet again – I’ve just gulped down the last 
bite of my cake. One nun fills four plastic basins with hot water, passes them in 
turns to two others who put them into assigned positions across the refectory. 
Around them, groups of nuns form, one washes, one dries, one puts away. 
Another one is going around the tables collecting the left over drinking water 
into the larger jugs so as to fill it back into the giant water heater. Another one 
goes around and wipes the tables. Another one is collecting the little pots of 
compost and throws them in the large compost bin. At last two nuns empty the 
basins of water and dry them. Another one dries the places where those basins 
were only a second go. She then folds the towels and puts them back into 
place. Then everyone goes back to their place and stand behind their chairs. 
Only three minutes have passed since we got up. Silence…” (1-2). 
At that moment in time, and long after I had left the community again, I could not 
make sense of the reasons behind this emphasis on strict routine; but somehow I 
became aware that it played a decisive role in the community’s life. This became even 
more evident when I disrupted this well-rehearsed routine that seemed to be led by an 
invisible hand on the second day after supper:  
“I wanted to be helpful, so I got up, took a towel and started drying. I made 
the mistake of not differentiating between the cutlery – I must have assumed 
they are all the same. Although very friendly and helpful, I could see Sr. F.-J. in 
clear distress over which of the two knifes I had handed to her was hers (they 
looked identical to me). I was very sorry but didn’t know what to say.” (1-4). 
Since I want to ground the account here deep in my own experience, I will present two 
more extracts of my fieldnotes that describe the structure and precision with which 
routine tasks were conducted by the community. While I am fully involved in the first 
extract, the second extract is taken from my passive observation of another Sister. 
Every morning after Terce prayer, I was involved in preparing raw vegetables for the 
kitchen team to cook:  
“…six of us stream into the second kitchen. Aprons are behind the door, we 
grab a cutting board from the shelf and a knife from the draw underneath the 
centre table – I must make sure I get myself a sharp one, not easy – and take 
position around the table. Sister. F.-J. always sits on her walking aid by the left. 
In the meantime Sister P. has brought in buckets full of veggies. Usually people 
try to stay away from the onions, apart from Sister F.-J., she gets right in there. 
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I don’t mind either – haven’t worn make-up for ages, so no danger of 
smudging. Sr. P. is the one judging the quantities, so she tells us when she 
thinks it’s enough – until then we keep going, two for the potatoes, two for the 
cabbage – one halves the leaves, taking the stem off – that’s me, and then Sr. 
M. chops the leave into 1-inch pieces, Sr. A. chops the carrots and Sr. F.-J. 
never cries over the onions. Potatoes have to be peeled, making sure all the 
dark eyes are removed. The two outer layers of the onions have to be disposed 
of; they will be too hard for some of the Sisters to chew, even after cooking. 
The cut carrot pieces usually fly around the table and everyone tries to catch 
them – quite comedic, so there is always a lot of giggling involved. Piles of cut 
veggies and compost grow on the table. Sister M. is humming a melody. Then 
we are done. The cut vegetables go back into the buckets – Sr. P. lifts them 
into the front kitchen. Sr. F.-J. has moved her walking aid to the sink and is 
receiving the dirty equipment we have been using. Sister A. is pushing the 
waste cuts into the compost bucket, Sister M. is wiping the table with a cloth 
after her, I am sweeping the floor, starting from the far corner, Sister Am. Is 
already waiting with a dustpan and brush. Aprons off and back behind the door. 
I look around, everyone is gone, apart from Sr. F.-J. who is now humming the 
same melody and drying the cutlery.” (2-28).  
The whole procedure took ten minutes. Reading this extract, and especially my 
involvement in it, might give the impression that the Sisters’ daily routine is rather 
rushed. Indeed I felt rushed everyday and all day; however, this was due to me not 
being used to the physical work. When watching others work rather than participating, 
I perceived a great calmness in their movements and concentration on their task. 
Although work was done with strictness and rigour, the speed never seemed hectic or 
stressful, but calm and smooth. This became evident when watching Sister G., the 
refectorian going after her work:  
“Sister G. is busy tidying the refectory. Within a couple of minutes she turns it 
from tea to supper layout. She moves swiftly back and forth, with a 
concentrated gaze, a strong sense of determination, completely ignoring me. 
There is no time-wasting here, no ‘hanging around’. She does not look up, does 
not smile, but does not look unfriendly. Back and forth, two biscuit boxes onto 
the tray, the tray behind the wall. The giant water heater turned off and refilled 
twice with a jug. All the tea assortments put in order next to it, likewise the 
instant coffee. The cupboard closed. The long counter wiped. She doesn’t need 
to stop and search. The two bread boxes from the corner onto the counter, 
back to back, one filled with white, the other with brown bread. A chopping 
board in front of each, together with a long knife. The butter (lightly salted) 
and diet margarine along the table. I can barely hear her footsteps. Jam 
assortments close by. The bowls ready on the trolley for later and pushed 
aside. She is done, she is gone.” (2-40). 
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The above extract is a good example of the many that I gained during my five-week 
participant observation. I won the overall impression that all members of this 
community who were physically capable were in a constant state of concentration, 
during prayer just as much as during physical labour. Idleness did not seem to exist in 
their daily routine, as even recreational time and resting periods were structured (see 
figure y). Everything they did in their waking hours was done with strong sense of 
purpose and direction. When I shared this impression with one of the Sisters, she 
commented: “We are creatures of habit, and the routine is good for us; idleness is the 
enemy of the soul. (…) Our work is like prayer to us.” (1-18). 
 
 
The fact that I was given a weekly timetable dated 2006 (figure 14) added to my 
impression that I ought to reflect further on the function routine fulfils for this 
community. A later incidence clarified to me that this routine did not only take effect 
on timetabling, but also on the distribution of responsibilities as well as communication 
routes. One of the visiting priest’s speech had fascinated me, hence I asked Sr. F., my 
mentor, if it would be possible to talk with him about it. Two days later,  
Figure 14: The community’s weekly timetable 
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“at morning prayer, Sr. G. entered the chapel and I could see her placing a 
small note on Sr. A.’s chair. When leaving the chapel, Sr. F. approached me 
with that piece of paper, which read ‘Father K. Saturday 11am ok?’, and she 
advised me to confirm with Sr. M. Before I had opportunity to do so, Sr. P. 
found me and said that I have to let the priest know where to meet, although 
Sr. M. informed me this will happen in the old parlour. However, Sr. P. insisted 
I let Sr. G. know. At this point I was silently chuckling away at what was 
happening here, and when I asked Sr. G. if she could shed light onto this 
confusion, she explained ‘we are very clear about who does what; Father K. 
approached me first, and since I knew it was not my responsibility, I passed the 
message on to Sr. A.; Sr. P. gives the priest spiritual direction, so they must 
have been talking about it then. And Sr. M. brings him food every day. I am 
responsible for the parlour bookings, and I assume since Sr. A. was involved 
because she is the abbess, and well, Sr. F. because she is your mentor...” (2-
57). 
Having acknowledged the importance of routine and structure to the community, I was 
left puzzled about reasons for this. Despite being aware that the management of a 
large group entails structure and rule, the extent to which this was followed seemed to 
me to be driven by graver underlying reasons. I will reflect further on such possible 
reasons with the help of relevant theory in the next chapter. 
 
 
6.3. Strong Individualism within Group Life 
One of the outstanding overall dynamics that I observed during my stay left me 
perplexed from early on. These relate to strongly communal features of the convent 
life on the one hand, contrasted with individualistic traits on the other hand.  
With regards to the first cluster of observations, each nun has her fixed task and place 
in the community, and since they are mutually interdependent, each is necessary for 
the well-functioning of the community as a whole. For example, if the laundry or 
cooking is not seen to as planned, there would be detrimental consequences on the 
routinised tranquillity described in the previous section that the community flourishes 
on.  
It became transparent early on in my stay that the sisters live as part of a bigger whole 
which they constantly strive towards renewing and maintaining, and their principle of 
Christian Unity reflects this (Appendix 7).  Looking at the sisters’ outer appearance 
makes this togetherness in union visible. Along with their formal and work habits, they 
do not possess any clothing that might differentiate them from each other, such as an 
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accessory or the like. Their fundamental belief of obedience is targeted at preserving 
the prioritising of the collective above individual needs. Along with that, so states their 
constitution, the Sisters give up their free will when entering, which speaks of a very 
strong devotion to communion indeed. Likewise, they accept a new identity by 
replacing their birth name with a religious one. 
Similarly, the principle of poverty supports the principle of putting the collective first: 
Prior to becoming a member of the community, a Poor Clare has to give up all her 
personal belongings and thereafter does not own anything by herself. I have learnt 
about this as one of the sisters inherited money from a family member, which was 
used to build a hermitage in the convent garden for the community’s use.  
Furthermore, I became convinced that the sisters had grown into a tightly knit family 
supporting each other with genuine love. This became evident in the continuous care 
for the elderly members of the community, and in general a constant willingness to 
help (1-39). I witnessed an exemplary display of their affection for each other two days 
after my entry. Four of the nuns were about to visit another order for a few days. All 
sisters assembled at the enclosure’s main entrance to give their blessings to the 
travellers. The goodbye ceremony was so intense, with some sisters getting teary, I 
was certain they were leaving the community for several years. When I was told that 
they would be back in four days, I was left astonished about how close the sisters had 
grown (1-7) and I remembered the words of one of the sisters: “Love. To be loving 
with one another is really the hallmark of our life.” (1-43). In a similarly intimate 
manner, during recreational time, where talking is allowed, sisters share openly with 
the community problems with family members they are occupied with. For example, 
one sister expressed her most private feelings and the latest news about her mother 
who suffered from Alzheimer. The community carefully listened with great empathy (1-
44). Routinely, the people who share their sorrow with the community are included in 
the prayers of the day. 
For the sake of pointing out the link between the identified themes, I can add that in 
general, thanks to the adherence to the strict structure and routine, the nuns 
interacted and collaborated so smoothly like cogs of a big machine, so flawless and 
efficient, in attunement with one another. They appeared to me like a choir of 
professional singers, not only in the chapel, but in daily life, constantly harmonious. 
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I will now shift focus to the second cluster of observations, where opposing this solid 
image of togetherness, is another key characteristic of the convent life, namely the 
strong individualism of each member. The nuns spent a lot of their time by themselves. 
Solitude seemed to be a welcomed state of being and I frequently encountered 
behaviour and opinions that made me realise the importance the sisters placed on 
solitude. Several years ago, the community had decided to introduce a ‘desert day’ on 
Wednesdays, when rather than being with each other, the sisters had the choice to 
take their supper to their cells and remain in solitude until the next morning’s Holy 
Mass. This also meant not having night prayer, office readings and morning prayer 
together in the chapel, but in solitude in their cells. I chose to sit in the refectory on 
Wednesdays to see who would prefer to eat in company instead, but the most I ever 
saw were a maximum of five people (1-6). 
Likewise, recreation time which is scheduled twice a week, lasts one hour only. Usually 
on a Sunday, there is additional TV time together scheduled; however, if possible, the 
community prefers to bring forward night prayer instead and retreat to their private 
cells half an hour earlier. Singing practice on a Wednesday is scheduled for one hour. 
When it was cancelled on a number of occasions, the sisters made their relief over this 
decision clear. One could now argue that they just did not enjoy singing, but taking 
into consideration the other examples I have given, it becomes clear that the 
community strives to spend as much time in solitude as possible. Furthermore, retreats 
for individual sisters were organised frequently, whereby the Sister in question was 
able to spend a consecutive 24 hours on her own, either in her cell, or in the garden, 
without being disturbed.  
I remember not finding much understanding for the sisters’ constant urge for being 
alone, because I very much valued the time spent in the group. I remember looking 
forward everyday to tea time at 4pm, where for half an hour talking was officially 
allowed and I would have the chance to mingle with the others. But then I was 
disappointed as good as every day, since, as the participation in tea time was 
voluntary, the vast majority of the community chose to continue going about their 
individual tasks instead. There was this constant longing for social contact from my 
side, for bonding with others, whereas the nuns’ need for fulfilment seemed to be of 
an inherently different nature. So it came that none of the sisters displayed the same 
amount of enthusiasm for that half hour of the day when coming together for a ‘chat’ 
as I did.  
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I began to wonder which personality traits it were that differentiated us so greatly in 
our longing to search for the proximity of Others, not with regards to our belief system 
– these differences were obvious – but with regards to those elements which we 
shared as human beings. Why did I feel this great urge for immersion in the group, 
while the Sisters were content with keeping some sort of separation from it as well as 
not seeming to need some form of constant confirmation of their membership of it? 
One could argue that the nuns’ wish to withdraw is only natural given that they are 
confined to each other in a comparably small space for the rest of their lives. This is a 
plausible argument; however, the nuns have chosen this way of life and confirmed 
their decision in a seven-year journey to becoming a professed nun of this order. 
Moreover, it is the nuns’ highest aspiration through this way of life to create and live 
together in union, as well as leading by example of that union. Hence I believe it to be 
valuable to look further into the reasons for why they spent so much time in isolation.  
An example for how the value of solitude is accommodated for, is the way the convent 
space facilitates each sisters’ independent identity. In addition to their own cell, each 
sister has a hobby room in which she pursues different arts and crafts, such as wood 
craft, tailoring, wax painting, candle-making, and knitting. Some of them love cooking, 
and some writing, and some flourish their individuality in gardening (2-47). It is clear 
that despite the tightly-knit community life and its duties, each sister has ample 
opportunity to develop as an individual.  
Next to the preference for solitude, the degree of differences of personalities among 
the sisters stood out. It seemed to me as though despite living together for several 
decades, the Sisters were still strongly individualised beings, without diffusion of their 
sense of independent self. Despite their dependency on each other for the daily 
running of the convent and community, the sisters remain heterogeneous and 
differentiated from each other. This as such was astonishing to me given my previous 
knowledge of social psychology theories such as deindividuation. Deindividuation is a 
state in which the self is subjectively less differentiated from Other persons in a group 
(Diener, 1980) and that behaviour appears to be highly normative (Spears, 1994). In 
other words, I expected to find a group with members that had become similar to each 
other in behaviour, opinion and attitude, especially given the amount of time they had 
been together. Their similarities, however, do not go beyond their outer appearance. 
In character, as I have argued, they are very different beings indeed.  
114 
 
It so came that for more than half of my time in the convent, I was accompanied by 
the creeping suspicion that I was failing as a researcher, because I was becoming 
more and more convinced of missing out on those significant moments when the nuns 
spend time together and when, as I believed at the time, those group manifestations 
of ‘Us versus Them’ thinking that I had come to study were readily observable. I felt as 
though I was never in the right place at the right time and commented on this in my 
fieldnotes:  
“I have been here for nine days now, but I’m still worried as far as my research 
is concerned. I can’t be everywhere at once. Yet the nuns are scattered around 
everywhere most of the time, so how am I supposed to study their GROUP-
dynamic? They spend most of their time either in their cell or working 
somewhere on their own. So I feel like calling my supervisor and shouting 
‘there is no group, it’s all a bunch of individuals, I’m done here!’”  (1-38). 
It took me a lot of time to accept the fact that this is a group other than my common 
understanding of a group – one that is always together, but rarely physically. One that 
has learnt to adjust to each other and to live as a unit, yet one that is highly 
individuated, and hence far from showing any forms of group cohesion or conformity. 
Rather, the Sisters left the general impression on me that they were strongly 
opinionated individually and confident in making their own voice heard. With the layout 
of their daily lives, the community seemed to have achieved that balance between 
separateness and togetherness that Bion described as a paradox (1961). 
Only much further into my stay, a coincidence made me realise that my worries were 
unsubstantiated because the nuns genuinely spent that much time by themselves in 
private: I was going for a walk in the back garden, taking a break from my 
observations and reflections. Dusk had settled in, and when I turned the corner and 
my gaze fell back at the convent building, I realised that I could look straight into most 
of the sisters’ cells. Despite the feeling of being intrusive, I continued to observe, and 
so I saw that all that time, I had not missed out on anything, no hidden agenda  - they 
were all there, by themselves on their cells, either reading, writing, working through 
papers, sorting the room, or going for a walk on their own - just like me. 
This experience proved to be a milestone in my fieldwork, as I realised that this is a 
group different from those I had witnessed in the past and which made up my very 
understanding of the meaning of ‘group’. These individuals did not need to be together 
physically to create a bond – the elements of their particular way of life, for example, 
the routine and structure as well as the three pillars of obedience, poverty and chastity 
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presented in section 6.2. seemed to be enough to create a tightly-knit union. The 
influence of routine and structure on this community’s group dynamics will therefore 
be discussed in more detail in chapter seven. 
 
6.4. At one with Self and Group 
From the discussion so far, one might have gained the impression that individual 
aspects and group aspects of the nuns’ life are independent from each other or even, 
to use Bion’s terminology, ‘at war’ with each other (1961). However, this is not what I 
have come to conclude. It became clear to me from the information the sisters 
provided that their individuality and their group life are in fact mutually dependent on 
and not separable from each other. I will try to make this clear in the following.  
It seemed to me that the time the nuns spent in solitude served their concentration on 
their own inner selves. An advice one of the sisters gave to a visitor reminded me of 
this strong inwards focus, this paying attention to ‘self’:  
“You have to pull off the layers of the onion, and you get a bit closer to the 
centre; don’t be frightened of it, look forward to it, because it’s a wonderful 
experience to come to know the real person that you are.” (1-18).  
In the same line of thought, the sister further suggested that “you have got to mother 
your inner child and grapple with your own inner daemons.”  (1-19).  
It was at this point that I started to wonder what implications a stronger relationship to 
one’s own self would have on one’s relationship to the Other and hence the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality. As I have emphasised in the literature review, the Other is often used 
as a container for one’s own split off and projected ‘bad’ parts. If, however, those ‘bad’ 
parts are not split off in the first place but rather contained (grappling ‘with your own 
inner daemons’), would that make projection onto a suitable Other unnecessary, or at 
least less likely? For example, the principle that “we can accept ourselves as who we 
are” (1-33), as explained to me by one Sister, indicates that projection of negative 
parts as a defence is not needed as they are not perceived as a threat: they are 
accepted. One can also argue that the Sisters use another channel through which to, in 
Erlich’s (2001) words, self-cleanse: While the ‘rest of us’ project our bad parts away, 
they ask God for forgiveness, and since “God can be found in silence” (1-17) and this 
is a silent order, one might speculate that this self-cleansing is an ever ongoing 
process. 
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Another conversation that I had with one of the Sisters supports this line of reasoning, 
as she even talks about projection herself:  
“The people that annoy you most – they are projections of yourself that you 
haven’t dealt with. They have a gift for you, because they have something in 
them that you are not understanding.”  (1-63).  
Similarly, another member of the community tried to explain the same principles to 
me:  
“what’s out there, is in here. If I try to only deal with the good, I’d burst one 
day; God loves the mixture! I have to own the ‘dark’ side too, befriend it, 
embrace the shadow (…) Christians are constantly challenged to grow into 
integrated human beings that way…”  (3-5).  
Thereupon I was prompted to have a look at the ‘Parable of Weeds’ from the bible, 
which mirrors this principle:  
“The kingdom of heaven is like a man who sowed good seed in his field.  
But while everyone was sleeping, his enemy came and sowed weeds  
among the wheat, and went away. When the wheat sprouted and formed  
ears, then the weeds also appeared. (…) The servants asked him, ‘Do you 
want us to go and pull them up?’ ‘No,’ he answered, ‘because while you  
are pulling the weeds, you may root up the wheat with them. Let both  
grow together until the harvest’…”  (Matthew 13:30). 
 
A research question that emerged from this case study was whether it is this 
awareness of the tendency to project and the ability to contain one’s own ‘bad’ parts 
that make this group of people so different from those I have got to know in the past. 
One can say that they might be able to recognise such naturally prone tendencies due 
to their increased self-awareness, and hence stop themselves from acting it out. While 
they might still have been inclined to identify an Other, the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality 
did not develop to any observable amount. I will now draw connections between these 
intrapsychic dynamics and how they might impact on interpersonal dynamics.  
The sisters explained they feel more united with their inner self if they are in unity with 
others:  
“If one of our relationships in the community is not right, then our prayers are 
not right. Because our human condition is such that if we are trying to become 
whole, all parts have to be harmonious. In prayer, one can come to see his own 
part in a dispute and then be reconciled.”  (1-62).  
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I understand from this that prayer is that form of meditation for the nuns which allows 
them to focus their gaze inwards, in a self-reflective way, and to strengthen their self-
awareness – to become ‘one’ in themselves. The quote above shows that this is not 
possible if they are not ‘at one’ with everyone else around them that makes up the 
praised universal unity. One sister formulated this notion well in her own words:  
“Through any relationship we are growing through love into self-awareness.” 
(1-63). 
 
6.5. The Role of the ‘Other’ 
Since I could not let go of my impression that the sisters contained ‘bad’ parts of their 
experience without acting out any projections onto a suitable Other, I conducted a 
thought-experiment, whereby I went through what I perceived to be possible targets 
for such projections. Especially given that the literature reviewed states clearly that 
there is an innate human need for enemies (see for example, Bion, 1961, Erlich, 1997; 
Volkan, 1988), I had expected that as soon as any difference in characteristics of a 
group of people became salient, it would serve as a ‘justification’ to attract an ‘Us 
versus Them’ boundary (Middents, 1990); in other words, if individuals or a group of 
people is significantly different, it would, so I thought, very likely be made target of 
projections. 
I imagined, for example, that the outside world as such would be kept ‘at arm’s 
length’, with the convent being strictly isolated from it, so that the ‘rest of the world’ in 
general could serve as the ‘Them’ formation. I was convinced another obvious target 
would be atheists, or members of other religious groups. However, my assumptions did 
not materialise. 
I then thought of any of these ‘outsiders’ being made the target of projections, as this 
would be the easiest explanation for the lack of projections within community. 
However, again I could not identify any such intergroup bias dynamics. The community 
treats other orders as being one of ‘Us’, following the principles of their constitution 
(article 216): “Although made up of autonomous monasteries, our whole order forms 
one family.”  (1-53). In one of the dominant prayers repeated on numerous days a 
week, the text reads “Let us also remember our Muslim and Jewish brothers and 
sisters.”  (1-57), showing their commitment to other religious groups, too. Likewise, no 
differentiation is made to other nationalities, as the community prays for “churches all 
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over the world”. I have to stress here, that these are not just written principles. During 
my stay I could witness a true commitment to put these principles into everyday 
practice.  
They also embrace members of the parish with their daily integration into prayers, 
making it not a privilege of their own to be allowed to speak the prayers. Next to daily 
integration into prayers, there was a monthly evening prayer during which the union 
with the parish became particularly transparent:  
“Today is the first Friday of the month, and at 7:15pm a very special prayer 
started. There was a large wooden cross laid on the floor in the middle of the 
chapel, in the front part that usually only the nuns and I access, but today the 
members of the parish were invited to sit around it, among the sisters. We 
started preparations half an hour earlier, and the main task was to arrange all 
the sisters’ chairs and the two front benches into a large circle with the cross in 
the centre. Then we put incredibly many candles all round the chapel, it was so 
atmospherical. Then we had to make sure that the right prayer books were 
distributed among all seats. When the visitors arrived, they sat down in-
between the nuns and sang along with them. The readings were also held by 
members of the parish, which is actually not that special because it happens all 
the time. But the sitting in the circle together, the sisters with all the ‘normal’ 
people as one, praying and thanksgiving as though they were no different, is 
what struck me most.” (1-55). 
Given that I could not discover any obvious external Other, I focused my search 
inwards, onto the intragroup level of the community, where I then expected to find a 
readily observable indication for some kind of segmentation or splitting. After all, I 
included a lot of examples in my literature review which indicate that without an 
outgroup, or enemy, the ingroup will split into subgroups in order to re-establish the 
duality (Robbins and Krueger, 2005). But I could not observe any dynamics that hinted 
towards ‘Us versus Them’ thinking, such as the formation of sub-groupings. One sister 
informed me about the community’s take on friendship, which could explain my 
observation:  
“It is human nature to be drawn to somebody more than to others, but we are 
called to love all; it’s when we are drawn to a person that makes the love 
exclusive to the rest of the community. We have to work to also love the one’s 
we are not inclined to.” (1-62).  
And in another conversation, a sister noted:  
“exclusion is against our principle of love.” (1-34). 
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This goes in line with the fundamental Christian belief that portrays unity as the 
highest state of being. And although this unity can only be fully achieved after death, 
in resurrection, when all of humanity is reunited in God, the sisters worked very hard 
daily on approximating this state in the here and now. One of the sisters explained that 
“…actually we are all connected to each other.”  (1-43, 57), (see also Appendix 7). 
Having defined the whole of humanity as ‘Us’, this led me on to look for something 
inhuman that could form the counterpart ‘Them’, to enable me to hold on to the idea 
that the presence of an ‘enemy’ is an innate human need. The devil, source of all evil 
came to mind immediately. It can be seen as one of the biggest projections as it is 
commonly blamed for the evil of humanity, a great scapegoat indeed: ‘It must have 
been the devil in me.’ However, reflecting further on the sisters’ belief system, I learnt 
that even the devil is accepted as one of the big ‘Us’, who through love will be turned 
to good; by, according to St. Augustine of Hippo, ‘hating the sin but loving the sinner’ 
(in Azkoul, 1991). One of the regular priests added that “by behaving lovingly, 
inclusively, the enemy [them], is turned into one of ‘us’.” (1-57) and as one of the 
visiting brothers explained to me, “we are asked to love the enemy.” (3-6). 
 
6.6. Traces of Conflict (Really?) 
I want to avoid the impression that I have idealised the group of sisters by being ‘blind’ 
to their discrepancies and disagreements. Talking about this group as only being 
harmonious without any occasion of friction would indeed be uncritical, for on a 
number of occasions, I did witness abrupt language and body language that suggests 
some form of controversy. However, while observing these incidences, I started to cast 
doubt on whether they were the traces of what I was looking for. I realised that my 
own perception of conflict was very different from the community’s understanding. I 
was looking for some sort of split in the community, some grouping, ganging, exclusive 
friendships or even scapegoating or bullying – any kind of formation or behaviour that 
could hint towards ‘enemy-thinking’ exercised on the group level as suggested by the 
literature I had studied.  
While I certainly found conflict in the sense of individual disputes, this was not acted 
out by the group as a whole. The dynamic that is so commonly observed in other 
organisations such as schools or businesses, namely the clustering of other members 
around those individuals who had the conflict in the first place, did not occur. Hence, 
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disagreements remained an issue between individuals and did not turn into a group 
phenomenon whereby the community split into subgroups along the lines of the 
controversy and amplified it through the display of ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. So for 
example, I witnessed on rather coincidental occasions that one Sister would be upset 
with another one due to an action or lack of it (shrinking of a pullover in the wash, 
forgetting to pass on a message, misplacing an important item) and expressed her 
feelings openly and directly. But after the other one had explained her own stance on 
the matter and apologised, the incidences were soon forgotten. 
Not only do I intend to record these observations of conflict but also my own 
experience of such examples. On one occasion, I had insight into the struggle one has 
to undergo with oneself in order to preserve the good of the community:  
“… It’s 6:30pm, but I have got absolutely no idea what day it is; I lost count a 
long time ago. I am completely agitated and emotional, I even feel like crying 
believe it or not. (…) I feel hugely agitated by Sr. X, and that probably since 
yesterday, but today it reached the peak. Sr. X was not present at the 
introduction to the SPM (…). So we agreed that I would fill her in the next 
morning. (…) (S)he really did not make any effort hiding the fact that she can 
absolutely not be bothered with my project. When I said ‘well, it would not 
really work if you only gave it five minutes to do the photos’ she answered, 
‘well that is all the time I would spend on it’. I know she probably doesn’t mean 
it, but I have noticed (…) that she can be that stroppy with a lot of people. (…) 
Anyway, just an hour ago then the final straw: I am standing in front of the 
notice board discussing the SPM with Sr. Y, (…) Sr. X passes by and stops, and 
when Sr. Y said ‘she is ever so good at explaining’, Sr. X answered: ‘Well it’s 
only in her own interest’. That infuriated me hugely. What an unfair and rude 
comment. First of all, I never made a secret out of how helpful it is for me, I 
have more than shown my appreciation. And I think that I give something 
back, too, and everybody can see that I am trying very very hard – I am 
literally breaking my back in the garden after all. Anyway, this did give me a 
different flavour of community life, and I could finally relate to what one of the 
nuns said a while back, that here you cannot just run away from problems, you 
have to sort them out. And that is quite literate: The strict schedule means that 
privacy can only take a maximum of two hours at a time. I cannot simply 
decide to remain in my cell and sulk. I have to pull my weight, pull myself 
together and do my part for the community. If I didn’t, it would unbalance the 
whole group that’s for sure. This was the first time I felt a pressing on me and 
an urge to go for a long walk, to have a time-out, just to get away. My head 
was spinning. I really had to compose myself, was kind of shouting at myself in 
my own head. I felt quite claustrophobic. Wanting to tell Sr. X how I really felt 
about her mean comment came over me. But then I wanted to retreat like a 
snail would into its own shell.”  (2-37). 
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Let me emphasise that I am neither concluding that the sisters have no need for 
Otherness, nor am I praising Christian principles as being enough to overcome the ‘Us 
versus Them’ mentality. But yet I could see that they worked for this community. I 
have shown that conflict does occur as a normal dynamic of everyday convent life, and 
as one priest explained to me:  
“This community is unusual; they deal with stuff. It struggles, it wrestles, we 
see the result of hard personal work – working on the self and the community.” 
(3-6).  
As stated in the clarification of the research design, this community was also the only 
one out of the six applied to that accepted me into the enclosure, further stressing 
their unusualness. It has also become clear during my stay that the Sisters have a 
strong sense of identity with regards to their Christian principles and what opposes 
these principles. Nevertheless, this strong sense of distinction did not develop into a 
sense of ‘Us versus Them’ towards those who are not in agreement, such as foregoes 
enemy-thinking. Rather than ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’, the nuns have, through their tolerance 
and understanding for self and Other – shown in this analysis to be two mutually 
dependent constructs -, developed the ability to hold an ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, or ‘Us’ with 
‘Them’ mentality. 
This notion then leads to a further discrepancy: The wide range of literature I am 
aware of that concentrates on the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality has announced the 
innate need for enemies. Due to my convent experience, I have begun to wonder if 
this is necessarily true, and if it is not enough to proclaim the need for ‘Otherness’ to 
be innate – but that this Other does not necessarily have to be labelled ‘enemy’. Other 
sources have expressed that we cannot love someone without having someone to hate 
(Segal, 1995), again displaying this inner need for animosity. However, one of the 
community’s fundamental principles would make the hating impossible: ‘We are asked 
to love our enemies’. Because my convent experience did not meet my expectations 
formed previously by the literature I had studied, I will continue into a more theoretical 
analysis of and distinction between ‘versus’ and ‘and’ in the next chapter. 
 
6.7. Contributions from the Social Photo Matrix 
During the two SPM sessions conducted (appendix 8 shows two examples of 
transcribed free associations), the following key themes kept resurfacing among the 
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free associations: (1) the Sisters’ acknowledgement of being part of a bigger whole, 
(2) their resourcefulness and (3) their perception of circularity between good and bad. 
In the following, I will give some examples of these free associations and try to 
interpret their meaning in context of my own experiences. 
6.7.1. The Sisters’ Acknowledgement of being Part of a Bigger Whole (figure 15) 
Throughout both SPM sessions, the Sisters made reference to the relationship between 
themselves as individuals and the whole group that constitutes the community. Free 
associations in words or phrases included:  
“Parts of the whole”, “It’s a kind of choreography”, “New wood added to old to 
keep it on its feet – just like us”, “One thing made of many ingredients”, Every 
yoke is unique, separate, yet together”, “United, yet each individual”, 
“Dependence”, “Synergetic”.  
 
 
These contributions remind strongly of the paradox I have began to formulate in this 
section; namely that of the Sisters having left behind their own life so as to create 
unity through dedicating themselves to the group on the one hand, whilst nourishing 
their individuality and own separate identity from that same group on the other hand. 
Along with this outcome of the SPM sessions, I find myself even more encouraged to 
investigate this paradox further by drawing on the theory of group dynamics into the 
later discussion. 
6.7.2. The Sisters’ Resourcefulness (figure 16) 
It astounded me to witness the Sisters’ ability to find purpose in any kind of objects 
encountered. An atmosphere of opportunity and possibility was therefore created; 
nothing ever went to waste, and the nuns were exemplary in finding as many uses as 
Figure 15: Example of a photograph in this theme 
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possible for all utensils in their everyday lives. However, it was not until sighting the 
free associations of the SPM sessions that I became fully aware of this pungent 
community characteristic:  
“Helpful wheels”, “everything has purpose and every space has a use”, 
“Everything has meaning”, “The organic nature of life, nothing is wasted”, “The 
immense variety for use of electricity”, “…continuity and using things until they 
are used”, “the usefulness of what is very humble”, “recycled grass”, “A place 
of possibilities”, “full of possibilities”.  
 
 
One could interpret this attitude not only in a religious sense, following which the 
Sisters’ maximum exhaustion of resources could be seen as a sign of their appreciation 
for God’s creations, but also as a sign of their superior imagination, inventive character 
and creative abilities. I can now see this as a further unique character that 
distinguishes this group from others I have experienced in the past and will therefore 
give attention to the concept of creativity in the discussion chapter. 
6.7.3. The sisters’ Perception of Circularity between Good and Bad (figure 17) 
The final salient theme that became transparent due to its emphasis and frequency of 
occurrence is symbolised by references made to the mutuality of life and death, good 
and bad, or beginning and end. Such free associations were for example:  
“The compost nourishes the flowers”, “We need to be muddled down”, “good 
from rubbish”, “Resurrection”, “Transformation is 95% decay”, “the older, the 
newer”, “Those who went before us”, “you can’t get away from the messy part 
of life”, “from ashes, something lives anew”, “Life, even from the barren rock”, 
“The path coming from and going to”, “Sometimes you have to have the mess 
and mud to let the beautiful grow”.  
Figure 16: Example of a photograph in this theme 
124 
 
 
 
These examples can be seen as reminiscent to my earlier supposition that the nuns of 
this community are capable of accepting and holding within themselves, both, good 
and bad parts of their selves without feeling threatened by them, so that projection 
onto an outside Other is less likely to be necessary. Following this comparison, parallels 
can be drawn to the earlier presented discussion around the ‘Parable of Weeds’ 
(Matthew 13:30). I will come back to this line of thought in the discussion chapter to 
give it a more theoretical underpinning. 
 
6.8. Me and the Group – a Case of Idealisation? 
Having initially stated my wish to avoid the impression of having idealised the group, 
by now I have accepted that this might indeed be what I did. Another researcher with 
different life experiences might have come to an alternative evaluation of the 
community’s functionality. A participant observer with more pleasant past experiences 
of group dynamics might not have been as astounded about the harmony this group 
displayed as I was. In the introduction, I have illustrated that my interest into the ‘Us 
versus Them’ mentality was driven by negative encounters with groups. I therefore 
commenced my research with the intention in mind to investigate what it is that goes 
‘wrong’ in groups so that an ‘Us versus Them’ mentality is evoked. That this experience 
at hand was very different from the ones I had in the past becomes evident in many of 
my fieldnotes in which I pay particular attention to the harmony and generosity I 
witnessed among the Sisters.  
Figure 17: Example of a photograph in this theme 
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Next to my previous examples of their care for the elderly and their display of affection 
when four of the nuns visited another order, I describe on a number of occasions in 
great detail the altruistic help the sisters offer each other unprompted:  
“In the chapel this morning, it must have been seconds before Sr. A. was about 
to ring the gong, Sr. G. spilled her glass of water (she typically makes too many 
erratic movements). As she jumped up and headed for the door – I guess to 
fetch a cloth or the like –it was actually Sr. P. who caught my attention. As 
soon as the spill had happened, she grabbed her cardigan from behind her and 
started to dry up the puddle. She lifted Sr. G.’s books that had been splashed, 
one after another, and with great care and diligence made sure she wiped them 
completely dry. But there was something more to it: It was her face that I 
remember so vividly, her smile, the calmness, the love that spoke on her face 
while clearing up Sr. G.’s mess – with the only cardigan she possesses. As I am 
writing this entry into my diary, a few hours after this has happened, I’m 
thinking: Not even a bystander effect in this group – something that I 
previously thought of occurring whenever a group of people come together.”  
(1-40).  
I report of a similar scene when Sr. F. succumbed suddenly to vehement back pains, 
and two other sisters volunteered to move the entire contents of her cell – furniture as 
well as personal belongings – to the ground floor so as to rid her of the chore to climb 
the stairs:  
“I am having a rest after lunch in my cell, exhausted with weighty eyes as 
usual, when I hear some very heavy breathing, some ‘one-two-three-hepp’ 
followed by the sound of squeaking and cracking and the pushing of something 
big, and then some heavy puffing again. It comes closer and closer, and when I 
poke my head around the corner (after all I enjoy my legitimacy to be nosy) I 
see how Sr. F. and Sister L. were pushing a wardrobe (!!!) down the corridor. I 
do offer my help, and my concern is probably visible on my face, as they stop 
to smile at me explaining their endeavour with obvious enthusiasm. Admittedly 
I am glad though about their insisting that they do not require my help – I can 
hardly keep up with the hard work of their daily routine as it is.”  (1-61). 
The fact that I have given these two examples, among many other similar ones, so 
much attention in my field notes might indicate that I am unfamiliar with groups that 
exert so much unconditional support for each other. My reference to the ‘by-stander-
effect’ shows indeed that my expectations of group dynamics rather point to the lack 
of action than to action. This could have consequently led me to idealise this group by 
lending more emphasis and attention to these – to me - new and positive 
characteristics of group life over the more – to me – ordinary and difficult ones. To 
illustrate my astonishment at the harmony of this group in particular, I will share the 
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fieldnotes that I recorded after the very first Holy Mass eight hours into my stay with 
them:  
“The bizarrest thing ever happened. Just then in Mass, first I was a bit 
indifferent, because I still don’t fully buy into it. The priest was praying and we 
were singing all together. The room sounded full, warm, harmonious… I 
remember feeling like this on Christmas Eve when I was very little… And then, 
it started upon his request to ‘give each other something’. I had no idea what 
on earth he meant, but basically all of a sudden everybody turned to each other 
broadly smiling, nuns as well as members of the public and I was overwhelmed 
by the genuineness in their eyes; we all hugged each other and said ‘God bless 
you’ and I somehow knew that these women, who I have had never seen 
before and who knew nothing about me, really meant it. Then we were asked 
to hold each other’s hands, and all of a sudden the whole chapel looked like a 
bunch of school children on Pancake Day. During this whole scene we were still 
all singing together and the atmosphere was so smiley and happy, innocent, 
naïve, childlike, trusting, so eventually I couldn’t hold back my tears, which 
resulted in me being squeezed even more.” (1-5). 
Since this deeply impacting experience, which by far exceeded my expectations of how 
welcoming the nuns would perceive me, happened on the very first day of my 
participant observation, it is indeed a plausible critique to state that I have idealised 
the group. I want to stress, however, that this circumstance in itself carries with it 
potential insight into just how unique a group this convent community is. Additionally, 
one needs to bear in mind that I only spent five weeks in the convent, which is a short 
amount of time with respect to the Sister’s lifetime commitment. Had I joined them for 
longer, or even a different time, my impressions might have been different.  
 
6.9. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have presented and analysed seven key themes as they have become 
transparent to me through the thorough reading and re-reading of my fieldnotes. I 
have further cross-referenced to these themes with the help of the findings from the 
SPM transcripts. I want to conclude this section by reflecting further on the 
interrelatedness of these themes with the prospect of filtering out the main surprises of 
my experience which, as I will show, have altered my understanding of the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality, and what a ‘group’ actually is. 
I want to start the summary with the third key theme ‘Individualism within Group Life’, 
as this has proven to be the biggest surprise for me. I have portrayed the dependence 
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of the community as a whole on every single member as part of that larger whole. 
Simultaneously I have shared fieldnotes that clearly emphasise the independence of 
each sister within the community. Along with that, I have illustrated the development 
of a paradox in my understanding: on the one hand, no Sister could achieve without 
the group what she has given up her free will for, namely, to create union with Others, 
and on the other hand, the community placed great importance on the individualistic 
and independent personal development of its members. Rather than fulfilling my 
expectations of having become similar to each other due to personal adjustment and 
compromise, the community remained strongly pluralistic in character. 
In the consecutive section ‘At One with Self and Group’, I have then tried to shift my 
understanding away from the metaphor of paradox, in which contradiction is at the 
core, towards mutual dependency of the two components of the convent life. I was 
therefore able to perceive the necessity to develop individually as a prerequisite for the 
development of the group, and vice versa, rather than seeing them as hampering each 
other. This shift in perspective further enabled me to understand the ‘Role of the 
Other’ in a new light, which I discussed as the fifth key theme.  
Here, I tentatively developed the thought that I cannot observe or experience any 
projection behaviour of the nuns onto each other or an outside group, because their 
being ‘At One with Self and Group’, or in other words, their acceptance of both ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’, seemed to deem its acting out unnecessary. This proved to be the second 
big surprise for me, as I had not previously considered the possibility of humans being 
able to withhold from projection behaviour. I was desperately looking for the Sisters’ 
‘Them’ but could not find it. Such development of thought then enabled me to make 
more sense of the first presented key theme, namely, my being assimilated into the 
community without any reservation or suspicion: if the Other is not met by someone in 
need of projection or self-cleansing, then suspicion towards an ‘unknown Other’, in this 
case me, was also less likely. 
While analysing these themes, particularly when discussing my welcoming into the 
group, the development of my relationship to it, and my idealisation of it, a constantly 
underlying question developed and gained urgency: compared to my other past 
experiences of groups, such as family, school, friends and work, and those in case 
studies one and two of this research, this group was different. Along with this 
explanation, one can understand that the welcoming and integration I perceived was 
another big surprise of my experience. There was something unusual about them. 
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Without being able to fully identify or comprehend what this something was, it led me 
to idealise the group. And still without grasping what it is, I suspected that reflecting 
further on it will help me understand why conflict in this group looked so different from 
what I was used to observing. 
I will leave this analysis now, without conclusion, and develop the discussion to include 
the theory of group dynamics in order to offer some possible interpretations of the 
‘something’. Along with that I will demonstrate how I eventually could make sense of 
the importance of routine and structure to this community (key theme two), which was 
another source for my astonishment but at this point of working with the case material 
was still mysterious to me. 
In summary, the four surprising experiences that came out of case study three were: 
1) The community’s ability to embrace individuality and pluralism 
2) The trust with which I was welcomed and my instant assimilation into the 
group 
3) The absence of projection behaviour and an obvious ‘Them’ 
4) The emphasis on strict routine and structure 
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Chapter 7: Case Study 3 Aftermath – Matching Theory to Practice 
So far, the development of my argument in this research has undergone a sequence of 
three epiphanies. The first major change in my thinking occurred during the sighting of 
relevant literature, when I shifted from concentration on a social psychology 
framework to including psychoanalytic theory, as well. I incorporated into my thinking 
the principle that an understanding of interpersonal and intergroup dynamics in the 
external world is inevitably linked to an understanding of intrapsychic dynamics in the 
internal world. 
During the fieldwork for case study three, I found the foundations of my underlying 
assumptions shaken a second time. Informed by the literature to date, I had 
commenced data collection with the firm belief that the need to have enemies is innate 
and hence inevitable in group life. Additionally, my research agenda was at that time 
still fuelled by predominantly negative impressions of group dynamics. However, due to 
my experiences I was brought to alter my understanding of the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality and question, in particular, my underlying assumption of its innateness. This 
development of events reminds strongly of Clancy et al.’s notion that when qualitative 
researchers come to the conclusion ‘that’s interesting’, it is “a clue that current 
experience has been tested against past experience, and that past experience has 
been found wanting.” (2011, p. 6). 
Lastly, after conclusion of the fieldwork, I was forced to draw in theoretical concepts 
not considered before to make sense out of the surprises of case study three. This 
incorporation of new theory led me to the third shift in my conceptualisation and I will 
start my theoretical reflections with this last epiphany presented in four interdependent 
propositions (figure 18): 
a) Turquet’s concept of Oneness is not a fourth basic assumption but the 
equivalent to basic-assumption mentality itself. 
b) McMillan’s concept of Unity is the equivalent to work group mentality. 
c) The three group states equivalent to Bion’s (1961) trilogy of basic-assumption 
mentality are in fact Key Modes of Interaction (Ki) and can be classified as: Key 
Mode of Interaction Dependency (KiD), Fight/Flight (KiF/F) and Pairing (KiP). 
Based on whether a group is in a state of Unity or Oneness, they are either 
supportive or inhibitive of the primary task. 
130 
 
d) Turquet’s concept of Membership Individuals (M. I.) describes the frame of 
mind of the majority of members of a Oneness group, while that of Individual 
Members (I. M.) depicts that of the majority of members of a Unity group. That 
of Singleton describes the frame of mind of the majority of members of a group 
who seek to deny their affiliation with it altogether. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to make the thought process by which I arrived at these propositions 
transparent, I will examine the following matters: First of all, the group context within 
which I place my own theoretical contribution will be defined (7.1.). Thereafter, with 
the presentation of Bion’s groupishness as paradox as starting point, Meness and 
Oneness as opposites, the tension caused between them, as well as Turquet’s concept 
of I.M. as equilibrium state in this tension will be discussed (7.2.). Lastly, the argument 
will continue to present Unity as an alternative to Oneness (7.3.), following which 
Oneness will be reinterpreted as being basic-assumption mentality itself, and Unity as 
being work group mentality itself.  This leads on to the application of key modes of 
interaction (KiD, KiF/F, KiP) to the Unity group and the Oneness group. A final section 
will summarise the main arguments (7.4.). 
Although this chapter aims at theoretical advancements in the body of knowledge to 
date, I will continue to highlight affiliations to case study three so as to communicate 
that these theoretical reflections have been directly inspired by the primary data 
collected during fieldwork. In the consecutive chapter, I will then also make use of my 
newly established theoretical understanding to revisit case studies one and two. 
 
 
 
Membership 
Individuals 
Individual 
Members 
 
Singletons 
Oneness Group/ 
Group with basic-
assumption 
mentality 
Unity Group/ 
Group with work 
group mentality 
KiD 
KiF/F 
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Inhibit primary task Support primary task 
 
‘No’ group 
Figure 18: Diagram of new theoretical framework 
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7.1. The Context of the Group Setting 
The key authors whose work I refer to in the consecutive argument have established 
their theories in different group size contexts. As Palmer (1999) points out, there are 
considerable variations concerning the boundaries of the word ‘large’ with regards to 
group size. According to the group relations conference tradition, a group of 30-100 
people is considered large, and Turquet (1975), reporting from the same tradition, 
explains that within the range of numbers between 20 and 80, observed phenomena 
do not  vary but in their intensity. The earliest definition of a small group was given by 
Bales in 1950 (cited by Hare, 1994), under the criterion that after a face-to-face 
interaction, each group member should be able to remember something about every 
other member. Turquet (1975) agrees and states that if face-to-face interaction cannot 
be maintained and the group is hence not encompassable anymore by each member, 
then it is to be called ‘large’. With 22 members, the convent community is a large 
group. 
My dilemma lies in the following: Turquet’s theory of a fourth basic assumption (1985) 
that I will make use of in this chapter has been derived from the context of small 
groups. Likewise, as Turquet reminds us, Bion’s concepts of work group mentality and 
basic-assumption mentality which I will refer to, are also theories established within 
the small group context. However, I will also draw on Turquet’s ideas of Singleton, I.M. 
and M.I. states, which he clearly defined within the frame of the large group of a 
traditional group relations conference. Turquet warns that in large groups, “the 
presence of other phenomena intrude on the characteristics of the small group.” 
(1985, p. 71), clearly making the case for the necessity to distinguish between them. 
McMillan, however, another key author for my own argument, seems to be of the 
opinion that Turquet’s abstractions on small groups apply to large group settings, as 
well. She explains: “Translating the small group phenomena (…) into the large group 
must be done with caution as different dynamics come into play. The argument will be, 
however, that basic-assumption oneness has great relevance to the large group and 
represents a dynamic that cannot be ignored (…).” (1981, p. 476). In agreement with 
this assertion, Gould (1999) adds that while size and scale of a group influence the 
intensity of phenomena occurring within it, the same ones can nevertheless be 
observed in any group setting. Adopting this reasoning, I am going to apply concepts 
gained from both, small and large group contexts to the convent case study at hand. 
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Furthermore, it is important to shed light onto the interest with which researchers have 
encountered the groups of their study, especially since Palmer (1999) postulates a 
tendency to overgeneralise from studies conducted in specific contexts to groups in 
general. Many of the authors quoted have a therapeutic background which might 
incline them to investigate into group dynamics with the intention of healing. Bion, for 
example, focused his theory of basic-assumption mentality on patients in group 
therapy, and his entire strand of group psychoanalysis stems from his work with 
traumatised post world war two soldiers (1961). Similarly, Hopper (2003), while 
claiming relevance of his theoretical framework for all group sizes, presents his ideas 
as a consequence of traumatogenic process and Gustafson based his findings on 
research into family relations of schizophrenics (1979). To that Palmer (1999) adds in a 
summative manner that psychoanalysis in general has mainly focused on small 
therapeutic groups, with little emphasis that observed phenomena can also occur in 
‘everyday’ groups. One needs to recall though that while Freud’s insights are based on 
psychotic and neurotic patients, they do tell something about all of us (Craib, 2001). 
While the majority of key authors I make reference to in this section focus their work 
on abnormalities in groups, I approach the phenomenon under investigation from the 
point of view that it is a ‘normal’ part of every group’s life, not only of those who are 
subject to or in need of therapy. Along with that, I am not looking for a specific cause 
of the ‘problem’, but am rather interested in understanding groups better in general.  
Lastly, the perspectives with which referenced authors have approached their studies 
differ. Turquet (1985) presents his concept of Oneness as a state of a group, while his 
continuum of Singleton, I.M. and M.I. describes states of individuals within a group. 
Lawrence, Bains and Gould (1996), concentrate their contribution on the relationship 
between the individual and the group, while Bion (1961) addresses the mental activity 
of groups5. As pointed out in the introduction chapter, these different angles from 
which to view the same phenomena are easily combined into a single approach. In 
support, Bion remarks: “I am impressed (…) by the fact that the psycho-analytic 
approach, through the individual, and the approach (…) through the group, are dealing 
with different facets of the same phenomena.” (1961, p. 8). 
 
                                                          
5 This assertion is not widely agreed on by the body of literature following Bion’s steps. In this 
research, I will adhere to French and Simpson’s (2010) accord and use the terms ‘work group 
mentality’ and ‘basic-assumption mentality’ to address the mental activity of the group in 
different constellations. 
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7.2. Bion’s Groupishness as Paradox 
When remembering the first surprise of my convent experience, namely that of the 
contradicting elements of the nuns’ lives, being officially committed to the group, yet 
preserving a strong sense of individuality, Bion’s concept of groupishness comes to 
mind.  Borrowing from Aristotle, he declares that the human being is a political animal 
at war with his or her own groupishness. He goes on to state that “for a (hu)man to 
lead a full life the group is essential” (1961, p. 53) as he “cannot satisfy any emotional 
drive without expression of its social component.” (1967, p. 118). He then adds that on 
the other hand, “all groups stimulate and at the same time frustrate the individuals 
composing them; (…) (for they are accompanied) at the same time (…) in this aim by 
the primitive fears that the group arouses.” (1967, p. 188). Along with this depiction of 
contradicting desires, Bion emphasises the constant conflict to be part of and apart 
from the group, which I perceive to be very illustrative of my experience of the 
convent community, although my elaboration on the interdependence of their being at 
one with self and Other shows that the two desires were not ‘at war’ with each other. 
Turquet adds to the same struggle by stating that “essentially, the single individual 
who joins a group is in a dilemma. He wishes to be part of the group and at the same 
time to remain a separate, unique individual. He wants to participate, yet observe; to 
relate, yet not become the Other; to join, but to preserve his skills as an individual.” 
(1985, p. 85). 
7.2.1. Meness and Oneness as Opposites 
Two other theories which are based on Bion’s above understanding of the duality in 
group behaviour are the basic-assumption mentalities “Oneness” (Turquet, 1985) and 
“Meness” (Lawrence, Bain and Gould, 1996). They help in making further sense of the 
above described dilemma. Turquet picks upon Bion’s principles of the group-seeking 
element of groupishness and formulates that there is a “need of individual members to 
search for and find an encompassable whole.” (1985, p. 71). In fact it was Bion (1970) 
himself who suggested a fourth basic assumption based on the illusions of fusion and 
Oneness experienced by an infant who needs to protect against the anxieties 
associated with becoming a separate object outside the mother (See also Armstrong, 
1992). Turquet then introduces as an addition to Bion’s three basic assumptions modes 
(Dependency (BaD), Fight/Flight (BaF) and Pairing (BaP)) a forth one: “basic-
assumption oneness group” (BaO), “whose members seek to join in a powerful union 
with an omnipotent force, unobtainingly high, to surrender self for passive 
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participation, and thereby to feel existence, well-being, and wholeness.” (1985, p. 76, 
emphasis added). “The group member is there to be lost in oceanic feelings of unity 
or, if the oneness is personified, to be part of a Salvationist inclusion.” (1985, p. 79, 
emphasis added; see also Cialdi, Brown, Lewis, Luce and Neuberg, 1997). 
Gustafson’s contribution can be added to this discussion as his introduction of 
‘pseudomutuality’ (1979) resembles the idea of BaO (see also Lazaar’s use of ‘pseudo-
unity, 2004, p. 146). The main principle of this pseudomutuality, so he says, is the 
blurring of distinctions, differences and boundaries, such as, for example, the 
obscuring of internal disagreement and opposition, as the group perceives this to be 
catastrophic. Evident and distinctive boundaries within a group are interpreted as 
confrontational behaviour and ‘threats’ of individuation - “everyone must be ‘equal’ and 
‘equal’ means identical.” (Mosse and Zagier Roberts, 1994, p. 153). He summarises 
that “this pseudomutual defence against differentiation (…) relies (…) on camouflage.” 
(1979, p. 70) and draws further on Laing and Cooper who have described the same 
defence as “the resistance of the survival group against separationist action…” (1964, 
p. 135). Similarly, Bercovitch indicates the presence of Oneness in his own 
observations by reporting that “when departments are in conflict, individual members 
tend to bury their differences and display greater loyalty to their department.” (1983, 
p. 115). 
On the other hand, Lawrence et al. focus on the separation-seeking aspect of Bion’s 
groupishness. They introduce a fifth basic assumption, Ba “Meness” (BaM) and 
proclaim it to be the opposite of BaO: “baM equals ba not-O” (1996, p. 31). They 
explain that when the individual feels threatened by social dynamics, a retreat into the 
inner world becomes a comfortable solution that offers refuge and shelter. Hereby, 
“the individual loses faith and trust in any structure, (…) that is greater than the 
individual.” (1996, p. 32). McMillan describes in her own words the forces of Meness as 
“an attempt to openly assert independence from the group by a member” (1981, p. 
479). Lawrence and colleagues then go on to portray a rather negative image of an 
individual in BaM, with diagnosis such as selfishness and paranoid tendencies towards 
the group, with the exception that BaM can have its temporary uses for the ultimate 
advancement of the work group. They say that “there is a necessity for all of us to 
withdraw deeply into ourselves (…) in order that we can reengage with the external 
environment”. (1996, p. 44).  
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7.2.2. The Tension between Meness and Oneness 
The relationship between BaM and BaO needs to be further investigated. Bion 
describes it as a dilemma by stating that the human being “wishes to be part of the 
group and at the same time to remain a separate (entity)….” (Bion, 1970, p. 85).  And 
Lawrence et al. express the idea that BaM and BaO are two opposing forces in their 
formulation “…ba M equals ba not-O” (1996, p. 31). Understanding the two forces as 
not being able to occur without the other, like two sides of the same coin, creates 
tension that pulls the individual into and back out of the group. For clarification 
purposes, I am illustrating this idea in figure 19: 
 
                                   
        BaM (Lawrence et al.)                     BaO (Turquet)  
      
Turquet stresses the oscillating nature between these two extremes, with the position 
from which both individual as well as social needs of the group member can be 
satisfied, as constantly being lost and ‘re-found’. On the one hand, there is the pull 
towards “I-ness” (Turquet, 1975) at play which strives to preserve the individual 
identity of personhood from annihilation of the group. Borrowing the terminology of 
Turquet (1975) I shall label this force ‘pull towards idiosyncrasy’. On the other hand, 
there is the pull towards group membership which is easiest attainable by getting ‘lost 
in the crowd’ and serves to protect the group from the idiosyncrasy of the individual. 
By so doing, the group’s aim is to create homogenisation, “that is, survival by all being 
alike, sinking or swimming together.” (Turquet, 1975, p. 92). Again borrowing from 
Turquet, I shall call this force ‘pull towards homogeneity’ (figure 20). Please note that 
this diagram stresses the idea that the two forces take effect on the group member in 
any position along the spectrum, not only at its extreme ends of Meness and Oneness; 
in other words, an individual in BaM will still experience a pull towards homogeneity 
and an individual in BaO will still experience a pull towards idiosyncrasy. 
 
                                                        
      BaM (Lawrence et al.)                           BaO (Turquet)  
 
Tension 
Figure 19: Diagram of tension 
Pull towards Idiosyncrasy 
Pull towards Homogeneity 
Figure 20: Diagram of tension creating forces 
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There are a handful of other authors (figure 20) who have tried to link BaO and BaM 
together in a single model, and although partly declaring to argue against each other, 
an intense analysis has led me to conclude that the main difference between 
contributions is the use of terminology to describe the same underlying dynamics, 
rather than any disagreement on theoretical grounds. Indicating that the literature 
centred on these dynamics is not conclusive, Scharff and Scharff (2003) point out that 
the distinction between the dynamics described by the following contributors remains 
problematic (cited by Hopper, 2003). 
It was Bion himself who, without using any concrete terminology, made the 
inescapable connection between these dual forces clear: “The group is often used to 
achieve a sense of vitality by total submergence in the group, or a sense of individual 
independence by total repudiation of the group…” (1961, p. 91). Similarly, based on 
three case studies of groups, Cano (1998) unites both BaO - driven by the fantasy of 
seamless union - and BaM – driven by the fantasy of self-sufficient individualism - as 
subordinated counterparts of the same basic assumption that she names ‘Grouping’ 
(BaG). However, she sees these dynamics as only occurring in groups where 
formation, reformation or dissolution is imminent, while I understand them, as stated 
earlier, to be part of everyday group life. 
In 2003, Earl Hopper contributed a further suggestion to extend Bion’s original three 
basic-assumption mentalities which is, to my knowledge, the most detailed elaboration 
besides Turquet’s. Hopper introduces his own terminology to express his idea of 
interplay of two opposing group defence forces against annihilation anxiety on the one 
hand, and separation anxiety on the other, based on cohesion and incohesion. Fear of 
annihilation, so he explains, is interlinked with the fear of separation as “separation 
from an object with whom one has fused is likely to be felt as losing a part of one’s 
self.” (2003, p. 54). Such anxiety, he argues, is experienced as the fear of intrapsychic 
fission and fragmentation, which in turn evokes the defensive response of introjective 
fusion and confusion. The outcome of this dynamic is a group regression into a state of 
mass. Here then, Hopper postulates, new anxieties are provoked such as fear of 
suffocation, being swallowed or becoming a puppet. Such felt threat is now defended 
against via the formation of or retreat into an aggregate, which is presented by Hopper 
as the bi-polar counterpart of the regressed state of mass. However, in this state, the 
sources of anxiety are reversed yet again and the members of the aggregate are 
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experiencing fission and fragmentation anxiety anew. This leads to a self-repeating, 
self-reinforcing and infinite oscillation pattern. 
In summary, Hopper’s definition of aggregate is characterised by too much 
individuality, an excessive degree of role differentiation and no sympathy among 
members with regards to shared beliefs, norms and values. Such constellation is 
intertwined with ignorance, misunderstanding and normlessness, whereas a mass on 
the other end of the spectrum, is characterised by a loss of individual identity, minimal 
role differentiation and a shared illusion of solidarity with respect to beliefs, norms and 
values, in which it is impossible to cherish individual skills and idiosyncrasies (2003). 
Robert’s observations during an organisational consultancy project illustrate what this 
latter state can look like in practice (see also Diamond, 1998). He reports that “the 
whole team was anxious to maintain their hard-won cohesiveness, hence the decision 
to work generically. In the process, they had obliterated differences in skills, training 
and experience among members (…). There was a chronic ‘running cost’ in that the 
denial of differences disabled individual members from using their special skills (…). 
Anything which could not be done equally well by everyone could not be done by 
anyone.” (1994, p. 193). 
The two different states of aggregation and massification are resulting out of the same 
underlying defence mechanism like two sides of the same coin. Hence they are both 
together summarised by Hopper into one basic assumption: incohesion 
aggregation/massification (Ba) I: A/M. It is this emphasis he places on the duality in 
nature of the two anxieties provoking aggregates and masses that makes his 
contribution easy to align to Turquet and Lawrence et al. He describes a constant 
struggle away and towards the group, which is also easily brought into relation with 
Bion’s concept of groupishness. Both must be understood as one dual process, as 
incohesive groups tend to oscillate between the bi-polar states of aggregates and 
masses in a pendulum-like6 manner. 
Morgan-Jones (2010) agrees and sees Hopper’s explanation of ‘masses’ equal to 
Turquet’s BaO, and Hopper’s explanation of ‘aggregates’ equal to Lawrence and 
colleagues’ BaM. Hopper even points out his agreement of the oscillating relationship 
                                                          
6 Turquet and Hopper have both also used the term ‘kaleidoscopic’ synonymous to ‘oscillating’ 
and ‘pendulum-like’ to describe the relationship between the two opposing extremes of their 
respective continuum. However, I think that a kaleidoscopic process is of a very different 
nature, for which reason I have omitted the term here.  
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between the two by stating that “it is indeed important that Oneness and Meness 
should be considered together” (2003, p. 49), and that Meness is a defence against 
annihilation anxiety as much as Oneness is one against separation anxiety. 
7.2.3. Turquet’s Concept of Individual Member as Equilibrium 
A separate contribution by Turquet helps to further make sense of the tension the 
nuns accomplish. In his chapter on large groups (1975), Turquet does not talk of two 
positions of the individual (either member of the group or not), but rather of three 
different states of group membership: The Singleton (S.), the Individual Member (I.M.) 
and the Membership Individual (M.I.). With this model, Turquet postulates that the 
individual arrives in the group as a Singleton, independent of the group that he or she 
thereafter tries to become part of and relate to, and with a strong sense of a ‘stand 
alone’ self. The presence of the group though, with all its attraction of being able to 
satisfy the individual’s social needs, forces the Singleton into a process of 
transformation, whereby he or she becomes ‘converted’ into an I.M. with an altered 
and unique group role, which still differentiates him or her from other group members. 
This process is in itself difficult as it involves the individual to recognise his or her 
sense of self beyond the usual parameters of separate individuality, and the successful 
managing of this transition then results in a new personal I.M. definition.  
Now in the I.M. position, so Turquet goes on to explain, the individual has to fend off 
the threat of annihilation that is posed by the group of belonging, whereby the group 
will try to make him or her a M.I., with the group dominating over his or her individual 
self-definition and self–needs. Having become ‘the tool of the group’, or, ‘the 
consultant’s puppet’ are expressions Turquet uses to clarify this notion, and along with 
that, a link becomes clear to Hopper’s earlier introduced work who talks of masses as 
provoking anxieties in the individual of becoming a puppet (2003). 
Next to a relation to Hopper, a link between Gustafson’s and Turquet’s thoughts can be 
established, and Gustafson himself has expressed these. So he points out that those 
group members that take part in the illusive creation of pseudomutuality are M.I.s. His 
explanation then goes on to include the possibility of ‘rapid splintering’ as a last resort, 
should the efforts to maintain the pseudomutuality fail; a state that would certainly pull 
the group members into the Singleton state, following the “enormous yearning to ‘be 
oneself’, to feel the clear outline of oneself in motion, rather than the blurring of 
member into member.” (1979, p. 75). 
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Portrayed as an equilibrium position in which both forces of idiosyncrasy and 
homogeneity are successfully balanced, the I.M. state allows the individual to be both 
at the same time: part of the group, yet having separate identity from it, and therefore 
being able to form an answer to the question, “How can I remain the same in the 
midst of the other?” (Modell, 1997, p. 51). However, as emphasised earlier, rather than 
being a stable position, the I.M. is subject to a constant struggle to maintain this 
balance.  “Fusion/separation is thus an ever-present dynamic, the former leading on to 
M.I. and the latter leading back to a Singleton state.” (Turquet, 1975, p. 98). 
 
 
 
                            
Singleton/BaM               I.M.     M.I./BaO 
      
 
 
 
 
 
My main analytic advancement so far has been to draw parallels between Turquet’s, 
Lawrence et al.’s, Hopper’s, Gustafson’s and Cano’s contributions to group dynamics 
theory (figure 21). Hopper made the links explicit himself by stating that in order to 
achieve his suggested optimum degree of cohesion in a work group, “the majority of 
participants must have become ‘Individual Members’.” (2003, p. 42). He further 
explicates that in the state of aggregate, “people tend to be (Singletons)” (2003, p. 
72), and during a mass constellation, “people tend to be ‘Membership Individuals’.” 
(2003, p. 72). 
Before I extend my own argument further, I need to point out some contradiction of 
my interpretation of Turquet to that of Lawrence and colleagues. The later authors 
clearly state in their work that they are adding a distinct additional stage to Turquet’s 
three stage continuum of Singleton - I.M. – M.I., namely the element of “Me-
Singleton”, and they thereby differentiate it with emphasis from Turquet’s “I-
(Ba) I:A/M – 
Aggregate 
(Hopper) 
(Ba) I:A/M – Mass 
(Hopper) 
& 
Pseudomutuality 
(Gustafson) 
Oscillation, Dual Polarity = Ba Grouping (Cano) 
Response to fusion anxiety 
Response to fragmentation anxiety 
Pull towards Homogeneity 
Pull towards Idiosyncrasy 
Figure 21: Diagram showing the links between referenced authors 
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Singleton”. They explain that their reason for doing so is because it is the “Me” part of 
the “I”, which puts the individual in such a basic assumption state that they do not 
want to form a relationship with other Singletons in the first place: Meness “hates the 
idea of ‘we’.” (1996, p. 32). Bains makes this explanation clearer by adding that in 
BaM, individuals behave via emotional distancing “as though there was not a group 
present” at all (2005, p. 33). They contrast this to Turquet’s description of Singleton 
state, as here the individual is looking to form a relationship with other Singletons in 
the group. However, if we look at Turquet’s description of occasionally uprising “I-
ness” of the individual, he does actually touch upon the very same explanation as do 
Lawrence at al.: “The exercise of such choice [to be an I.M., a Singleton or to opt out 
of the group], whether consciously known or not, is the occasion for the expression of 
individuality, of ‘I-ness’. (…) these transitional states may allow (the person) to re-
assert his own particular individuality (in a) sudden upsurge of ‘himselfness’, a state of 
‘I-ness’.” (1975, p. 96). So Turquet does indeed cover with the ‘I-ness’ element of his 
Singleton terminology the wish of the individual to opt out from the group completely, 
and along with that, I do not find it helpful to distinguish between Turquet’s I-
Singleton and Lawrence and colleagues’ Me-Singleton in order to further my own 
argument.  
7.2.4. Affiliation to the Convent Experience 
Referring back to my observations of the convent community, the ‘oceanic feelings of 
unity’ Turquet uses to describe BaO are the very aims of a nun’s purpose in life; to 
strive towards union is their raison d’être. The personification of the Oneness as 
indicated by Turquet is also represented in the community’s belief system, as the 
Sisters strive towards their communion by acknowledging their being part of the body 
of Christ. When praying together in silence, the nuns also resemble the passive 
participation in a powerful union with an omnipotent force that Turquet depicts; at 
least this is the impression I gained. Nevertheless, beyond the sheer definition of 
Turquet’s BaO, its application to my own observations becomes problematic for two 
predominant reasons. First of all, he states that since Oneness is a basic-assumption 
mentality, the group has come away from fulfilling its primary task. However, it is the 
primary task of the convent community to create union. Secondly, he continues to 
declare that as with all basic-assumptions mentalities, the group behaves like a closed 
system with the sole purpose of its existence stemming from within the group. 
141 
 
Following my fieldnotes though, the community’s integration with its environment 
mirrors an open system. 
Similar difficulties restrict the application of Lawrence et al.’s concept of BaM to the 
case study material. Although I have witnessed on a number of occasions the nuns’ 
appreciation for isolation and retreat, this does not supersede their prioritising the well-
functioning of the group, nor did they display paranoid tendencies towards the group, 
as Lawrence et al. proclaim. However, their proposition that “there is a necessity for all 
of us to withdraw deeply into ourselves (…) in order that we can reengage with the 
external environment”. (1996, p. 44), does seem to come close to the Sisters’ frequent 
concentration onto their inner selves.  
Since the application of Oneness to my experience of the convent community proved 
somewhat problematic, McMillan’s related concept of Unity will be drawn into the 
discussion in the following.  
 
7.3. Unity as an Alternative to Oneness 
The convent community’s concept of Oneness is very different from the one Turquet 
explicates. This is predominantly so because the group Turquet describes, perceives 
any kind of differences among members as a threat. It is hence intolerant of any such 
differences that weaken the sought after homogeneity. The Oneness as the nuns 
understand it entails more tolerance of difference. Here, union is not achieved through 
homogeneity, but through shared interest and belief. Difference is therefore seen as a 
necessary ingredient of a healthy community. 
McMillan introduces her understanding of Unity as being similar to Oneness, yet 
sufficiently different to award it its own status. She proclaims that Unity results in 
synthesis from the bringing together of diverse elements, and has to be distinguished 
from Turquet’s description of Oneness as boundaries between members remain clear 
and distinct (1981). Turquet did not make such distinction as for him, unity was a core 
characteristic of Oneness – it was ‘oceanic’. Along with this, McMillan portrays Unity as 
a group constellation in which the wholeness composed by diversity of members 
guarantees its commitment to learning and growth. Along with this, every encounter 
with difference is taken as an opportunity for reintegration. 
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McMillan (1981) emphasises that Unity results in synthesis from the bringing together 
of diverse elements. This diversity in Unity is capable of recognising both, the ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ in objects and also within the Unity itself. We have seen from previous 
extracts from my fieldnotes that this, the recognition of the ‘whole’, is a dominating 
principle of the convent community (“God loves the mixture”), which has been used in 
this research as an example of a Unity group. McMillan contrasts this to those 
constellations which deny the existence of evil, or in fact, deny the existence of 
difference per se. This denial of the ‘bad’ then makes up the emotional basis for 
Oneness. 
McMillan’s idea of recognising both ‘good’ and ‘bad’, owning it as one’s own 
responsibility, rather than trying to find the source of it in some outgroup, explains the 
lack of projecting of a Unity group. She further includes one of her own case studies, in 
which a very fragmented group due to their members’ being from different 
nationalities and backgrounds, had found a way to overcome their disintegration 
anxiety by forming a Oneness group and creating an external ‘bogey’ onto which bad 
feelings were projected: One member introduced her recent experience with the CIA 
which led her to have feelings of distrust with regards to revealing her feelings, and in 
the development of the session, this story turned into a general atmosphere of distrust 
carried by the entire group. The group pulled together in Oneness against a common 
outside enemy. McMillan interprets this ‘bogey’ of a CIA agent as an attempt to identify 
a cause of doubt within the group about whether their task could be achieved onto a 
source outside the group. 
The issue of difference in groups is an important one. Since its investigation from the 
literature on ‘extended community’ brings additional understanding to the primary data 
of this research, I will include some key sources here. Next to Peck’s notion that a real 
community tolerates difference (1987), Greene’s definition of the ‘extended’ 
community is characterised by being “attentive to difference, open to the idea of 
plurality” (1993, p. 17), and grounded on “the desire to extend the reference of ‘us’ as 
far as we can” (1993, p. 18). In the same line of thought Thayer-Bacon and Bacon 
explain that:  
“The extended community redefines the division of “us and them” and expands 
the boundaries to treat former others of difference as new others of similarity. 
In this case the notion of community is no longer founded on mere common 
characteristics, among members, but on the shared ideology of democracy and 
inclusive wills.” (1998, p. 109). 
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I will draw in a further source to make the distinction between Turquet’s Oneness and 
McMillan’s Unity apparent. In a paper that reports from a religious perspective, Vieten, 
Amorok, and Schlitz (2006) describe the concept of Oneness in very similar terms to 
Turquet. Here as well, characteristics such as interconnectedness with Others and a 
sense of interpersonal unity, as well as fusion with and dissolving of boundaries 
between self and Others are presented as common features of Oneness. Likewise, 
feelings of alignment with a greater force are described. However, the authors also 
emphasise that such a state of Oneness does not involve a feeling of selflessness. This 
is a key assertion. The self remains clearly defined, but now through the relationship 
with Others rather than as an isolated existence; a state that makes the theoretical link 
to Turquet’s portray of I.M.  
Along with that, despite using the term Oneness, Vieten et al.’s description reminds 
more of McMillan’s understanding of Unity, and I have added it here because I also 
understand it as such. 
The idea of preservation of clear self-boundaries is an important and reoccurring one. 
For example, Turquet explains that for a Singleton to be successful in navigating the 
transition into I.M. without succumbing to M.I. is that it first has a clear boundary 
which both defines and limits itself, or, to refer back to Winnicott, to know what is 
‘me’, and to know what is ‘not me’ (1987). It might be that the nuns use their time in 
isolation to constantly re-establish their inwards gaze so as to renew their self-
boundaries. This notion would certainly go in line with my observation, and this 
process in turn could equip them for the constant struggle of remaining in I.M. without 
succumbing to M.I. According to Turquet, while remaining within one self’s quietness, 
one can truly be a Singleton (1975). 
To apply Turquet’s definition of the I.M. and combine it with Vieten et. al.’s assertion, 
he stipulates that, despite the usual parameters of separate individuality having been 
transcended, the I.M. is a state in which boundaries still both define and limit the 
individual. The new role as I.M. does not involve a feeling of selflessness, as enough 
opportunity for self-expression is given within it (figure 22). 
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7.3.1. Affiliation to the Convent Experience 
The nuns’ group constellation is a closer resemblance to the Unity group than to the 
Oneness group; it is the “synthesis of a dialectic.” (McMillan, 1981, p. 480). By striving 
to connect with all humanity through ‘the Body of Christ’, the community creates a 
union that grows through principles of plurality. Tolerance of difference is their 
hallmark, turning every encounter with an Other, such as for example my entry into 
their life, into an opportunity for learning. In contrast to a Oneness group, they do not 
become selfless individuals and neither do they feel threatened by annihilation of the 
group and retreat into the Singleton state (Turquet, 1975). 
This emphasis is in so far important to make, as religious communities are often 
believed to adhere to totalitarian cultures. Diamond and Allcorn’s publication (2006) 
helps to counteract this common belief. Without explicitly using the terminology 
Oneness group and Unity group, they separate organisational groups into these two 
states. They postulate that on the one hand, some groups promote communication and 
performance by “acknowledging differences, new ideas, challenges to the status quo, 
and conflicts….” (2006, p. 55), and are capable of containing the paradox caused by 
plurality, diversity and complexity; a description which equates to the convent 
community as a Unity group. On the other hand, the authors depict some groups that 
are totalitarian-like closed systems, relying on submission and domination to “reinforce 
ideological homogeneity, uniformity and simplicity” (2006, p. 55), rendering them 
incapable to tolerate difference; a description which equates to a Oneness group and is 
therefore not applicable to the convent community. 
I believe that the nuns were constantly working at maintaining the equilibrium 
between idiosyncratic and homogenetic forces by balancing the tension between them. 
Pull towards Idiosyncrasy 
Pull towards Homogeneity 
Figure 22: Diagram showing the position of Unity 
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They have committed themselves to a life of constant readjustment to Turquet’s 
position of I.M., which allows them to live in Unity – not in Oneness. As stated earlier, 
this position is an ideal one and due to the constant tension difficult to maintain. I 
therefore suggest a ‘space’ rather than a ‘spot’ (or position), within which the convent 
community oscillates (see figure 23). 
 
 
 
                                              
                   
                Singleton                                              M. I. 
   
 
 
Having applied the discussion on the balance of the tension between idiosyncrasy and 
homogeneity to the convent community, I can now also make sense out of the Sisters’ 
heavy reliance on their strict daily timetable. Comparing all activities they have to 
undertake on a daily and weekly basis shows that the schedule supports the balancing 
act of a Unity group. It is possible to class activities into those which support 
idiosyncrasy, such as for example, individual meditation and time for the pursuit of 
individual arts and crafts, and those that foster homogeneity, such as for example, 
prayers in chapel, choir rehearsals and the group recreational times. 
Since I am not as mature as the Sisters, I can contribute one of my own experiences of 
oscillating beyond the boundaries of I.M. during my stay with the community (figure 
23). In the data presentation chapter I share an extract from my fieldnotes, in which I 
describe an episode of ‘conflict’ I had with one of the sisters. As has become evident 
from the description of my own feelings, I was pulled into the Singleton state, where I 
wished for nothing more than to escape from the other members of the community 
and withdraw within myself (“I wanted to retreat like a snail would into its shell.” (2-
37)). However, my need for belonging superseded this defensive retreat and led me to 
confide my frustration in another Sister. After sharing my emotions and listening to her 
advice, I felt drawn into the group again (surprising given I only stayed there for five 
weeks). 
 
I.M. (The Convent 
Community) 
Me 
 
Figure 23: Diagram showing the ‘space’ of I.M. 
Equilibrium: 
Holding/Containing the Tension 
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Moreover, my general perception that the Sisters stayed strongly differentiated from 
each other without any signs of deindividuation further designates the community’s 
commitment to plurality. Difference is not perceived as a threat. Along with that, my 
welcoming and seamless assimilation into the group as opposed to my past 
experiences of being a newcomer can be scrutinised with the notion of Unity rather 
than Oneness. The Abbess explained to me that having me living and sharing with the 
community is a great opportunity for them to learn. This emphasises anew their 
commitment to learning, growth and tolerance, as the former two cannot be achieved 
without the support of the latter. 
7.3.2. Oneness as Basic-Assumption Mentality and Unity as Work Group Mentality 
The discussion so far has tapped on Bion’s notions of work group and basic-
assumptions group mentality, and since the similarities in definition between Oneness 
and basic-assumption mentality, as well as between Unity and work group mentality 
are striking, these will now be made focus of attention. 
A handful of authors have attempted to distance themselves from the idea that 
Oneness is an additional basic assumption. McMillan (1981), for example, postulates 
that it actually manifests itself before any of Bion’s other original three basic-
assumption mentalities, as the group first has to feel conform, such as is the case with 
a Oneness group, before moving into Dependency, Fight/Flight or Pairing – these are 
behaviours exercised by the group as one body. Conformity is a key term here. 
Oneness, which I present to be the group constellation of a majority of individuals in 
M.I. state, is not an extension of the three basic assumptions Bion originally formulated 
– it is basic-assumption mentality itself. In reviewing Hopper’s argument, Schermer 
agrees and states that (Ba) I:A/M “is not an ‘assumption’, but is a ‘pre-assumption’ 
(…), establishing the very primitive boundary conditions that enable basic assumptions 
to occur in the first place.” (2003, p. 173; emphasis original. Note that he is referring 
to Dependency, Fight/Flight and Pairing when talking about ‘basic assumptions’).  
As stated excessively in the literature, in any of Bion’s basic-assumption mentalities, 
the group has come to a common belief of a distorted reality. The according emotional 
state is therefore shared among group members; they feel and act as one, even if 
unconsciously (Miller, 1998). In accordance with this notion, Sutherland (1985) 
comments that individuals lose their distinctiveness to other group members when 
being in basic-assumption mentality. He states that “in the work group, individuals 
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remain individuals and co-operate, whereas in the basic assumption group they are 
swept spontaneously by the ‘valency’ of identification, into the undifferentiated unity of 
the group in which inner realities overwhelm the relationship with the real task.” (1985, 
p. 64). This is the exact same dynamic with which McMillan describes the group myth 
of Oneness.  
Clear parallels between characteristics of a group in work group mentality and a Unity 
group, as well as characteristics of a group in basic-assumption mentality and a 
Oneness group have become evident. Miller (1998) draws similar conclusions and also 
disregards presented attempts at expanding the ‘list’ of basic assumptions on the basis 
that even Hopper’s work still refers to the relatedness of the individual to the group 
rather than concentrating on an investigation into the group dynamic itself. He 
exempts from his judgement Turquet’s Oneness – and exemption that I would not 
make. My argument depicts Oneness as basic-assumption mentality, not even pre-
basic-assumption mentality. 
This however, does not necessarily pose any contradiction to Bion’s original thoughts, 
but rather involves a re-reading of his work with different emphasis. In order to do so, 
French and Simpson (2010) were instrumental. They present some of Bion’s notions 
from a novel angle which brings to the fore that he was already familiar with the 
dynamic of Oneness. So they assert that the tipping over into basic-assumption 
mentality is “somehow agreed by the group without being aired…” (2010, p.1863, 
emphasis added). They explain that this somehow agreed ‘as-if’ decision then guides 
group behaviour, and that, most important to stress for my own line of thought, “such 
a group does indeed appear to be of one mind.” (2010, p. 1863). Eisold quotes Bion in 
a similarly helpful way while reporting of his own observations: “I realize I am 
expressing my feeling, not of the group’s disharmony, but of its unity. (…) for every 
attempt I make to get a hearing shows I have a united group against me.” (Bion, 
1961, p. 52, quoted by Eisold, 2005b, p. 359). Eisold then elicits from this Bion’s 
‘discovery’ of an unconscious group collusion. 
Seeing a selection of Bion’s contributions reiterated in such sequence does indeed 
strongly resemble the characteristics that Turquet ascribed to Oneness. Miller adds to 
this Bion’s formulation of “a state of fusion without purpose” (1998, p. 50), indicating 
the deviation from the primary task. Likewise, the notion that “the group’s behaviour 
then makes it look as though, what has actually been assumed in fantasy only has 
been agreed in reality” (1998, p. 50, emphasis original), and, “the ‘as-if character of 
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basic-assumption mentality means that (…) something else appears to be – is 
‘assumed’ to be – more ‘real’..” (French and Simpson, 2010, p. 1868) resembles the 
portrayal of McMillan’s group myth of Oneness presented earlier. 
Lastly, Fraher (2004) is helpful to support my argument: She states that Oneness 
should not be understood as an extension in numbers to Bion’s original three basic-
assumption mentalities; together with the counterforce Meness, with which it creates 
an inseparable tension, it describes an ever present force that binds and separates the 
individual from the group, and plaits itself along the dimensions of Bion’s groupishness. 
As established earlier, Oneness, a state in which the majority of group members have 
become M.I.s, is the group state of basic-assumption mentality. 
Unity on the other hand, which is the group constellation of the majority of members in 
the I.M. state, is characterised by development, learning and growth through 
creativity, for which diversity and pluralism is the main driver. Such are also the 
characteristics of a group with work group mentality (figure 24). 
 
 
 
                               
            Singleton           I.M.          M.I. 
        No Group                W G Mentality /          B-A Mentality / 
          Unity Group        Oneness Group 
 
 
I concluded earlier that conformity is the predominant characteristic of the Oneness 
group. Since this dynamic ‘prohibits’ diversity, it is the direct opposite to the tolerance 
of difference of the Unity group. In the following, I will elaborate further on this 
characteristic, as it will support the case for attributing work group mentality to the 
Unity group and basic-assumption mentality to the Oneness group. 
Tolerance and intolerance of difference has been identified as one of the major 
distinguishing characteristic for the concepts of Oneness and Unity (McMillan, 1981). 
Similarly, French and Simpson state that work group mentality is characterised by the 
capacity to accept “the tension between shared intention and individual differences.” 
(2010, p. 1868). They further refer to Lawrence et al., (1996) who emphasise that in 
Pull towards Homogeneity 
Pull towards Idiosyncrasy 
Figure 24: Diagram aligning group constellations to mentalities 
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order for work group mentality to be established, ‘people with minds’ are necessary; 
not a ‘group-mind’. Likewise, they add Armstrong’s notion that basic-assumption 
mentality is hampering creative space (2005); hence, creativity cannot flourish. Shotter 
and Gergen (1989, cited by Lazaar 2004) add that such lack of creativity due to the 
need to ‘flee’ from the acknowledgement of difference can lead to a ‘lock-step’ type of 
organising.  
Coming back to Bion’s original work, he does report of individuals’ assertions that they 
‘cannot think’ in the group and hence wish to withdraw themselves from the rest 
(1961, p. 95). Similarly, in depicting Oneness, Hayden and Molenkamp explicate that 
“(m)embers of oneness groups appear to lose their capacity to think and instead get 
filled with a sense of being merged with each other.” (2004, p. 143). This does 
strongly resemble outcomes of the group phenomenon called conformity, or ‘group 
think’ (Janis, 1972), whereby group members lose the ability to exercise individual 
judgement. This in turn, is another principal characteristic of Oneness, and it has to be 
emphasised here that conformity is portrayed as an unconscious dynamic, 
differentiating it from those occasions when an individual consciously chooses not to 
speak up so as to not stand out from the group.  In a state of Unity, however, such 
creativity-harming and difference-suppressing conformity characteristics do not occur, 
as group members are a collection of I.M.s.  
According to Gabriel, in a state of conformity, “(e)verything comes under the sway of 
the group, which precludes spontaneously acting on our desires and the individuality 
and initiative that grow out of that spontaneity” (2004, p. 67). This description of 
power that the group holds over its members, together with its intolerance of 
individuality, difference, disagreement and criticism (Janis, 1972) does indeed 
resemble one of the principle conditions of Oneness, and so does Gabriel’s notion that 
members of such group will experience themselves as being like everyone else in their 
group (Janis, 1972). Illustrating clinical examples of conformity, Schafer adds that 
individuals in an conforming state “shrink their potation for using inner life creatively in 
work, love and play.” (1997, p. 29). The assertion that members have a vested interest 
in and are striving towards maintaining the group which has become an idealised entity 
(Manz and Neck, 1997) also shows parallels to the wish to fuse with oceanic unity in 
the Oneness state (Turquet, 1985). And as McMillan (1981) and Hopper (2003) pointed 
out, so does Gabriel (2004) conclude that groups of conformity are only cohesive in 
fantasy. Smith, Hogg, Martin and Terry add that “Conformity creates intragroup 
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consensus, agreement and uniformity, and it produces a shared expectation of 
agreement.” (2007, p. 773). 
Another psychoanalytic contributor, Morgan-Jones, adds that “fusion and pseudo-
solidarity turn Singletons into anonymous homogenised group members…” (2010, p. 
87). Differences are actively, though not consciously ignored, with the result that the 
group, which is really incohesive, acts “as if” it is strongly cohesive. Hartman adds that 
despite strong adhesive attachments, integration is low, making an ‘adhesive’ group 
less cohesive than a ‘cohesive’ one (1981, cited by Hopper 2003). 
7.3.3. The Valency of Oneness? 
Re-interpreting Oneness to be basic-assumption mentality itself also calls for a 
revisiting of Bion’s idea of ‘valency’. Bion (1961) borrowed the term from the discipline 
of Chemistry, in which it determines the number of bonds an atom can form with other 
atoms so as to create higher order chemical units. In his own use, he defines it as “the 
capacity of the individual for instantaneous combination with other individuals in an 
established pattern of behavior.” (1961, p. 175). Hereby each individual has a different 
valency or disposition for forming one of Bion’s three basic assumptions with other 
group members, but he never established any differences or a ‘typology’ of valencies. 
This definition is in so far compatible with my new interpretation of Oneness as basic-
assumption mentality per se, as it draws attention to the ‘degree’ of bond between 
group members, rather than to what type of bond they are developing. Delivering the 
counterpart to this drive to bonding is Hafsi, who postulates a “minus valency” (2006, 
p. 34) that has the reverse function of valency. Rather than drawing individuals to each 
other, this drive resembles the idiosyncratic forces described earlier in so far as it 
annuls and works against any interpersonal bonding. Such comparison provokes the 
question whether there are people who are more prone to succumb to conformity, 
described previously as being a typical characteristic of a Oneness group than others.  
7.3.4. Application of Key Modes of Interaction (KiD, KiF/F, KiP) 
I have claimed that Oneness is the equivalent to basic-assumption mentality. In other 
words, for either BaD, BaF/F or BaP to occur, Oneness needs to manifest itself first. 
While being confident in these findings so far, I am simultaneously faced with a 
contradiction: the nuns were not in Oneness, and yet I have made clear observations 
of what I know as BaD dynamics. So for example, submission to an omnipotent Other 
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is at the core of the community’s principles. In order to lead my analysis out of this 
confusion, drawing French and Simpson (2010) back into the discussion proved to be 
enlightening: 
French and Simpson’s core argument is that Dependency, Fight/Flight and Pairing can 
be either inhibitive to or supportive of the group’s purpose. They give examples for this 
from their own research, when these dynamics were indeed necessary to achieve the 
primary task. Along with this, they have opened a previously hidden door to a 
drastically new way of thinking about Bion’s contributions: They have ‘divorced’ , to my 
knowledge for the first time in the existing body of knowledge, the notions of D, F/F 
and P from the concept of basic-assumption mentality and given them an important 
‘status’ by themselves. D, F/F and P are now ‘Key Modes of Interaction’  (KiD, KiF/F 
and KiP) that can occur both, in groups in work-group mentality, in other words Unity 
groups, as well as in groups in basic-assumption mentality, in other words Oneness 
groups.  
The core difference lies in the purpose these states are serving. If they serve to 
progress the primary task, they can be understood as having the function of 
containment of anxieties and other group emotions. Even the unpopular action of 
procrastination, an example given by the authors themselves as putting the group ‘off 
task’, I can now see as supportive of the primary task. However, if these key modes of 
interaction are fulfilling the aim of defence against a felt threat – avoiding or covering 
up difficult emotions, for example, - then this will have rather disruptive consequences 
on group development and the pursuit of the primary task (figure 25). 
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Figure 25: Diagram of Key Modes of Interaction 
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Following this line of thought, I can now suggest that the Unity group also creates that 
containing environment, or, to use Winnicott’s terminology (1974), potential space, 
which is necessary to tolerate the ambiguity caused by creativity – trying out new, 
unfamiliar things -, diversity – with the possibility of disagreement and conflict -, and 
learning and change – referred to by the community as spiritual growth. Within a Unity 
group, each member can accept that there is “no resting place for identity (…) but a 
great need to tolerate ambiguity, tension and deferral of closure.” (Schafer, 1997, p. 
34). 
7.3.5. Affiliation to the Convent Experience 
The novel approach to understanding Bion’s original contribution suggested by French 
and Simpson has such relevance to my own argument as I am now able to understand 
the Sisters’ Dependency (KiD) within the construct of the Unity group. Submission to 
authority, a characteristic that Gould (1998) has claimed to be key for Dependency, is 
unquestioned in the convent, driven by the awareness of their dependency on God’s 
will and on each other; obedience is one of the three pillars of their life: “If one of our 
relationships in the community is not right, then our prayers are not right.” (1-62). 
However, despite the acknowledgement of this relationship, the nuns are not in basic-
assumption mentality; their perception of reality is not distorted by some unconscious 
defensive wish for fusion, but rather, the creation of union is a conscious decision and 
itself their primary task. 
Likewise, KiF/F is vital to the community’s commitment to learning and growth. My 
frequent observation of them sharing honestly and openly with their fellow Sisters their 
opinions is an action that opposes conformity. In the section ‘Traces of Conflict’, I have 
discussed a few incidents where this open sharing comes to show. It seems that 
similar dynamics are present during the weekly chapter meetings. Although I was not 
present at these meetings, many of the Sisters explained to me that they can 
occasionally be somewhat fierce, when people openly declare their disagreements and 
worries. I believe that such sharing supports the maintenance of a multiple perspective 
on their life, preventing the community from falling into ‘one best way of doing things’. 
As such, their attitude reflects their idiosyncrasies and passion for learning and growth. 
Lastly, KiP can also be detected within the primary data. Some of the daily tasks, such 
as for example gardening, require two Sisters to work closely together. Similarly, the 
Abbess will often ask the advice of the Vicaress, and the two of them will be better 
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able to come to difficult decisions. Additionally, the chapel choir is headed by two lead 
singers without a conductor, and I was fascinated in the first week of my stay about 
how incredibly well they are attuned to one another despite the inability to talk; they 
use their eyes only. 
7.3.6. The ‘Good’ and the ‘Bad’? 
According to most scholars, the nature of basic-assumptions mentality is described as 
being counter-productive to achieving the primary task of the group, or at least 
inhibitive of its pursuit. Since Oneness has been set equal to it, it is useful to reflect on 
the common interpretation of ‘bad’ due to its inhibitive character of the primary task.  
Hopper (2003) for example, describes it as a state of ‘social paralysis’ and Gustafson 
(1979) portrays it as preventing development. Some authors do allow for the possibility 
of temporary benefit of basic-assumption mentality, but with their emphasis on 
‘temporary’, they agree it is to be avoided. In this line of thought, Gosling states: “I 
noticed that what crept into my discourse was a faint suggestion of: “Work Group – 
good; Basic Assumptions Group – bad.”” (1994, pp. 1-2). Hence, Gosling brings to the 
fore what many authors implicitly believe. However, Gabriel points out that “(t)he issue 
of whether and how basic assumption behaviour may be constructively channelled are 
not conclusively resolved.” (2004, p. 125). 
By referring back to Bion’s original work, French and Simpson (2010) support the 
negative ‘taste’ of basic-assumption mentality: They explain, for example, that it 
‘diverts’ from the group’s purpose so that touch with it will be lost, from which the 
outcome is ‘stagnation’ of development. They also make clear that basic-assumption 
mentality ‘distracts’ or ‘obstructs’ progress with a change away from purpose. Since 
this happens on an unconscious basis, basic-assumption mentality also indicates a lack 
of reflexive awareness which is again ‘opposed’ to development. 
I will now make my own stance on the ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ of basic-assumption 
mentality clear. During the last few supervisory meetings, I was asked to occupy 
myself with the question whether the states of work group mentality and basic-
assumption mentality are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or whether they are rather just present 
always. My supervisors remarked that it was rather ‘misleading’ to think of one state as 
‘good’ and the Other as ‘bad’, as this would automatically lead to the assumption that 
one should be avoided. Their assertion goes in line with contributions from Bion 
himself, who used the terms work and basic assumption group to refer to two 
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descriptions of the very same group…”the two groups are in existence simultaneously. 
There is therefore no Work Group activity totally without signs of the going-on typical 
of a Basic Assumption Group…” (1961, p. 48). Likewise, Gosling concludes, “As there is 
no Work Group without some kind of Basic Assumption Group running concurrently, 
work cannot be performed efficiently unless the Basic Assumption culture is kept 
appropriate in kind and in amount.” (1994, p. 5). 
French and Simpson quote (2010) refer to Bion and others to illustrate the ‘binary 
structure’ of basic-assumption and work group mentalities. They state that this 
coexistence is only separable in theory and both parts offer an unconscious 
complement to one another. This interplay can then indeed ‘further’ work group 
development, rather than hamper it. Armstrong agrees and adds: “we are fated to 
experience the tension between the two, here, now, and always. Anything else is an 
illusion.” (2005, p. 141). “Basic-assumption mentality is, using Bion’s formulation, the 
“dual” of the work group.” (2005, p. 143). 
I find it helpful for the support of my own argument to reproduce my answer to my 
supervisors here7. First of all, I propose that whether one believes that the mentalities 
are good and bad or not, does not mean they cannot always and simultaneously 
coexist – these are two separate matters. I think the states of work group mentality 
and basic-assumption mentality do not always coexist –my aligning them with 
Turquet’s positions of Singleton, I.M. and M.I. turns them into a question of either/or 
indeed. However, in the terminology introduced earlier, the pulling forces towards 
either of them always exist; hence the tension between them does so, too. It is 
therefore not a question of whether the pull should or should not be avoided – 
because it cannot – and it is also not a question of whether this pull is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – 
because it just is – but, the question of whether its ‘extremes’, namely the states of 
Singleton and M.I. are ‘bad’ and should be avoided, I would answer clearly with yes. 
I have illustrated in this chapter that the Oneness group is characterised by conformity 
and the myth of complete cohesion. Such state leads to stagnation and an illusory 
perception of reality: total merger with the group. Any key mode of interaction in this 
position is anti-developmental. I am struggling to see the ‘good’ in the basic-
assumption mentality of the Oneness group as I have constructed it in this research. 
                                                          
7 This proves to be difficult due to the difference in use of terminology. Whereas my supervisors 
apply the concepts of work group mentality and basic-assumption mentality, I have introduced 
the terms ‘Unity group’ and ‘Oneness group’. 
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7.4. Chapter Summary 
The theoretical framework developed in this chapter concentrates on the pendulum-
like nature of group life. The concepts of BaM, Singleton and aggregates were 
presented in a combined manner as one extreme end of a spectrum, opposing BaO, 
M.I. and masses as the other extreme. Above all, the tension between these two 
positions has been emphasised and the equilibrium state of I.M. elaborated, where the 
tension between the constant pull towards homogeneity on the one hand, and 
idiosyncrasy on the other hand are balanced. 
Along with that, the interpretations were concerned with an underlying matter: the 
degree of bond between individuals and the group itself that the individuals have 
formed, together with the question of where the boundaries between these lie. 
The most valuable insight that came out of this discussion is the development of the 
concepts of the Unity group, aligning to Turquet’s I.M. position, and the Oneness 
group, mirroring Turquet’s M.I. position. Not only did these notions help to make more 
sense of my convent experience, but they also supported my understanding of the 
relationship between individuals in a group with work group mentality and with basic-
assumption mentality. 
It follows from these developments that Oneness is basic-assumption mentality, and in 
order to achieve and preserve work-group mentality, participants in a group, such as 
the convent community, have to be able to create Unity. In such Unity group, any of 
the three Key Modes of Interaction (KiD, KiF/F and KiP) can foster learning and 
growth, and hence the advancement of the primary task. 
This chapter comprises the core theoretical contribution of this research to the body of 
knowledge to date and is in turn based on my experiences of fieldwork in the convent 
community in case study three. In the following section, I will make use of my newly 
gained perspective and revisit case studies one and two. My aim is to combine insights 
from all three case studies so as to provide an integrated response to my research 
questions.   
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Chapter 8: A Second Look 
Readdressing and Redressing Case Studies 1 & 2 through Oneness 
Since my experiences and observations during fieldwork for case study three have 
remarkably altered my understanding of and underlying assumptions about the ‘Us 
versus Them’ mentality, I decided to return to the primary data of the previous two 
case studies. It was not until after my stay in the convent that I could turn my practical 
experiences into a significant advancement in my theoretical knowledge and I 
therefore wanted to seize the opportunity to apply this newly gained insight to the 
already familiar.  
 
8.1. The Hegemonic Power of Oneness at FutureCo 
The data presentation and preliminary analysis of case study one has identified a 
strong presence of hegemonic influence within the organisation which led to the 
instigation of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality from sides of the Clericals and the 
Industrials alike. The case study has enriched my understanding of these dynamics 
through versatile examples of how hegemony can manipulate self-perception and the 
perception of Others in such a way that the boundaries between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ are 
continuously and unconsciously fortified. Along with that, the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality at FutureCo has been portrayed as permeating the very texture of what it 
‘feels’ like to work there. Mistrust, suspicion and hostility towards the Other were 
companions of everyday life. 
It was further established that this hegemony manifests itself through unwritten rules 
which dictate individuals’ behaviour, opinion formation and perception. As such, 
hegemony has a stronghold over employees, as they conform to these unwritten rules 
unquestioningly, treating them as their own. The discussed notion that management 
rules have been introjected into the superego of employees offers an explanation to 
this feeling of ownership and conformity to it (Freud, 1986). 
The concept of Oneness introduced in the previous chapter has already claimed 
conformity as its predominant characteristic. In the following, I will integrate this new 
framework with the concept of hegemony and apply it to case study one so as to 
understand the forcefulness with which the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality at FutureCo 
was experienced. 
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The Oneness group cannot tolerate diversity. Any difference among members is 
interpreted as idiosyncratic movements threatening to disintegrate the group (Hopper, 
2003). People making up such a group are M.I.s (Turquet, 1975), thinking and 
speaking as one with the aim of constant agreement rather than learning. Smith, Hogg 
and Terry point out that “Conformity creates intragroup consensus, agreement and 
uniformity, and it produces a shared expectation of agreement.” (2007, p. 773). The 
resulting loss of individual distinctiveness and ability to exercise individual judgement 
(Sutherland, 1985) leads to some of Bion’s group observations of members 
complaining about not being able to think (1961). 
Such dominance of the group as a “thing-in-itself” (Lazaar, 2004, p. 140) over its 
members is also present at FutureCo. The memoir and interview do not only recall 
incidents of mine and the respondent’s behaviour, but also of Clericals and Industrials 
at large. The refusal to greet one of ‘Them’ (1-123), the efforts to maintain a ‘buffer 
zone’ in the canteen between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (1-25), and informal dress codes (1-31) 
differentiating ‘Us’ from ‘Them’ visually are but few examples of how both “groups-as-
a-whole” in their own rights (Bion, 1961) interact with each other. Deviations from 
these group norms are unusual, and if they occur, they attract great attention due to 
their rarity. The interviewee’s expression of gratitude for being offered a hand shake 
by a Clerical (2-88), the feeling of breaking a taboo when having lunch with me (2-10), 
as well as the accusation of cheating aimed at an Industrial who collaborated with a 
Clerical – the ‘enemy’ (2-46), support this assertion. The last example also shows what 
happens to a member of the Oneness group ‘Industrials’ who dares to ignore group 
norms: collaborating with a Clerical does not align to ‘the way we do things here – we 
don’t talk to Clericals’; being called a cheater equals the emotional expulsion from the 
group, in which case the M.I. is ‘degraded’ to a Singleton.  
Out of this discussion, hegemony can be seen as a ‘control tool’ of the Oneness group 
against desintegration anxiety, undermining any threat to its cohesion – illusory as it 
might be - that might be caused by idiosyncratic agendas of its members. Therefore, I 
do not portray management to be in control of hegemony as described in the literature 
(see for example Angus, 1992; Clegg, 1989); the remote control is not in the hands of 
management. Rather, they are themselves part of the Oneness group ‘Clericals’. It is 
the ‘group mind’ itself (Lazaar, 2004) that holds the reigns, and management is just as 
unconscious of this as other Clericals. Confirming such ability of the group itself to be 
in control, Ezriel (1952) adds that individuals in a group can be driven by forces 
158 
 
beyond their control, as if the group has an agency apart from the members 
composing it. Due to the unconscious nature of this dynamic, the state of M.I.s is a 
relatively stable one. The questioning of reality has become impossible (Schein, 2010), 
further stabilising the group myth of Oneness (McMillan, 1981).  
This line of thought contrasts Stacey’s understanding of group-as-a-whole, who states 
that “(f)ar from being lost, individuality is always constituted in a group. If one takes 
this perspective then there is no place for the notion of the ‘group-as-a-whole’ as an 
explanation of human action.” (2005, pp. 1-2). Case study one has indeed shown 
through real-life examples and in line with the theory of Oneness group how 
individuality can be consumed by the group. I would therefore suggest rephrasing 
Stacey’s conrtibution in such a way as to say that in a Unity group, “individuality is 
always constituted….”, but not in a Oneness group.  
It follows from this an important notion about the nature of the enemy-image as it has 
manifested itself in FutureCo. The Other, be it Clerical or Industrial, is not the enemy 
of the individual, but rather the one of the Oneness group. The dualistic character of 
the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality has been elaborated in the literature review. Duek, for 
example, states that “The need for an enemy is coupled with the need for a friend. 
They constitute two opposite poles of the same continuum and have a contradictory 
form of coexistence.” (2009, p. 71). Opposition in this case study defines the 
relationship between two Oneness groups, not individuals; however, it is important to 
repeat that it impacts so strongly on individuals’ interaction that it is now the group 
who determines the outcome, not the individuals themselves. 
I am therefore postulating that if a Clerical and an Industrial meet, so as did my friend 
and I for lunch in the canteen, it was not our individual ‘selves’ that identified as 
enemies, but rather our groups of belonging as we were acting as representatives of 
them. It was our group identity that undermined our individual identity and led us to 
feel as though we were breaking a taboo by not conforming to the unwritten rules. 
Although we met as two individuals, we were also embodying an intergroup action. 
However, it is important to emphasise that despite my feeling awkward, triggered by 
some sense of guilt or ‘wrong doing’ when interacting with my friend who was in that 
instance predominantly signified as being one of ‘Them’, I did chose to ignore these 
pressures and act according to my own will. This might be an indication that my 
valency for Oneness, as introducded earlier, is very low, for which reason I was still 
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able to meet with my friend, while individuals with higher valency for Oneness might 
not evade conformity dynamics. 
So far, the concepts of Oneness and hegemony have been aligned and their wide 
overlap emphasised. While this explains the development of ingroup stereotyping, it 
does not account for the tendency towards outgroup stereotyping and intergroup bias 
described by Perdue et al. (1990) with the resulting strong degree of enemy-thinking. 
That these dynamics were present in FutureCo, is mirrored for example by my boss’ 
devaluative mistrust regarding the Industrials’ professionalism in general (1-99) and 
likewise by the aggression with which Clericals are accused of not caring for Industrials 
(1-159). In fact, my entire account of both groups is stereotyped, and so are the 
interviewee’s assertions. 
Borrowing again from the theoretical framework of case study three, McMillan’s (1981) 
comparison of Unity and Oneness helps to bridge this gap in explanation building. 
According to her, diversity as well as commitment to learning on which Unity is based 
enable the group to recognise both, the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ elements of one’s own 
actions. She contrasts this to those constellations that deny the existence of evil, 
making up the emotional basis of Oneness. Applying this intolerance of the Oneness 
groups ‘Clericals’ and ‘Industrials’ to contain the ‘bad’, the urge for self-cleansing 
(Erlich, 1997) can reveal the groups’ tendency to project their own ‘bad’ parts onto the 
Other group, making their own respective ingroup all ‘good’, and the opposing 
outgroup all ‘bad’ – it has been turned, via projection, into the enemy.  
As previously, the discussion steers towards the underlying research question whether 
there is a ‘real’ enemy out there, wanting to do harm, or whether this enemy is the 
result of a distorted concept of reality. The analysis of the FutureCo case study 
supports the latter claim, enemy as distorted perception due to projection. Since the 
psychoanalytic body of knowledge portrays such intrapsychic dynamics as innate, the 
answer to my original research question would be that we do not have a choice but to 
have enemies, with FutureCo being a prime example. However, the data gathered 
during my convent stay in case study three contradicts this conclusion. Hence this 
confusion will be made subject to further scrutiny in the discussion chapter. 
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8.2. Oneness as Defence at the Fun Trust 
The data presentation and preliminary analysis of case study two has identified a 
generally sceptical and apprehensive attitude towards the suggestion for collaboration 
in both charities which was linked to four predominant risk factors. This suspicious 
state of mind was perceived to be stronger on sides of the Fun Trust, and the fact that 
the organisation would have to invest proportionately more resources into the project 
and therefore face higher risk than the Play Trust, was declared to be the underlying, 
‘real’ reason for this observation. With support of Robins and Post’s notion of paranoia 
(1997), the Fun Trust was then portrayed as being defensive towards the prospect of 
collaborating as well as displaying behaviour of intergroup bias by portraying the Play 
Trust in a more negative light. I will now combine these preliminary findings with the 
theoretical insights gained from case study three so as to derive at a more thorough 
understanding of the Fun Trust’s and the Play Trust’s mistrust. 
Scarcity of resources has been a constant problem for both organisations, not only in 
the current economic climate, but also, as interview responses show, since their 
foundation (J1 89, J1 146). Threats to survival are incidences that pave each charity’s 
history. Such times of crises could have provoked feelings that Hopper conceptualised 
as fragmentation and desintegration anxiety (2003), since the ceasing of an 
organisation equals desintegration of the group. Although I have previously postulated 
that Hopper’s insight does not only apply to traumatised groups, one can say that 
these two organisations have been through a lot of traumatic experience indeed. As a 
consequence of these anxieties, according to Hopper, the group regresses into the 
constellation of a mass and finds refuge there. As affirmed in the previous chapter, 
such state equals the constellation of the Oneness group.  
Since these traumatic experiences have been so frequent in the past and the ‘fighting 
through’ them has become such a significant part of the organisations’ identities, I 
speculate that the sheer prospect of having to face such risk again is enough to trigger 
the same defence pattern whereby the groups fall back into Oneness. My observation 
that the Fun Trust displayed more defensive behaviour than did the Play Trust leads 
back to the fact that there is more ‘at stake’ for them in case the proposed 
collaboration does not succeed. I was further convinced of this finding when comparing 
interview responses with regards to their opinion about the collaboration: Without 
exception, all eight interviewed staff out of the 22 employed told me that on the one 
hand, they are worried about the Play Trust diluting their professionalism and service 
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quality standards (for example: “the Play Trust spreading too thinly is a worry..” (J2 
118)), while simultaneously stating that they hardly know that organisation (for 
example: “I’d have to ask first about the Play Trust, what do they do?...” (J5 70)). 
Informal conversations with three further practitioners on home visits and team 
meetings reiterated these statements. Such agreement  could be interpreted as 
indicating a conforming group mind and the loss of individual judgement, which are 
the most striking character traits of a Oneness group.  
Two other circumstances that have been drawn out from the preliminary data analysis 
can be brought into conjunction with Oneness. Firstly, the strong overlap between 
employees’ values and the charities’ vision typically found in not-for-profit 
organisations creates an ideology manifesting itself in staff members’ identity as many 
of them have been part of their organisation since its inception (J1 4, J3 8, J5 22). 
Staff made a life commitment to the organisation, which is also a shared commitment 
between all of them: “People here really believe in what they do…” (R3 19). This 
passion for creating something together, accompanied by a readily observable ‘we-
spirit’, might create a group cohesion so tightly-knit, that it brings the group very 
‘close’ to Oneness. Therefore, it only takes a slight increase in anxiety levels, such as 
provoked by the prospective of an advancing risk, to ‘tip over’ the group into Oneness. 
The second circumstance builds upon the strong group cohesion of the first one and 
refers to the dense support network that both groups have created through it. The 
preliminary data analysis has illustrated that strong group cohesion is vital for the 
maintenance of high service quality, as it acts as container for difficult emotions. When 
on their own ‘out there’ on home visits, practitioners cannot work through these 
emotions but do so once back in the ‘refuge’ of the group. The resulting sharing of 
emotions and experiences might have additionally elevated group cohesion to such 
extend that the group is very ‘close’ to the state of Oneness. 
Lastly, the Fun Trust, the more sceptical charity with regards to the collaboration, has 
displayed more behaviour indicating the idealisation of the ingroup and intergroup bias 
than has the Play Trust. In a team meeting, for example, one nurse reported with 
great dislike that practitioners of the Play Trust had laid PVC flooring in a client’s 
kitchen during a home visit, and that she would never do such thing. This can be 
understood as a projection behaviour, like in case study one, aimed at idealising the 
ingroup and derogating the outgroup. 
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An outcome of this ‘second look’ is then that in case study one, Clericals and 
Industrials were presented as groups that had long been in a stubborn state of 
Oneness, whereas in case study two, the Fun Trust as a group showed tendencies 
towards Oneness characteristics such as conformity and a common aversion towards 
the Play Trust, but did not seem to have regressed to this defensive state completely. 
Simultaneously, the FutureCo case study presented strong patterns of the ‘Us versus 
Them’ mentality in the form of enemy-thinking, while such assertion for case study two 
would be an exaggeration of the situation. Having established this connection, the 
consecutive discussion chapter will investigate deeper into the parallels between 
Oneness and the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality.  
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Chapter 9: Discussion – The Lighthouse in Sight 
I set off into this research project driven by the wish to gain deeper insight into the 
dynamics surrounding the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality in organisations. I selected three 
case studies in different contexts, namely, the manufacturing plant of a profit-driven, 
multinational company, the collaboration plans of two local service orientated not-for-
profit organisations and a religious order, so as to pave the way for experiences as 
versatile as possible. Figure 26 summarises these different experiences of ‘Us versus 
Them’ with alignment to the theoretical developments from chapters seven and eight. 
In the following, I will clarify the different shapes of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality I 
witnessed in these real-life settings further and demonstrate what learning came out of 
this for me. 
 
 
 
             
                               
 ‘No’ Group      Work Group Mentality /             Basic-Assumption Mentality / 
    Unity Group                         Oneness Group 
 
 
 
9.1. ‘Us versus Them’ at FutureCo 
Case study one revealed an extensive amount of artefacts that made ‘Us versus Them’ 
highly visible to the observer. This did not only refer to clothing and other physical 
items, but also, and more importantly, to the behaviour of people involved. The 
dynamic left a strong flavour of mistrust and animosity in the mouths of all employees, 
accentuating the ‘versus’ that separated the ‘Us’ from the ‘Them’. The “we-spirit” 
communicated by the company slogan “Us at FutureCo” was suffocated by intergroup 
bias and hostility, making any hope for exchange and empathy utopian. 
Few, ‘rational’, circumstantially driven reasons were suggested that could have induced 
the divide between Clericals and Industrials, such as for example, the split nature of 
the task at hand into manual labour and administrative processes, as well as the 
The Fun 
Trust 
Convent 
Community 
Clericals & 
Industrials 
Figure 26: Positioning the three case studies within the suggested continuum 
The Play 
Trust 
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separation of physical space for production lines and offices; however, these 
circumstances did not account for the powerful opposition that marked the relationship 
between Clericals and Industrials.  
The case study also detailed power imbalances between Clericals and Industrials, 
brought about by the fact that decision-makers within the organisation – management 
– were Clericals. Industrials were restricted in their career path with regards to 
progression up the hierarchy, a dilemma of which the Marxist body of knowledge 
reports plentiful. However, the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality witnessed in this setting 
construed reasons reaching beyond the imbalance of this power aspect, as even I, the 
‘coffee-maker’ and ‘dish-washer’ at the very bottom of the organisational hierarchy, 
was subjected to the same animosity as my fellow clerical colleagues. To ‘Them’ 
(Industrials), we were all the same, and to ‘Us’ (Clericals), they were all the same. 
Clericals and Industrials alike did not only stereotype each other, but simultaneously 
embodied their own stereotype so that conformity was a dominant characteristic of 
both groups. Without awareness, group members followed so called unwritten rules, 
not questioning their purpose, consequence or origin. Along with that, distance 
between them was created in two dimensions through differentiation and 
discrimination: On the one hand, horizontally by a drifting apart based on the 
exaggeration of perceived differences due to intergroup stereotyping, and on the other 
hand, vertically by a drifting apart through the idealising of the Clericals and the 
devaluating of the Industrials. These dynamics were so permeable that they led to a 
distorted perception of reality on both sides, whereby Clericals felt superior and 
omnipotent and Industrials lost their sense of self-worth. In fact so much distance was 
created – referred to as ‘Grand Canyon’ in the introduction chapter – that no 
opportunity for learning about each other and alteration of perception of the Other was 
possible. Instead, Clericals and Industrials alike ‘stuck to their own camps’, thereby 
confirming their perception of the Other to be reflecting the ‘truth’: The enemy was 
real. It is therefore necessary to include in the discussion a reflection on how and why 
difference mutated into opposition at FutureCo. 
 
9.2. ‘Us versus Them’ at the Children’s Charities 
In contrast, case study two offered a much milder experience of the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality. Here, the phenomenon was experienced as scepticism and adverseness of 
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the Fun Trust towards the Play Trust more so than the other way around. I found this 
much easier to sympathise with, as the rationale for opposition seemed plausible, 
given the actual threat to the survival of the organisations posed; bankruptcy would 
result in the ceasing of the charity, and desintegration anxiety was hence based on 
something circumstantially driven and ‘real’. This is the most significant difference to 
case study one. Moreover, my engagement with the organisations could have led to an 
intensification of these anxieties, as I might have been perceived by the interview 
participants to be a promoter of the suggested collaboration, and hence making the 
threat more eminent.  
Next to these logic, circumstantially driven justifications for a cautious attitude, 
however, the analysis also protruded a tendency to perceive the ‘unknown Other’, in 
this case, the other charity, as a threat in a paranoid manner. Taken together, this 
perceived threat pushed staff into conformity, noticeable to me in the interviews, when 
all respondents raised the same concerns regarding the other charity despite 
admittedly lacking information about it. Their behaviour spoke of a group that had 
regressed into Oneness as a collective defence mechanism in the face of desintegration 
anxiety. 
This summative discussion of the first two cases outlines a development of thought 
with regards to myth and reality: Were there rational, circumstantially driven reasons 
at play that resulted in intergroup hostility, in other words, was there a ‘real’ enemy, or 
was the enemy-image a result of paranoid, disowned projections and hence only 
existed in the group’s phantasy? I will come back to this question shortly. It can further 
be drawn out of the discussion of the presented data that in case study one as well as 
in case study two, there was significant psychic distance maintained between the two 
groups making up ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, in the sense that knowledge about each other was 
meagre and opportunities to interact with each other overall lacking. This feeds further 
into the question around myth and reality, as an ‘unknown Other’ cannot logically also 
be classed as an ‘opposing Other’; if a person is unknown to me, there cannot exist 
any rational reasons for their being perceived as opponent. Yet the tendency persists, 
as outlined by the literature on stranger anxiety (see for example Volkan, 1988). I will 
henceforth draw contributions from the literature on the concept of stranger into the 
discussion to advance this development of thought. 
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9.2.1. The Stranger as Enemy 
There is a body of knowledge dealing with this inclination to turn the ‘unknown Other’ 
into an enemy, whereby the literature refers to Other also as ‘stranger’, and both 
terms are used interchangeably. This might in so far be understandable as the self 
maintains a psychical distance to the Other, who then does indeed remain unknown 
and strange. The term stranger itself, however, does not imply animosity. According to 
the Oxford English dictionary, a stranger is defined as “a person in a place or company 
that he does not belong to ....”. The term ‘enemy’, on the other hand, generally refers 
to a conscious and defined Other with whom there are reciprocal relations of 
opposition, struggle and hostility.  
Ostroff (2000) elaborates on this deviance in definitions more and points out that the 
meeting with people who seem significantly different is often accompanied by 
perceptions of threat, inflicting a tendency towards prejudice, fear, anger, hatred and 
hostility. Furthermore, Fornari (1966) talks about the previously mentioned stranger 
anxiety of the child as the first conceptualisation of the Other as enemy (see also 
Volkan, 1988). He emphasises that the child is responding to someone with anxiety 
who it has never met before, and hence never had negative experiences with. 
Accordingly, the “original establishment of the other as enemy is comprehensible only 
in terms of (projection) onto the stranger of a bad internal object.” (1966, p. 162), and 
Erlich (1990) adds that there has always been a great readiness to project onto the 
stranger the role of the enemy, “the destroyer of peace” (1990, p. 199). It is also 
interesting to note that the word ‘hostile’ derives from the Latin ‘hostis’, which 
originally referred to ‘stranger’ (Barash, 1991). 
There is also an extended body of knowledge discussing the closely related concept of 
Othering as a process, which will briefly be outlined here. Chang for example, 
differentiates between ‘Others of difference’ and ‘Others of opposition’. He states that 
the “perception of difference may play just as powerful a role as actual difference….” 
(2008, p. 26, emphasis added) and explains that if this difference is perceived as 
threat to the self, the ‘Other of difference’ transforms to ‘Other of opposition’. These 
Others, Chang continues, “are regarded as “enemies”….” (2008, p. 26). Canales (2000) 
uses a similar typology and introduces her ideas of inclusionary Othering, making the 
Other one of difference, and exclusionary Othering, making the Other one of 
opposition. 
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Baumann presents a possible interpretation of this dynamic by explaining that the 
stranger provokes hostility because of the degree of uncertainty embodied and 
consequently upsets the clear order of binary opposition: 
“Strangers”, he says, “are the premonition of that third element which should 
not be. These are the true hybrids, the monsters- not just unclassified, but 
unclassifiable. They question oppositions as such - the plausibility of dichotomy 
it suggests and the feasibility of separation it demands. They infringe onto the 
division of things.” (1991, p. 54).  
He further declares that they stand against the ‘cosy antagonism’ of this dichotomy 
and that against 
“this conflict torn collusion of friends and enemies, the stranger rebels. The 
threat he carries is more horrifying than that which one can fear from the 
enemy. The stranger threatens the sociation itself - the very possibility of 
sociation. And all this because the stranger is neither friend nor enemy; and 
because he may be both.  And because we do not know and have no way of 
knowing which is the case.” (1991, p. 55). 
One could argue that enemy projections onto the ‘unknown Other’ - the psychically 
distant Other - are easier justifiable to the self, and in one sense, the maintenance of 
distance to the ‘unknown Other’ is useful for that self who is in search for a suitable 
target of its projections. Bowles (1991) adds to this notion that the stricter group 
boundaries separate people, the easier it is for projections to be made. Applying this 
line of thought to case study one, one can speculate that as long as Clericals do not 
meet and get to know Industrials and vice versa, they can hold on to their phantasies 
of each other; the distance between them eradicates any opportunity to be proven 
‘wrong’. Likewise, in case study two, the Fun Trust ‘knew’ that the Play Trust would 
have difficulties matching their own high quality service and professionalism – a 
phantasy retained, despite the acknowledgement that information about the Play Trust 
was lacking that could justify their reasoning. This development of thought makes 
evident the need for a further reflection on the ‘reality of an enemy’, which will follow 
below. 
 
9.3. ‘Us versus Them’ in the Convent 
Case study three brought the focus of enquiry into the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality onto 
a new level in so far as my experiences forced me to question the actual ‘versus’ 
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between the ‘Us’ and the ‘Them’; I simply could not find a ‘Them’. My immediate 
assimilation into the group meant that in stark contrast to my past experiences as 
‘newcomer’ to a group, I was welcomed as one of the ‘Us’ into their midst. 
Moreover, group members stood out as individuals, highly differentiated from each 
other, opinionated, strong–minded and willing to share openly any disagreement. As 
such, they opposed directly the conforming behaviour I had documented in case 
studies one and two, which led me into a reflection on my very understanding of the 
term ‘group’. This thought process resulted in the differentiation between a Unity 
group and a Oneness group; the latter of which I had witnessed plentiful throughout 
my life. 
Two findings in particular have come out of this surprising experience, and stressing 
the link between them is insightful: Firstly, there is the preservation of the individual 
within the group, and secondly, the absence of a ‘Them’. It follows then that the 
success of this group to maintain the balance between their individual and their group 
selves reflects positively on their ability to tolerate difference and ambiguity. 
Maintaining a ‘healthy’ sense of individuality within the group enabled them to engage 
in the necessary self-reflection in order to recognise that the splitting of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ is illusory and that containing the wholeness of their personhood, without 
succumbing to the urge of projecting away those ‘bad’ parts onto a suitable Other, who 
then becomes the enemy in this myth of self-cleansing, is a healthier way of being and 
interacting with the worlds. The ‘bad’ stayed within and was embraced by the group. 
Consequently, a Unity group is able to deal with and preserve the ambiguity that the 
stranger – the ‘unknown Other’ could be either a friend or enemy, enabling them to 
take opportunities to get to know and learn from that Other and grow with and 
through her/him. Differences are acknowledged, but not devalued or labelled ‘bad’. An 
important implication for the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality which was introduced into and 
treated by this research as a relationship to the Other characterised by ‘Us versus 
Them’ is, in this case study, actually one of ‘Us and Them’8 (figure 27). 
 
 
                                                          
8 The sources included in the literature review have not made this distinction explicit – the 
words ‘and’, ‘versus’  and ‘against’ are used interchangeably to express opposition. 
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            No Group                   Unity Group             Oneness Group  
  ‘Me versus the World’      ‘Us and Them’              ‘Us versus Them’ 
 
 
 
Such distinguishing automatically calls into question the confident assertion proposed 
by the psychoanalytic literature that there is an innate need compelling humanity to 
having enemies without which a healthy sense self-identity cannot be maintained. 
Allport, for example, states that “hostility towards out-groups helps strengthen our 
sense of belonging, but it is not required.” (1979, p. 42, emphasis added). I therefore 
proclaim that the identification process requires a ‘different from me or Us’, but not a 
‘worse than me or Us’, and that it is the need for differentiation which is innate to 
humanity, not the need for having enemies. Enemy-thinking does not make the 
distinction any more profound; it is rather the opposite: combat brings more closeness 
(Kohut, 1972).  
This is not to say that in a Unity group, there is no tendency within individuals to 
create enemy-images through projection; however, the ability to self-reflect and 
contain, and along with that become aware of one’s own role in this very process of 
enemy-creation obviates this tendency from turning into a reality. That this takes a lot 
of effort becomes evident in the nuns’ repeatedly emphasising that they have to work 
hard every day to maintain the community. The important deduction out of this 
elaboration however, is that we do have a choice in the matter. 
 
9.4. Parallels to Kleinian Positions 
The discussion on paranoid tendencies of the Oneness group and its primary concern 
with self-preservation reminds strongly of the restricted perception of part-objects in 
the Paranoid-Schizoid position. Likewise, the ability of the Unity group to contain 
ambiguity and its drive to integration draws significant parallels to the relation to whole 
objects typical of the Depressive position. Although the following will only be a 
Pull towards Homogeneity 
Pull towards Idiosyncrasy 
Figure 27: Aligning expressions of ‘Us versus Them’ to Unity and Oneness groups 
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tentative comparison with a basic reiteration of Kleinian thought, the theoretical 
elaborations of this research would be incomplete without referring to their 
interconnectedness; the parallels are simply too evident. The Kleinian positions were 
outlined in the literature review, hence I will proceed directly to discussing them in 
conjunction with Oneness and Unity. 
Since I have introduced the concepts of the Unity group and the Oneness group as my 
own contributions to the related body of knowledge to date, literature drawing parallels 
between these and Kleinian positions does not exist. There are sources though that 
apply Kleinian thought to organisational intergroup dynamics in general (see for 
example Diamond and Allcorn, 2006; Jarrar, 2003; Raeve, 2009; Schafer, 1997). 
Additionally, two authors, Gosling (1994) and Gould (1998) have most extensively 
elaborated on the links between Klein, Bion and Bion’s basic-assumption mentalities, 
which have been brought into relation with Unity and Oneness groups. However, since 
their argumentation is incompatible with mine, I have refrained from detailing their 
work here. McMillan’s original explication of Unity (1981) and Hopper’s (2003) and 
Fraher’s (2004) general discussion on Klein and Bion proved more relevant, and I will 
draw on these sources for my own argument.   
Both Klein and Bion have adapted an object relations theory stance on the 
development of their ideas. Klein did even frequently mention the term Oneness, or, 
being ‘at one’, when describing the infant’s sense of fusion with the mother (Fraher, 
2004). Bion also made explicit that he believes the behaviours of basic assumptions (I 
am resorting back to his own terminology here) to be ‘anchored’ in Kleinian part-object 
relations. So for example he points out that basic assumptions are developing from 
states when the infant still perceives its environment as an assembly of part-objects 
and mechanisms of splitting and projective identification are dominating (1961). 
Bion further explicates that his three basic assumptions are best understood in terms 
of the interplay between the Paranoid-Schizoid and the Depressive position: “I think 
that the central position in group dynamics is occupied by the more primitive 
mechanisms that Melanie Klein has described as peculiar to the paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive positions (…) and the interplay between them.” (1961, p. 188). Hopper 
contributes to this Bion’s implications that dependency develops from idealisation 
associated with the schizoid element of the Paranoid-Schizoid position, and fight/flight 
from denigration associated with the paranoid component. Moreover, pairing 
sexualisation as a manic defence, according to Bion, can be interpreted as targeted 
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against anxieties arising in the Depressive position. Indeed, Bion aimed to apply the 
Kleinian psychoanalytic insights into the individual’s early development to the group 
setting. He explained that what goes on in groups often closely mirrors very early part-
object relations, a state others have referred to as regression (see for example 
Sutherland, 1985).I am aware that in his later career, Bion diverts from Kleinian 
thinking (Symington and Symington, 1996), but for the purpose of my own argument, 
I will focus my references to the period during which Bion still pursued alignment to 
Kleinian models of the mind. 
Gould (1988) adds that Bion made parallels between his understanding behind basic 
assumptions and Kleinian positions explicit, using the metaphor of ‘binocular 
correspondence’, but has never progressed to elaborate in more detail on these. A 
quote from Hopper, who also occupies himself with bringing to the fore the links 
between the Kleinian positions and Bion’s three basic assumptions explicates:  
“In any group, all three basic assumptions and combinations of them emerge 
kaleidoscopically, as do the correlates of the Paranoid /Schizoid and Depressive 
positions on which they are based. For example, when the basic assumption of 
Pairing fails as a defence against depressive anxieties, certain kinds of Paranoid 
/ Schizoid anxieties are likely to emerge, associated with denigration, which in 
turn, generates the basic assumption of Fight/Flight. However, when other 
kinds of Paranoid / Schizoid anxieties emerge, associated with idealisation, the 
basic assumption of Dependency is likely to follow.” (2003, p. 34). 
Referring back to McMillan’s earlier presented case study example strengthens the 
already drawn parallels between Oneness and the Paranoid-Schizoid position. A 
common fear united this group and served against fragmentation anxiety. This 
simultaneously meant the group had regressed into the Paranoid-Schizoid position, 
where it was primarily concerned with blaming some form of Other (outgroup) for the 
source of ‘badness’; any ‘badness’ that might disturb the tight knit of Oneness will be 
projected outwards, onto an outgroup or other suitable Other. This is the account of a 
group in the Paranoid-Schizoid position. In the same line of argument, Fraher states 
that “the ba group (a group in basic-assumption mentality) finds its roots in the 
Paranoid-Schizoid position” (2003, p. 35), where the primary task is to fend off anxiety 
provoking ‘badness’. Likewise, Diamond and Allcorn (2006) indicate that human 
relations in organisations frequently regress into the Paranoid-Schizoid position, where 
multiple splits break social structure into ‘Us versus Them’ relations. Along with that, so 
the authors explain, “open conflict and confrontation are … typically avoided in favor of 
scapegoating and blaming others usually outside the group.” (2006, p. 69). In 
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contrast, a Unity group resembles more characteristics of the Depressive position 
where rather than blaming the Other and being paranoid of her/his retaliation, the 
primary task is acknowledgement of one’s own weaknesses and reparation (figure 28). 
Supporting this commended portrayal of the Depressive position, Jarrar (2003) as well 
as Raeve (2009) argue that it is the foundation for better group integration and 
intergroup relationships. 
It is important to note that the discussion so far has not considered the Singleton state 
(no group) in the continuum. This is in so far plausible as Bion’s basic assumptions 
mentality describes a group dynamic. I am expounding though, that parallels can also 
be drawn between characteristics typical for the Singleton state and those typically 
ascribed to the paranoid-schizoid position. The significant difference to those parallels 
drawn between the Oneness group and the Paranoid-Schizoid position is that here, the 
typical behaviours of splitting and projection are carried out by the individual, so on an 
interpersonal level, as opposed to an intergroup level. In other words, while a Oneness 
group directs projections onto an ‘external’ Other, Singletons will find that Other – or 
many Others – within the group; hence the urge to distance themselves from it. Using 
conformity and individualism terminology, Schafer comes to the same conclusion and 
explicates that “extreme conformists (Membership Individuals) as well as extreme 
individualists (Singletons) seem to be fully situated in what Melanie Klein (…) 
designated the paranoid-schizoid position….” (1997, p. 29). 
 
 
                           
                No Group                        Unity Group           Oneness Group  
      ‘Me versus the World’          ‘Us and Them’            ‘Us versus Them’ 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
(group in) 
Paranoid-Schizoid 
Position 
(group in) 
Depressive  
Position 
Pull towards Homogeneity 
Pull towards Idiosyncrasy 
(individual in) 
Paranoid-Schizoid 
Position 
Figure 28: Aligning the Paranoid-Schizoid and the Depressive Positions to the group 
constellations 
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9.4.1. The Oscillation between Kleinian Positions 
Not only do parallels exist between the Kleinian positions as a model and the model of 
Oneness group, Unity groups and Singletons (no group), but also between the 
oscillating relationship within each of these models. Numerous authors have elaborated 
on the oscillating nature between the Paranoid-Schizoid and the Depressive position, 
and Klein herself explains that the dynamic relationship between the two continues as 
a significant force in adulthood (1959). Steiner adds that the Paranoid-Schizoid and the 
Depressive positions create an equilibrium-like situation within which the tensions force 
the individual to continuously move from one to the other; without neither of them 
dominating “with any degree of completeness or permanence.” (1985, p. 2), a 
relationship which resembles the tension between idiosyncratic and homogeneitic 
forces. Bion (1963) expressed this graphically with P/S <-> D.  
Hopper described the driver behind this process as a regressive one, and there has 
been a discussion in the literature about the relation between regression and 
development with regards to the Kleinian positions. I am aiming to present with this 
discussion that it equally applies to the oscillation dynamic in Turquet’s continuum. 
Bion (1965; cited by Grotstein, 2007) compares the oscillating movement between the 
Paranoid-Schizoid and the Depressive position (P-S <-> D) to processes of 
disintegration and reintegration, experienced by scattering or splitting in one direction, 
and coherence in the other direction, which is already presented by Hopper’s 
pendulum-like relationship of Aggregates and Masses (2003). Steiner (1985) likewise 
adds that a shift towards the Depressive position occurs during periods of integration, 
and the opposing movement towards the Paranoid-Schizoid position when 
fragmentation and disintegration dynamics are present. 
It has to be noted that Klein herself commented on the ‘interchangeable’ aspect of the 
positions. She says that they are not confined to certain stages of development, like 
Freud explains them, but rather refer to specific groupings of anxieties and defences 
(1948, cited by Spillius et. al., 2011). Klein states that even those who manage a 
thorough integration of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects may resort back to binary splitting in 
stressful situations. “Complete and permanent integration”, she says, “is in my view 
never possible.” (1959, p. 233). The Kleinian positions are far more complicated than 
elicited by me here in the literature review and this analysis section. For example, 
anxieties of a persecutory nature do exist in the Depressive position as well (Steiner, 
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1985). However, the existing stringent parallels to the Singleton, Unity and Oneness 
group make a comparison obvious. 
 
9.5. Is the Enemy ‘Real’? 
One underlying question that has evolved throughout this chapter is whether hostility 
towards an Other springs from ‘real’, rational, circumstantially driven reasons on the 
one hand, or originates internally through paranoid projections on the other hand. In 
case study one, the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality seemed to be fuelled predominantly by 
paranoid projections of one Oneness group onto the Other, whereas in case study two, 
more circumstantially driven causes were assumed. 
I therefore pose the question: Is the enemy reality or phantasy? Sandler (1988) for 
example, explains that we hold mental representations of our environment created by 
our projections onto these, and postulates that how we perceive the world to be is not 
necessarily how it is. Similarly, as mentioned in the literature review, Dartington 
explains that “… we begin to build an inner world that relates to but not equates with 
an external world of good and bad objects….” (2010, p. 31). Jung (1969) adds to this 
that projections can isolate us from our environment as we indulge into illusory 
relationships with these rather than with the real objects they represent, and, as 
mentioned in the literature review, Bion (1970) states the same idea in even stronger 
words, that pathological splitting leads to the loss of a sense of reality. 
Moreover, it is a fundamental psychoanalytic principle that the world is apprehended 
via introjections and projections, and it is intriguing to apply this tenet to enemy-
thinking. Do I dare to speculate that enemies are always at least partly created 
through our own paranoid projections when there have been more than 14,600 wars 
since the beginning of recorded history (Kutash, Kutash and Schlesinger, 1978)? To 
this question of ‘mix’, Robins and Post (1997) answer that the enemy is never a 
complete delusion, but always contains some distortion of truth. and Stein remarks 
that “we cultivate our enemies.” (1986, p. 195). He explains that they do not emerge 
externally, although the unconscious might believe so, but are a consequence of our 
projections, whereby our perceptions then confirm these. In a similar notion, Buber 
(1960) warns that one needs to acknowledge that conflict between oneself and the 
Other resembles the repercussion of internal conflict of the self. 
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Bringing this argument into context with the previously analysed readiness of the 
Oneness group to project onto a suitable Other its own split off ‘bad’ parts, Miller 
explicates that “the group’s behavior makes it look as (if) what has actually been 
assumed in fantasy only, has been agreed in reality.” (1998, p. 45), emphasising that 
the ‘as if’ assumption of the Oneness group is always a myth. Consequently, one can 
assume that when a Oneness group acts ‘as if’ there were an enemy, this is also based 
on ta shared group myth (McMillan, 1981). Supporting this argumentation, Smith and 
Berg (1987) declare that the shared phantasy of the Other group as being 
fundamentally different, usually in terms of negative attributions, plays a vital role in 
the development of a differentiated group identity, to which Skolnick and Green add 
that “the threatened loss of the denigrated unconscious fantasy of the “other” through 
increased transactions across boundaries may threaten the fabric of the paranoid 
processes that have sustained identity since human time began….” (2004, p. 132).  
I therefore assert the necessity to distinguish not only between Unity and Oneness 
groups, but also between their ‘enemies’. As the Unity group has been set parallel with 
the Depressive position, and the Oneness group with the Paranoid-Schizoid position, it 
suggests itself to assume that the enemy of a Unity group is created predominantly by 
circumstantially driven reasoning, while the one of the Oneness group is mainly 
provoked by paranoid projections identified in the literature review as the “pathological 
counterpart of synthesis.” (Lichtenberg and Slap, 1973, p. 772). Such differentiation 
also reflects the situations of case studies one and two as an intolerance of diversity 
and ambiguity of the Oneness group and explains how and why difference in case 
study one was mutated into opposition, and why ‘real’ risk coupled with paranoia 
tendencies in case study two led to increased scepticism of the Fun Trust towards the 
Play Trust. 
In association with the latter group state, Lazaar (2004) recommends to overcome 
these projections in order to be able to enter into a peaceful relationship with the 
Other. However, his argument denotes that all enemies are projections, leaving no 
room for the possibility of the enemy to be ‘real’. I, on the other hand, have developed 
the notion of ‘mix’, with which the enemy always contains elements of both, reality and 
phantasy, and have explained how this mix can consist either preponderant of 
circumstantially driven or internally projected causes, depending on which of the 
Kleinian positions the group is situated in (whether it is a Unity or a Oneness group). 
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Consultancy projects directed by Daum (2002) and Gould (1999) indicate that the 
question whether an enemy is ‘real’ or not is indeed a difficult one to answer. So Daum 
points out the limitations of his own findings by stating that  
“(t)o what extent this threat is grounded in reality or merely a collective 
phantasy was a dilemma at the heart of this research. The challenge has been 
to work with the complexity of the interplay between phantasy and reality, 
projection and the-way-things-are.” (2002, p. 127).  
Further portraying this complexity of ‘mix’ of reality and phantasy, Gould reports from 
his own observations of intergroup working that  
“positive, reality-based aspects of the relationships, were constantly intruded upon by 
the paranoid concerns they stimulated (…). While agreeing in principle, the groups 
formed numerous reasons to be sceptical.” (1999, p. 709).  
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9.6. Summary of Findings 
In the following, I present a table that summarises the main findings supported by the 
different theoretical frameworks discussed in this research. Leading this alignment is 
the introduction of the Unity group and the Oneness group: 
 
 
Group Reaction 
Containing Ambiguity Defending against Perceived Threat 
Group Perception 
Reality: Wholeness Myth: Splitting 'good' & 'bad' 
Relationship to the 'Other' 
Other of Difference: dependency 
acknowledged, distinctiveness remains 
Other of Opposition: Concern for 
preservation of self 
Intergroup Dynamic 
'Us' and 'Them' 'Us' versus 'Them' 
Kleinian Positions 
Depressive Position Paranoid-Schizoid Position 
Group mentality activity (Bion) 
Work Group Mentality Basic-Assumption Mentality 
Individual state (Turquet) 
Individual Members Membership Individuals 
Group Constellation 
Unity Group Oneness Group 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions – Throwing Anchor 
This research endeavour has been inspired by my own life experiences of hostile 
intergroup dynamics with regards to family, friendship groups and work place settings, 
in which a vanishing understanding and misperception of self and Other with no 
opportunity for a coming together marked human relationships. I developed a tireless 
curiosity for the underlying origins driving the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality and wanted 
to understand better the intrapsychic motivations behind it which appeared to me to 
be so interwoven with human nature that they present a permanent companion of 
social life in general. 
Volkan (1988) identified psychoanalysis to be a depth-psychology of tension and 
conflict (Gosling, 1994), and accommodating for the wish to include an investigation 
into origins of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality which may be hidden ‘underneath the 
surface’, it was the predominant theoretical framework supporting the sense-making of 
this research encounter. 
Supported not only by a theoretical literature review, but also by three real-life 
organisational case studies, the development of the argument has undergone three 
key epiphanies. Next to the combination of the psychoanalytic and the social 
psychology frameworks, the innateness of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality so 
thoroughly defended in the body of knowledge was contested and a new 
understanding of Oneness elaborated. Out of this progress, particularly the theoretical 
advancements of chapters seven, eight and nine, the six research questions can now 
be answered. 
 
10.1. Answering the Research Questions 
I. Is ‘enemy-thinking’ an innate characteristic of being human or do we have a 
choice other than having enemies? 
‘Enemy-thinking’ is not an innate characteristic of being human. We have a 
choice other than having enemies. 
 
II. If ‘enemy-thinking’ is not innate, what provokes it?  
‘Enemy-thinking’ investigated in this research is provoked by psychotic 
projections of the Oneness group. 
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III. What needs does having an ‘enemy’ satisfy? 
Having an enemy satisfies the Oneness group’s need for ‘self-cleansing’ as a 
‘suitable’ Other contains its psychotically split off and projected ‘bad’ parts. 
 
IV. What are the differences in the way individuals relate to one another when 
shaping a group?  
In a Unity group, Individual Members maintain the balance between their 
individual and social needs. In a Oneness group, individuality is lost and 
Membership Individuals form a higher-level entity, the group as a ‘thing-in-
itself’. 
 
V. Do these different kinds of bonding have any impact on the ‘Us versus Them’ 
mentality?  
In the Oneness group, the relationship to an Other is characterised by ‘Us 
versus Them’. In a Unity group, ‘Us and Them’ better describes the 
identification process with the Other. 
 
VI. Is ‘enemy-thinking’ exercised on the group level or on the individual level? 
Enemy-thinking is exercised by the Oneness group as a ‘thing-in-itself’, not by 
the individuals containing it.  
 
My research encounter was guided by two underlying key interests. Understanding 
better the origins of the so called ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, thereby questioning their 
innateness as claimed in accordance by psychoanalytic literature, was a motivation 
summarised into the question: Is the need for an enemy really an innate characteristic 
of being human, and do we therefore have no choice but to have one? 
Informed by the primary data and theoretical reflections of this research, I can now 
confidently answer this question with ‘No’. The data tells not of an innate need to have 
enemies, but rather of a drift to succumb to such projection behaviour due to the same 
reasons that render it a struggle to maintain the equilibrium between forces of 
idiosyncrasy and homogeneity. If one fails to balance these, the transformation 
happens from Individual Member to either Singleton (no group) or Membership 
Individual (Oneness group), were those paranoid-schizoid projections are active that 
cause enemy-thinking.  
Next to questioning the innateness of the need for enemies, this project investigated 
into the dynamics that unfold between individuals when forming a group. I wanted to 
scrutinise the different constellations individuals might create and thereby understand 
the very meaning of the word ‘group’ better. The research led to the establishment of 
the Oneness group and the Unity group, and could be brought into direct connection 
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with the first key interest: In the Oneness group, strong conformity pressures and the 
regression of the group as a whole into the Paranoid-Schizoid position overthrows 
individual autonomy and impedes on members’ ability to contain ambiguity so that the 
tendency towards enemy-thinking turning into a reality cannot be prevented. Paranoia 
does indeed lead to a distortion of reality and the need for a suitable Other that can be 
made target of the group’s projections.  
The Unity group, however, is not in need of such target, as the ability to contain their 
own ‘bad’ parts deems such projections unnecessary and paves the way for tolerance 
of ambiguity and diversity, as well as the ability to learn, be creative and work through 
difference for the purpose of growth. Since it occupies a state more similar to the 
Depressive position, primary concern is for reintegration and reparation, not for 
paranoid self-preservation.  
Therefore, this research has developed the argument that enemy-thinking is a direct 
result out of the failure to balance and provide for both, individual and group needs of 
the self. The constantly oscillating nature between Singleton state, the Unity group and 
the Oneness group also implies a laborious and endless process to maintain the ‘middle 
ground’; however, the main implication is yet again that no matter how laborious and 
reiterative this process might be, we do have a choice in the matter, and the ‘need to 
have enemies’ is consequently not innate. Enemy-images are always a mix of ‘real’ 
threat and illusory paranoia, and if one manages to recognise one’s own role in this 
construction, intergroup relationships might be able to advance from an ‘Us versus 
Them’ to an ‘Us and Them’. 
Skolnick and Green occupy a more pessimistic opinion and conclude that “despite 
remarkable advances in science and technology, dominant cultures of the world and 
their interactions remain characterized by and mired in primitive paranoid schizoid 
processes that stultify growth.” (2004, p. 134). The authors call for groups to develop 
the capacity to acknowledge and free themselves from the fixation in the Paranoid-
Schizoid position. This research has supported the argument that with regards to 
psychic maturity, the Depressive position does not outperform the Paranoid-Schizoid 
position, but rather, that both continue their oscillating relationship throughout life. 
Hence my response to Skolnick and Green would be that groups should indeed be 
motivated to avoid being trapped in the Paranoid-Schizoid position; abandoning it 
permanently though, is not possible. Since projections in the latter are paranoid in 
nature, it becomes evident that the need for having enemies is directly related to the 
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Kleinian positions, with which the conclusion that the need is not innate is further 
supported.  
Consequently, the question of innateness has to be re-drawn. It is now the possibility 
of progressing permanently out of the Paranoid-Schizoid position and into the 
Depressive position, or in other words, of a group managing to permanently remain in 
Unity and not fall into Oneness or apart into Singletons, which has to be questioned. 
The discussion on the holding of the tension between forces of idiosyncrasy and 
homogeneity has shown that this is possible, but realistically rather difficult to achieve 
and likely to be a permanent task. Along with that, one can conclude that the working 
against the need to have enemies is also a constant and never-ending challenge of 
being human. A group such as the convent community of case study three has 
provided a prime example of how Unity can successfully and durably be maintained, 
but its applicability to other group environments is questionable. 
 
10.2. Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
The literature review of this research presents the first comprehensive compilation of 
the most relevant frameworks regarding the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. The term 
itself has been used demotically, but an academic, summative definition and body of 
knowledge on it has not existed before, making this research an inimitable 
contribution. Furthermore, the ‘current-affairs-status’ of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality 
and its manifestations in versatile social settings has been emphasised, making the 
necessity of its study more poignant. 
Likewise, the data collection methods of this project have provided a significant 
contribution to knowledge, as to date, with only a few exceptions (see for example 
Cilliers and Greyvenstein, 2012; Czander, 1993; Daum, 2002; Diamond and Allcorn 
2006; Gould, et al.; Roberts, 1994) case studies that offer in-depth insight into on-
going, real-life organisational settings are scarce. 
This research has constructed several contributions for the psychoanalytic body of 
knowledge. First of all, by arguing that the need to have enemies is not innate to 
humanity, this thesis offers an alternative to the strong agreement among 
psychoanalytic sources that have made ‘Us versus Them’ dynamics subject to their 
investigation. Among others, Abecassis (2003), Barash (1991), Baumeister and Leary 
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(1995), Berman et al. (2000), Bryce (1986), Duek (2009), Edelman (1983, cited by 
Volkan, 1988), Finlay et al. (1967),  Frank (1967), Girard (1986), Gold (2010), Ostroff 
(2000), Pinderhughes (1982), Robins and Post (1997), Rozenblit (2008), Segal (1995) 
and Volkan (1988) all agree on the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality being a “basic structure 
of human social organisation” (Berman et al., 2000, p. 53) and therefore declare the 
underlying need to have enemies to be innate, primal, basic and inborn. 
Along with the declaration of this alternative positioning, this research has shifted 
attention to our own involvement in enemy-construction: the process is now not a 
predetermined development which we can only helplessly and passively watch 
unfolding and determining how we interact with each other (“it is innate, we have no 
choice”), but rather, my findings call for the acknowledgement of our own agency in 
the matter and therefore demand to take responsibility for it (“it is not innate, and we 
have the choice to work on it”). By discussing the occurrence of ‘enemy’ with regards 
to reality and illusion, the task is given to actors to challenge their own perception of 
that enemy. 
Underlying the conclusion for the need to have enemies, the literature review has 
indicated two lines of argument that psychoanalytically informed authors have used to 
explain its innateness. On the one hand, biological and evolutionary reasons were 
given, such as tribal and survival instincts that provoke us to distrust strangers. On the 
other hand, the inability to tolerate or contain ambiguity caused by a stranger were 
said to be causes for the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. The findings of this research have 
shown that the latter reasoning is more insightful in explaining enemy-thinking. It is 
indeed the inability to contain diversity and ambiguity, as typical of the Oneness group, 
that leads to paranoid projections onto an Other who is then turned into enemy. 
Secondly, but not independently from the first conclusion, this research has established 
a novel approach to viewing group dynamics and has combined contributions mainly 
from five key authors (Bion, 1961, Hopper, 2003, Laurence et al., 1996, McMillan, 1981 
and Turquet, 1975 and 1985) into a single model, headed by the terms ‘Unity group’ 
and ‘Oneness group’. Along with that, manifold interpretations of the dynamics 
between individuals and the group consisting of them have been brought together into 
a coherent framework. While those individual interpretations independently hold a lot 
of explanation power for depicting group dynamics, their lack of agreement on a 
common terminology and a common framework made the joint effort of advancing 
Bion’s original work rather complicated, so that there is still no consensus on a fourth 
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basic assumption despite versatile efforts to establish one (Scharff and Scharff, 2003). 
I hope that by having constructed my own framework closely along the above 
mentioned authors’ ideas, I have been able to bring them closer together, rather than 
adding to the confusion of use of terminologies. 
Since the concepts of Oneness group and Unity group were introduced for the first 
time here, their alignment to and discussion together with the Kleinian positions and 
Kleinian concepts of psychoanalysis in general forms another contribution to 
knowledge of this research. Eliciting that Oneness is basic-assumption mentality per se 
and that the Oneness group is a group in the Paranoid-Schizoid position has made it 
possible to explain the paranoid projection behaviour that is known from intrapsychic 
theory and apply it to the group level. This itself has been done before (see for 
example Cilliers and Greyvenstein, 2012; Czander, 1993; Daum, 2002; Diamond and 
Allcorn 2006; Gould, Ebers and Clinchy, 1999; Lazaar, 2004; Menzies-Lyth, 1960; 
Roberts, 1994), but not in combination with the frameworks subject to the theoretical 
advancements of this research. 
Lastly, with the perspective taken in this thesis, I have readdressed the importance of 
the individual level in group dynamic studies. Alford declared in 1994 that the group is 
the basic state of human existence. It is certainly true that the individual would does 
not exist without the group and is therefore never independent from it, and XX 
reminds us of the original meaning of the word individual: Not separable from the 
group (XXXX); however, focus should not shift entirely onto the group level but remain 
a combination of both, so as to be able to also take into account the dynamics that 
unfold between each individual member of a group. Especially the discussion on Bion’s 
concept of valency has shown how important the inclusion of the consideration of the 
latter is to understand group life itself. Accommodating for this principle, this research 
has concentrated on both, individual and group levels and as such has scrutinised the 
tension that exists between both which determines our essence as being human. 
 
10.3. My Personal Journey 
I hope I have succeeded in my efforts to structure and narrate this research in such a 
manner that the development in my own thinking has become transparent to the 
reader. Next to the three epiphanies I have detailed in chapter seven, the enquiry of 
the last three years has had influence on my more personal thoughts, too. Despite 
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having shown my awareness of the interconnectedness between this research and my 
personhood right at the start of the thesis (chapter one), I was at times left astonished 
about the insights that my research offered to me into my own perception of the 
world.  
Foremost, I was ‘forced’ to develop rather quickly more thorough reflexive abilities that 
would include a focus on myself as researcher and researched of my own inquiry. I 
had argued the necessity for such approach with detailed theoretical elaboration 
(chapter three), but actually putting these principles into practice proved indeed to be 
challenging for me. I had to learn to acknowledge the value of my own experience as 
rich data, which demanded a certain willingness to disclose and share – something 
that, as it turned out, did not come naturally to me. 
In many instances during the composition of this research, I gained insight into my 
own relationship to groups and my role within them in general, and especially during 
the three case studies, I ‘lived through’ Hopper’s notions of fusion and confusion 
(2003). Among numerous other thoughts, I started questioning whether Bion’s notion 
of valency (1961), with which he expresses that some individuals are more prone to 
adopting certain behaviours during basic-assumption mentality (for example leading or 
following) than others also applies to the concept of Oneness, and whether I in that 
case have a particularly ‘low’ valency to Oneness. Such speculations helped me to 
make sense of, only to name a few examples, my reoccurring role of whistle-blower 
and fence-sitter in groups, as well as being the only person in a large group relations 
event who kept pointing out over and over again that we are going more and more off-
task. 
Especially given my past affiliation with the organisation subject to case study one, I 
could appreciate how this thesis offered me the opportunity to not only look at 
Oneness as a theoretical concept from a researcher’s perspective, but also reflect on 
my practical experiences of it as a participant. Not only did I describe the theoretical 
tension between forces of idiosyncrasy and homogeneity on the Individual Member, 
but I could also reflect on my own experiencing of these. So for example, when 
reporting to my Director of Studies that it was the trade union who was the cause of 
the split between Clericals and Industrials, I automatically and without awareness fell 
back into the language of ‘my’ past Oneness group, reporting in a derogative and 
emotional manner about ‘Them’. As previously mentioned, it took my supervisor 
several conversations to convince me to at least consider the involvement of 
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management itself (one of ‘Us’) as a driver of this harmful split, and finally being able 
to follow his advice did indeed feel as though I had just escaped the claws of the 
hegemonic Oneness group and regained my individual ability to think. 
Another major personal realisation refers to my own projection behaviour and my 
tendency to construct a dramatised image of opposition, where there really was only 
little. Along with that, this research enquiry also incited me to explore my own past 
experiences and inner motivations for such attitude, of which I have shared some with 
the reader (chapter one), thereby pointing out how they formed the entire underlying 
perspective for my investigation into the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. I will come back 
to this significance when discussing the limitations of this research. 
 
10.4. Limitations of this Research 
10.4.1. An Assembly of Singletons as ‘No’ Group? 
I have started the data analysis chapter with the realisation that not only did I have to 
rethink my perception of the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, but also of the very 
understanding that I have of ‘group’. My theoretical advancements in this regard have 
been to differentiate between two types of group constellations, namely ‘Unity group’ 
and ‘Oneness group’, together with the imminent thought that I had more life 
experiences of the later than of the former. However, this argument would not be 
complete without including reflection on the Singleton state and the type of group it 
represents.  
Pine explains that rather than the object of ‘group’, the action of ‘grouping’ as an 
active process should be subject to investigation, suggesting the dynamic rather than 
static nature of the meaning behind ‘group’. This fits with the discussion in so far as a 
group has not been presented as a stable state but a pendulum-like fluctuation 
between three states, equivalent to the ever changing relationship between the group 
and the individuals constituting it.  
Brown defines a group to exist “when two or more people define themselves as 
members of it” (1988, p. 2). Palmer agrees and notes that the existence of groups 
comes about when individuals indulge in activities of definition and recognition. He 
adds that individuals define themselves as belonging to a particular group, even in its 
absence. The term belonging, or the related sense of affinity, seems to be key in this 
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kind of definition, and along with this criteria, I speculate that Singletons can indeed be 
perceived as ‘no group’. The essence of this state is the unconscious denial of any 
connection to other individuals, without which a sense of belonging or affinity is not 
possible. Schafer (1997) adds that individualists, or adhering to Turquet’s terminology 
Singletons, are driven by the wish to construct oppositeness as a steady state. Palmer 
(1998) suggests that if this sense of belonging, recognition or affiliation is not present, 
the term ‘cluster’, such as can be found at a bus stop is more appropriate than the 
term ‘group’. 
It follows from this that in the Singleton state, none of the Key Modes of Interaction 
identified in chapter seven are possible because there simply is no group. The 
psychological bond between individuals has been lost that is the very foundation of a 
group. Bain supports my assertion by adding that in BaM, individuals behave via 
emotional distancing “as though there was not a group present (at all).” (2005, p. 33). 
During my data collection of the Fun Trust, it became explicit that one member of staff 
did not agree with the organisation’s ‘way of doing things’ and opposed these openly. 
This individual was further noticeable to me as (s)he did not seem to form the same 
close relationship with the other members of staff typical of this organisation, and on a 
number of occasions her/his opinions and actions showed strong disagreement with 
the organisation. Half a year after the conclusion of my primary research, I was 
informed that that member of staff had left the organisation. I feel that this is a good 
example showing that the ‘no’ group character of the Singleton state does indeed 
materialise; if a significant majority of staff would have acted in the same way, the 
organisation would have ceased.  
10.4.2. Related Concepts not Considered 
There have been a number of other related concepts touched upon during the 
development of this thesis which could be related to the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality. 
Although a detailed analysis of these would lead the argument off topic, they need to 
be mentioned in brief.  
For example, envy (Mouly and Sankaran, 2002) and narcissism, have been identified as 
a driver behind intergroup bias, since the narcissistic mind cannot tolerate its own 
imperfections (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1984; Gardner and Pierce, 2011). Among others, 
Kohut (1972) explicates that narcissistic beliefs lead to putting ‘Us’ up and ‘Them’ down 
(see also Stein, 2000). Similarly, Moses (1982) concentrates on narcissism as a reason 
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for paranoid projection and explores the resulting dynamics on the individual and 
group level. 
Additionally, the concept of guilt can be discussed in conjunction with the Oneness 
group and the Unity group in such a manner that would depict the former as lacking 
the ability to accept guilt and hence inhibiting its own opportunities for healing. Fraher 
(2007) has also made use of this concept to investigate into the changes in 
constellation of basic-assumption mentalities. 
Likewise, literature on ‘the Other’ and the process of Othering has only been touched 
upon briefly, but a more in-depth discussion of this concept will lead to more insight 
into the ‘Us versus Them’ mentality from an additional perspective (see for example 
Canales, 2000, Frosh, 2002). 
Shifting focus of analysis from projection and identification towards projective 
identification might help to further clarify the duality of the identification process – the 
need for belonging as much as the need for not belonging (Daum, 2002) – as it 
emphasises the fact that one still identifies as much with that part that has been 
projected away (Sandler, 1988) as with that part that is introjected. It brings to the 
fore that despite emphasising how much something is ‘not me’ or ‘not Us’ it still is ‘me’ 
or ‘Us’. 
Moreover, literature concentrating on Winnicott’s ‘potential space’ (1974) and Bion’s 
related understanding of ‘holding’ (1970) can help advance the understanding about 
the creative and holding capacity of the Unity group and the Oneness group’s lack of it. 
Especially in conjunction with the presented concepts of Key Modes of Interactions 
(French and Simpson, 2010) this potential space in the Unity group is created, and 
Diamond and Allcorn (2004) emphasise its indispensable role for productive groups. 
10.4.3. The Impact of my own Dualistic Thinking 
After having intensely occupied myself for the past three years with the study of the 
relationship between the individual and the group traits of human nature, I still find 
myself slipping into doubts, asking whether we are either predominantly independent 
individuals or group animals. I am still perplexed about how both parts ought to exist 
evenly and simultaneously, while standing in direct contradiction to each other. It is, to 
me, a paradox. Thereby I seem to be driven by the urge to find an answer to this 
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question, a solution to this ‘problem’, even though accompanied by a lingering 
disappointment due to the awareness of such quest’s impossibility. 
This awareness comes out of the realisation that the discrepancy does not reside in the 
answer, but in the question itself: Despite having established that dichotomising the 
world into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ results in an illusory perception of reality, the construction 
of this thesis’ main argument can be viewed as being dichotomised itself. I have 
portrayed Unity, and along with that the Depressive position as all ‘good’, and 
Oneness, or the Paranoid-Schizoid position as well as everybody who dislikes difference 
as all ‘bad’. Consequently, critics could regard the presented model of Singleton, Unity 
and Oneness as the manifestation of my own paranoid splitting tendencies, hampering 
my ability to contain that ambiguity that enables to experience the ‘real’. From this 
point of view, Unity and Oneness are nothing more than symbols of my own internal 
representations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. I had already pointed towards this matter of 
insecurity in the introduction chapter when stating that throughout the process of 
writing up, I was constantly and continuously accompanied by the doubt that 
everything I so passionately and rigorously observed, recorded, analysed, scrutinised 
and reported, so as to share it with the reader as a ‘thing’ that really is, may at the end 
of the day, only exist in my own head. 
‘Soothing’ this rather harsh self-critique are my occasional indications towards 
contingencies within the suggested model, with which a tendency away from systems-
thinking towards process-thinking is, even if only tentatively, surfacing (Stacey, 2007). 
So for example, I express that the positions of Singleton and Oneness group are 
extremes along the continuum and the Unity group the middle of these, but this is not 
to exclude an uncountable number of other positions along the continuum; in fact, the 
use of the word continuum itself suggests room for further possibilities. In line with 
this notion, I explicate that a group can indeed portray characteristics of, for example, 
Unity and Oneness at the same time, such as did the Fun Trust in case study two. This 
consideration for simultaneity counteracts a critique on dualistic grounds as for 
example formulated by Stacey (2007). Beyond this accommodation though, I have 
difficulties incorporating the notion that a participant in a group can simultaneously be 
in any of the states of S., I.M. and M.I.. Likewise, I have emphasised that even in the 
extreme positions of Singleton and Oneness group, the forces of idiosyncrasy and 
homogeneity are both just as active as in any position along the continuum. However, 
there are also included in the model those ‘pure’ extremes which I have scrutinised 
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intensely in chapter seven. And as Weick (1995) states, sometimes it is necessary to 
study the extreme to make sense of the usual; what one must remember to avoid by 
doing so though, is to confuse the models we construct for the very reality they serve 
to explore (Wozniak, 2010). I constructed the ‘pure’ states of Singleton, Unity group 
and Oneness group theoretically, so as to understand the reality of groups which might 
at any given be anywhere along the continuum between these theoretical positions. 
Turning back to the underlying problem of paradox, the question is then whether the 
relationship between individual and group aspects of the self is one of tension that 
allows for co-existence, or one of paradox, which demands an either/or solution. This 
dilemma is also a recognisable theme throughout the literature. 
Bion (1961) for example, talks about these two elements of the human as being “at 
war” with each other, clearly indicating a win/lose situation. Explicating the same 
impossibility of co-existence, Modell adds that “the self is fundamentally paradoxical 
(as it is) contradictorily both private and social.” (1997, p. 47, emphasis added). 
Similarly, Stacey points out that according to the entire Freudian tradition (including 
Klein, Bion and the Tavistock Institute at large), “the internal world of the psyche is 
structured by the clash between individual instinct and the group.” (2005, p. 189, 
emphasis added) and he thus concludes that Freudian thinking is characterised by an 
artificial duality of individual as separate from group (see also Elias, 1991). It is 
important to note here that the construction of this research is based on the same 
underlying assumption of individual and group as being two separate aspects of the 
self. Stacey’s critique therefore applies to the entity of my findings. 
In contrast, Winnicott calls for a change in our understanding of the meaning of 
‘paradox’ and explains that “(m)y contribution is to ask for a paradox to be accepted 
and tolerated and respected, and for it not to be resolved. By flight to split-off 
intellectual functioning it is possible to resolve the paradox, but the price of this is the 
loss of the value of the paradox itself.” (1974, p. xii). Rather than paradox, Winnicott’s 
explication resembles my understanding of tension as portrayed in the presented 
model of this research, describing the constant battle for balance between the two 
elements of being human. As established earlier, the Unity group has the ability to live 
with and tolerate this tension and the ambiguity that comes through it. Modell (1997) 
even goes so far as to define this ability as a measure of mental health. 
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10.5. What New Questions have Emerged? 
10.5.1.  Applicability of the Unity Group to Other Real-Life Settings 
I have established above that the Unity group is a theoretical state only, which helps to 
understand, but is not reality. Having said that, I also believe that the convent 
community is an exception in so far as in this case, the theoretical concept of Unity 
group does match the reality of the group of Sisters very well; after all, it was this real-
life case study which led to the establishment of the concept in the first place. The 
question is now whether the concept of Unity group helps to understand realities that 
are not exceptions. Can it be applied to groups which do not live in enclosure, whose 
members are not committed for life towards the same goals and whose tasks do not 
provide for an optimum balance between isolation and union? 
For example, it stands out that neither the division of task outlined in case study one, 
nor the scarcity of resources, which was a decisive factor in case study two, applies in 
case study three. As reported, due to their primary task of creating union, working 
together as a whole presents conditions very different from case study one. Likewise, 
the Sisters’ principle of restraining themselves from materialistic attachments means 
their needs are provided for within the community. Additionally, they are not in direct 
competition with each other such as are, for example, the employees of the 
organisation in case study one or both organisations in case study two. Therefore, a 
new research project could explore how the principles of Unity as they have been 
witnessed in the convent community might apply in the ‘outside’ world, where 
competition and rivalry dominate most working relationships.  
It would also be interesting to study real-life organisational settings in which the nature 
of the task itself makes group members highly prone to homogeneitic forces. Watching 
the Olympic synchronised swimming teams gave rise to this suggestion. In such case, I 
postulate it is not necessarily individual valency that determines the likelihood of a 
Oneness group to occur, but contextual and environmental circumstances. 
Lastly, the reviewed literature as well as this research have concentrated on the ‘Us 
versus Them’ dynamics between two parties, meaning one group represented ‘Us’ and 
one group took on the role of ‘Them’ respectively. It would be interesting to investigate 
into a case study in which more than two groups interact with each other, as this is 
often more representative of real-life situations. In the political arena, for example, 
where ideologies partly overlap and are partly incompatible, who is like ‘Us’ and who is 
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not like ‘Us’ is often not as clear or might fluctuate frequently. Additionally, one 
ingroup might be faced with two outgroups. Who is the enemy in such case? 
10.5.2.  Self and Other as a Western Construct? 
Throughout this research, the differentiation between self and Other has been 
highlighted as an important function for identification. However, further research could 
add insight from a non-western cultural environment. In Western societies, the self is 
traditionally understood as a unique and separate identity. Although post-modern 
psychoanalysis has acknowledged the interconnectedness of self and Other through, 
for example, principles of intersubjectivity and the emotional turn (Clarke and Hoggett, 
2009), the commonly notion that self is defined by the boundaries of skin still prevails 
in Western understanding (Wilber, 2001). The question is therefore if the findings of 
this research are also applicable in societies in which collectivism is stressed over 
individualism.  
Malina (1993) for example, investigates into cultures with strong group orientation. 
Likewise, Young (1999) studies the issue of diversity by concentrating on how societies 
deal with heterogeneity. Based on Levi-Strauss research (1992), he thereby 
differentiates between two different types of societies. Anthropophagic are those 
societies who deal with strangers and diversity by ‘swallowing’ them, taking them in 
and turning them, similar to Greene’s account of an extended community (1993) into 
one of ‘Us’. Modern Western societies, in contrast, are anthropoemic, as they ‘vomit 
out’ the stranger or the one who is different, keeping them at safe distance to who is 
‘Us’. It would therefore be interesting to investigate into a case of intergroup relations 
in of members of a anthropophagic society to see if they have to undergo the same 
struggles and difficulties to stay in Unity.  
The ‘Us versus Them’ mentality might also have other manifestations or not occur at all 
in non-Western societies that have strong collective values. The Buddhist philosophical 
principle of ‘Indra’s Net’, for example, holds that infinitely repeated mutual relations 
exist between all members of the universe which render them all interconnected 
(Cook, 1977). Such believe goes directly against the separation into ‘Us’ and ‘not Us’ 
and it would be interesting to have an investigation into a case study whose members 
follow this belief. 
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10.5.3.  Black’s Contemplative Position – an Alternative 
One of this thesis’ major theoretical advancement has been to emphasise the parallels 
between Kleinian theory and group dynamics theory as presented by Turquet and 
other authors inspired by Bion. Along with that, I have emphasised the common 
characteristics of a Oneness group and a group in the Paranoid-Schizoid position, as 
well as those of a Unity group and a group in the Depressive position. Although I have 
presented a sound argument with this line of thought, it is possible to draw in an 
alternative theory in order to shed light on the convent community’s lack of need for 
an enemy. Abiding to the notion of developmental positions, Black (2006) tentatively 
adds a third one: The Contemplative position. 
He bases this contribution on the grounds that it is more helpful to understand 
consciousness as continuity from unconscious to conscious, rather than two absolute 
states of either complete consciousness or complete unconsciousness as portrayed by 
Freud (Craib, 2001). Black then explains that the Kleinian positions are only two points 
on this continuum, and hence many more, such as the Contemplative position, can be 
added to portray lesser or higher degrees of consciousness. Such notion accompanies 
for Stacey’s above detailed critique of dichotomised systems-thinking (2005) as it 
allows for fluidity of one position shading with another one. Black further asserts that 
the Contemplative position is one “from which the experience of being alive in the 
world can be perceived and thought about without the need for immediate action.” 
(2006, p. 75), enabling the individual to exert greater tolerance of frustrations, anxiety 
and excitement with a willingness to contemplate on these feelings, rather than to act 
upon them with a sense of urgency; a definition which reminds strongly of ‘negative 
capability’ (French and Simpson, 2006). 
Black goes on to postulate that such state of consciousness touches upon the proto-
verbal phase of psychic development during infancy (12 to 15 months), when 
verbalised thought does not yet force the brain into dualistic thinking and 
categorisation – a time when language is not developed yet and hence cannot distort 
or dilute experiences (see also Crociani-Windland’s discussion on the limitation of 
language (2009)), which might make knowing beyond words possible (French, Case 
and Simpson, 2012). Because such states of consciousness go deeper into the 
unconscious realm, they are much harder to access and maintain, as they “reach 
deeper than the verbal levels to contact implicit emotional memories of a stable 
‘contentless’ togetherness…” (2012, p. 75). 
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This is a state that very much reminds me of the convent life. Being together in silence 
might be understood as a conviction towards achieving and maintaining this state of 
consciousness. Black does make explicit that religious groups derive at the 
Contemplative position through prayer and meditation, as the impulse to immediate 
action response is stilled. I did on a number of occasions try to describe something 
about the nuns’ behaviour which I perceived to be unusual, but the closest I could get 
to was “they are hesitating, they do not react immediately, they are so tolerant and 
patient”. Hence, Black’s notion helped me to articulate my perceptions in more precise 
terms, and it was like another Eureka moment when I learnt about his theory.  
In chapter six I described my astonishment for the proportionately little time 
considered by the timetable for the physical coming together of the community, 
whereby most of that time is spend during the seven daily prayers in chapel. The nuns 
have referred to these assemblies as the core of their live, and explained that “day 
after day, when you pray with the Sisters, it’s like we build something together.”  (1-
21). I still have difficulties understanding in full how building something together can 
happen without verbal communication, but Black’s contribution helps me to at least 
theoretically make sense out of the nuns state of mind during prayers. To me it looked 
as though the Sisters were standing in front of God as individuals, each connected with 
Him separately from each other. However, their principles do not agree with my 
observations. A painting that one of the Sisters drew for the second SPM session talks 
of an opposite message than the one I perceived and stresses the interconnectedness 
between the nuns into which Christ is brought (figure 29). 
 
 
Figure 29: Painting depicting the Sisters togetherness 
during prayer 
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An exception in my own observations is noticeable when reporting of their singing 
together, as here I gained the impression indeed that through their different voices 
and lines, they were creating something together that cannot be brought to life by any 
one of them individually. 
Through contemplation, as Keating (1992) explains, self-knowledge, the coming to 
consciousness of the dark side of one’s personality in addition to the light side which is 
easier to own up to, is accomplished, thereby enabling the individual to accept oneself 
as who one really is; a process he also refers to as ‘the unloading of the unconscious’. 
This explanation echoes the conversations I had with the convent community and 
might enable the nuns to come to a deeper understanding of their inner thoughts and 
feelings, even if these might resemble the need for an enemy, and to ‘re-own’ these 
projected ‘bad’ parts, so that the need for an enemy is abolished. In agreement with 
this reasoning, Black lists, among other changes, the withdrawal from projections in 
the Contemplative position. Lastly, he adds that the proto-verbal state of experience in 
the Contemplative position grants the individual “some degree of independence from 
the glamour of group membership.” (2006, p. 75). 
I tentatively want to link the theory of the Contemplative position to Stacey’s earlier 
critique of dualistic thinking that I have applied to my own work so as to offer an 
alternative interpretation of the group dynamics model suggested by this research. I 
have noted that the strict division of the suggested Unity and Oneness groups into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ might be the result of my own paranoid-schizoid dichotomisations, 
which led me to lack exactly that ability to tolerate confusion and anxiety necessary to 
prevent dualistic thought processes. If I would be able to approximate a Contemplative 
position with a higher degree of negative capability – which I am, at least at this stage 
of my life, by far not – then maybe my diagrams would look more like figure 30: 
 
 
                           
                   No Group  +         Unity Group     +     Oneness Group  
                
 
 
 
Paranoid-Schizoid 
Position 
Depressive  
Position 
Pull towards Homogeneity 
Pull towards Idiosyncrasy 
Paranoid-Schizoid 
Position 
Figure 30: Integrating the Contemplative position 
T h e  C o n t e m p l a t i v e  P o s i t i o n 
Position 
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10.6. Final Worlds 
As outlined in the introduction chapter, this thesis was occupied with investigating into 
the tension and conflict of being human. Lazaar (2004) points out that Klein’s theories 
of splitting and projection together with Bion’s contributions of basic-assumption 
mentality cover the main aspects of the field of human conflict rather well. And 
although Bion (1961) stresses that we cannot possess absolute knowledge about 
human relations, this research has advanced our knowledge about it. 
Furthermore, the literature identifies Bion as the most significant contributor to the 
body of knowledge on group psychoanalysis. Lawrence and colleagues, for example, 
describe his 1961 book as “a landmark in thought and conceptualization of the 
unconscious functioning of human beings in groups” (1996, p. 28), and Hopper is even 
more explicit: “Experiences in Groups (Bion 1961), which includes all Bion’s papers on 
group dynamics, constitutes a time marker in the psychoanalytical study of groups that 
should be known as ‘zero’, all previous studies to be dated ‘BB’ and all subsequent 
ones ‘AB’.” (2003, p. 29, emphasis original). I am therefore hoping that this research is 
accepted as a milestone along this timeline, reading ‘51 AB’.  
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Appendix 1: Full Theoretical Discussion of the Social Photo Matrix 
The Social Photo Matrix: A Visual, Integrative and Psychoanalytical Research Tool 
Visual research has been well established in anthropology and sociology, but has yet to 
come to the fore in organisation studies (Warren, 2009). Visual practices refer to 
image based methods which include drawings, photographs, video or film and internet 
pages (Meyer, 1991). We are living in an image-rich society in which ‘a picture is worth 
a thousand words’ (Langer, 1957) and where the visual forms part of everyday life’s 
symbolism, making it sensible and necessary to include it in research practices. 
Further, pictures provide more insights than rational discussion and reveal part of the 
‘unthought known’ (Bollas, 1987), therefore offering a promising method for enquiring 
into the unconscious. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the use of visual methods developed from 
being embedded in a strongly scientific-realist approach, towards a more reflexive 
approach (Pink, 2007). The difference between these two perspectives is expressed in 
the use of the photographs. On the one hand, they are used as data itself, 
representing a reality. On the other hand, they are used as a means of generating data 
(Warren, 2009). Here, emphasis is not given to what is actually shown in the picture, 
but rather, what it means to the viewer (Harper, 2005). 
The SPM, in addition to incorporating the richness of contemporary visual methods, 
also entails a psychoanalytical perspective on doing research. Borrowing from Stein’s 
account on organisational consultancy, many workplace phenomena most often exist 
outside of the immediate awareness of organisational participants: “The surface picture 
presented to the consultant often is a symptom and symbol [...] Client organizations 
often do not know what they, at some unrecognized level, already know too well” 
(1994; 8-9). As an innovative action research method that pushes the boundaries of 
creativity and open-mindedness towards a new edge, the SPM is a suitable research 
method to make accessible for examination such unconscious processes, as have done 
the conceptual frameworks of organisational diagnosis and interpretation of 
organisational text before (Diamond and Allcorn, 2003).  
It was pioneered by the German professor of Organisational Development, Burkhard 
Sievers, in 2005 and is a further development out of the combination of social 
dreaming and role analysis traditions. As such, it is promoted as a means of getting 
‘beneath the surface’, and understanding the unconscious in organisations (Sievers, 
2007). By coming together in a matrix, “out of which something new can grow as in a 
uterus” (Lawrence, 2005), participants are invited to share their free associations, 
amplifications and link without boundaries, what comes into their minds in view of the 
photographs. The aim is to expand their thinking, as the photographs capture both, a 
direct object as well as a memory of experience (Reynolds and Vince, 2007). To ‘see 
the unseen’, and to ‘think the unthinkable’ (Sievers, 2008), and to reveal “inner psychic 
model(s) of (organizational) reality” (Sievers, 2008; 236) can enable change on a 
deeper level through awareness, insight and mutual understanding. 
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After having published the experiences of the first SPM with students of a university in 
2005 (Sievers, 2008) and of the second with inmates of a prison and students in 2007 
(Sievers, 2009), the SPM was repeated on numerous occasions in other institutions. In 
the subsequent discussion, I will explain in more detail the procedure and aims of the 
SPM, before discussing both, the strengths and weaknesses of the method. By so 
doing, I will draw on my own experiences of hosting SPMs, participating as a subject, 
as well as on related published research. At this stage though, articles on this novel 
method are only available from Sievers, the pioneer himself and Warren (2012) who 
takes a critical stance on the method. 
Set up and course of action 
Undertaking a SPM comprises of three distinct phases. First of all, participants are 
being given a theme, which should be discussed in some depth so as to ensure that 
each participant has made sense of it, however individualistic that sense might be. 
Ideally, such theme is formulated memorably, for use as a trigger or reminder in later 
phases in order to re-establish focus. Participants are thereafter instructed to reflect on 
the theme and to take photographs of anything of their choice that is related to or 
resembles the theme visually. Sievers encouraged participants to provide such 
photographs that will show what in the organisation is normally not seen (2009).  
Further, participants will need to learn in advance that despite the initial instruction to 
take as many photos as wished in order to get used to the task and not to prematurely 
‘shut the door’ to new discoveries, eventually, they will have to chose a small number 
of their favourites, usually between three and five photographs. Additionally, 
participants have to be made aware that they are only going to work with a small 
selection of the created pool of photos, which is determined by randomness and time 
restraints, rather than purposeful favouritism. Moreover, the issue of ownership has to 
be dealt with before research commences. Participants need to understand that 
although each of them will certainly take a photograph with a specific reason in mind, 
this will not be discussed in later phases of the SPM; who took the photo, where and 
why will be irrelevant and any revealing information omitted. If not made explicit 
beforehand, this might lead to disappointment pervading the SPM.  
The second phase embodies the one hour free association session. The randomly 
chosen small selection of photos need to be projected on a big screen, as this makes 
the presentation to the participants easier. Each photo should be shown for 
approximately ten minutes, depending on the development of the session, i.e. how 
many contributions are being initiated. Long pauses should not give reason to proceed 
to the next photograph prematurely. 
Throughout the matrix, participants are encouraged to let go of inhibitions as much as 
possible and to share freely, the associations they make in view of the photos, 
cognitive ones and emotional ones, as well as amplifications and links that come to 
mind not only with regards to the photos, but also as responsive reactions to other 
participants’ contributions. It is helpful to make participants aware that contributions 
are not being judged, there are neither right ones nor wrong ones. They can be made 
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in single words, fragments of sentences or whole sentences, but the session is not the 
place for a fully fletched conversation.  
In addition to guaranteeing that each participant has unrestricted view of the photos, 
the set up of chairs as a so called ‘snowflake-pattern’ (Lawrence, 2005) is further 
aimed at helping participants to free themselves from group pressures of conformity.  
In the third and final phase of the SPM, attention is shifted away from the photographs 
and towards the newly inspired thoughts and emotions that were provoked by them. 
Hereby, the participants and hosts turn towards each other in a circular set up so as to 
reflect together and exchange impressions gained. Traditionally, this phase has been 
split into three parts by Sievers, concerning a) the photograph with biggest impact, b) 
new thoughts and emotions experienced and c) how these can be linked back to the 
theme, so as to provide us with a new understanding of the theme.  
I perceive the third reflection question to be of most value, as it aligns the newly 
gained insight to the research theme and therefore allows for some form of joint 
analysis. Personally, I found it fruitful to write down all contributions of participants 
myself as they were being made during the matrix; it was indeed possible to pick up 
on commonalities among them from the second photograph onwards. During the 
reflection session, I was then able to ‘propose’ commonalities that I believed to have 
become aware of, to offer them at the participants in a probing manner, inviting them 
to discuss my suggestions among themselves, agreeingly or disagreeingly. However, 
the host can chose to not guide the discussion in any such way at all. 
If the research setting allows, the second and third phase of the SPM should be 
repeated four times in weekly intervals. Along with that, participants have the 
opportunity to become familiar with the method and might integrate more openly, and 
the pauses between sessions allow for more space for the development of thinking 
(Sievers, 2008).  
Strengths of the SPM 
The SPM is not only an extremely creative and integrative action research method, but 
also one of the few that concentrates on unconscious dynamics for data generation. As 
expected, any novel research method does not only pave the way for new 
opportunities, but also confronts the researcher with new concerns. In the following, I 
am intending to cover most of them as completely as possible. 
Philosophical underpinning. With the aim of expanding thinking beyond rational 
discussion (Sievers, 2008), the SPM embodies the philosophical urge to overcome the 
limiting half-truths of the rational mind. Opposing the Cartesian duality of the body and 
mind, whereby thinking is the sole product of rationality, the SPM follows the demands 
of the ‘emotional turn’, also referred to as the ‘epistemological turn’ of the 1990s 
(Clarke and Hoggett, 2009). The research endeavour of the SPM aspires to a more 
holistic view of the research subject, including not only its conscious, rational parts, but 
also its unconscious, emotional ones, as rationality has traditionally been ascribed to 
the conscious part of the Super-Ego, and irrationality to the unconscious part of the Id 
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(Craib, 2001). Along with this notion, Schwartz (1995) explains that saying something 
is irrational is not the end of the story, but its beginning.  
Participant involvement. The SPM turns every participant into a researcher. Power 
irregularities are minimised, if not overcome completely, as the researcher is 
‘degraded’ to an initiator and host of the SPM. The participants in turn are assumed to 
be in no lesser position to produce valid insight as is the researcher. These prevailing 
power structures have previously been a major point for critic of conventional social 
research methods (Hollway and Jefferson, 2005).  
During data analysis, maximum participant involvement and empowerment is 
maintained. Data analysis takes place intersubjectively during the reflection session, 
whereby interpretation is not targeted at ‘solving the problem’ or ‘finding the answer’, 
but at opening up further possibilities of thought. The aim is to open, to widen the 
newly known further, rather than closing or narrowing down with the effect of losing 
richness, for the primary and secondary associations, could be extended continuously. 
Drawbacks of such open-mindedness will be discussed later.  
Along with the ‘everything goes’ attitude, the SPM welcomes with open arms 
contributions of any kind, emphasising that there is neither a wrong nor a right one. 
Such open-mindedness allows for free development and can be seen as extending the 
social science methods continuum, starting from structured interviews, over semi-
structured and unstructured ones, towards the SPM. The advantage of the 
unstructured interview, namely, to accommodate for the possibility that the respondent 
might add to the data collection themes that otherwise would not have been touched 
upon is multiplied.  
However, one needs to bear in mind that meaning is not to be understood as 
consensus; agreement as such is not encouraged. Rather, it is emphasised that the 
SPM is a matrix, not a group, where no pressures to conformity dominate the 
development of new insight. The Sanskrit origin of ‘matrix’ means mother, or also 
whom, “out of which something new can grow” (Lawrence, 2005). Schulte offers, in 
my opinion, an excellent account of the essence of a matrix constellation and its ability 
of bringing unconscious ‘knowns’ into the conscious realm. He explains: 
“The matrix can be described as the slowly developing common pool of 
feelings, experiences, ideas, transactions, stories, images, metaphors, 
dreams and associations in the life of the group that forms the shared 
set of references and points of contact between the group members. 
They are the phenomena through which the multiple subjectivities of 
the group intersect, and which thus provide the ground of 
intersubjectivity in the group. [...] the group provides the setting 
within which these ‘autistic’ – or cryptic – phenomena can unfold 
publicly, between people, and thus have the potential to become 
meaningful. [...] (through) a new kind of conversation, one that makes 
meaningful and able to be articulated aspects of ourselves that had 
previously been unthinkable.” (2000; p. 540, emphasis added). 
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The limitations of language. The SPM meets the need to overcome the limiting nature 
of social research also on another level, the language level. As Crociani-Windland 
(2009) noted, sometimes words are not enough, as the essence of what it means to be 
human and have human experience cannot be expressed with words alone. According 
to her, an experience will always be richer than its representation. The SPM can hence 
be perceived as a means by which the gap between an experience and its 
representation is filled a little bit more by making the representation ‘richer’. This is not 
to say thought, that the photographs replace language; rather, they facilitate it and 
enforce the appearance of words in a so called ‘photo-text’ (Warren, 2009). 
Not only does the SPM offer a method to shift the barrier between the conscious and 
the unconscious further into the unconscious psyche by calling into awareness the 
unnoticed, but it also accommodates for the increasing importance of our visual world 
and imagery (Warren, 2005), as well as the significance of other artefacts in our 
everyday lives. Mersky (2012) points out that the SPM can help organisations to 
increase their capacity to think about difficult realities they face instead of suppressing 
them, which would lead to the unconscious acting out of these in other parts of the 
system. Increasing awareness for the particulars of the environment also comes to 
show that the SPM is a method that does not only adhere to the idea of the co-
creating nature of the inner and the outer world, but also explores this mutual 
relationship; disclosing our inner pictures of our outer environment. 
Weaknesses of the SPM 
As mentioned earlier, every research method has its own limitations. When dealing 
with a novel research method, unfamiliar pitfalls have to be considered and 
accommodated for. In the following, I will try and raise some concerns regarding the 
conduction of the SPM and ponder upon ways of how these can be circumvented 
without jeopardising the rich value of this method. 
Free Association. To start with, the very idea of free association is ambiguous. The 
term describes “the mental process of making associations which the reason does not 
order, repress, or control [...] in order to gain insight into subconscious processes” 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2010). Note here that this definition differs to some degree 
from Freud’s German ‘freier Einfall’; free idea. As Bettelheim explains, “associations are 
not free, but are always conditioned by or related to something;” (1983, p. 94), they 
are usually logically and consciously connected with their stimulus. On the other hand, 
‘free idea’ refers to something that suddenly occurs to one’s mind, and which was 
previously external to the participants, as opposed to ‘hidden inside’. The implications 
for the SPM might then be to add to the instruction of free association also the 
question “what ideas pop into your mind when seeing that photograph?”  
According to conventional literature, thought, a free association is perceived as a voice 
originating in the id, the suppressed emotional part of the inner psyche. Building 
further on Freud’s second structural model of the self, the repression or control of such 
emotions would be exercised from the super-ego, since this part of the psyche forms 
the moral judge, the censor through which every expression, be it verbal or non-
verbal, has to ‘pass’ in order to be communicated to the outside world. The task of 
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freely associating according to this line of thought demands from the subject to ‘switch 
off’ their super-ego, to deliver less of this, but more of the id instead. This would 
technically imply the necessity to ‘remove the super-ego’ from the inner world. Such 
endeavour is of course, by its nature of being unconscious, impossible. 
Additionally, one needs to scrutinise the taken-for-granted assumption that free 
associations are expressed verbally. If it is the id that we want to ‘hear’, it is not 
enough to concentrate on words. Similarly, pauses of silence might have significant 
expressiveness, or, in Siever’s words, “Schweigen hat Inhalte”; silence has contents.  
Social pressures. In addition to one’s own censorship, participants might hold back 
associations out of fear of being ‘disclosed’ in front of others or even judged by other 
participants of the SPM. Sievers reports on participants’ feedback “you are afraid to say 
the wrong thing” (2009). Urges to conformity and acceptance might lead to ‘group 
think’ (LeBon, in Wren, 1999), despite the great emphasis on individual thought 
throughout the introduction of the SPM. The fear of being ‘misunderstood’ or possibly 
insult one another, breaking a cultural taboo due to ‘inappropriate’ associations, might 
additionally inhibit the free flow of thought and emotion. Likewise, the urge to 
establish the truth might not be as easy to overcome as implied by the method, for it 
seems natural to human beings to reify their own truth about the world as being 
objective. Such wish to ‘stick to the truth’ might be evident when participants insist on 
the photograph ‘showing, just what it is showing’.  
Despite such strong critical voice, I can contribute to the discussion form my own 
experience, that the SPM at least rises awareness of issues that were not ‘known to be 
known’; that were evident but yet unrealised and unused. Further, it is helpful to 
differentiate between the social and the private part of free associations; those that we 
share, and those that we keep to ourselves.  
Further, shared meaning, although explicitly discouraged by the SPM, seems to be an 
attractive escape from anxiety provoking uncertainty and is rather difficult to avoid. 
Who has not experienced the comfort of hearing that someone else has had the same 
thought. Social comparison theory has long shown that individuals seek comparison 
with similar others and avoid comparison to different others so as to increase opinion 
certainty (Turner, Brown and Tajfel, 1979). Differences between one’s own opinion and 
the ones of others, in this case expressed by free associations, might then be 
overcome via purposeful agreement. Moreover, organisational groups that are 
participating in a SPM are likely to be long-term groups with some elevated need for 
group cohesion (Karau & Hart, 1998), enforcing the need for belonging and 
conformity. Warren (2009) adds that organisations are “serious places, where 
emotions are normally suppressed” further hampering the implementation of the SPM. 
Hence, the so called snowflake-pattern according to which the seats are arranged 
during the free association session can be understood as a means by which to ‘free’ 
the individual mind from group pressures. Lawrence (2005) explains that the setting, 
whereby participants do not directly face each others’ gaze as in a circle, facilitates the 
workings of the matrix by breaking the patterns of the group and creating a freer 
thinking enclosure. On first thought one might be rather sceptical against such 
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attempts to free one’s mind. Especially Warren (2012) understandingly raises critique 
in this direction, proclaiming that an effort of seat arrangement alone is not enough to 
overcome prevailing group pressures. While sharing Warren’s worry, I can draw back 
on my own experience of being a participant in an SPM, and in self-reflection, I did 
notice strongly the change of my emotional state when sitting in the matrix 
constellation throughout the free association session, as compared to when sitting in a 
circle in the following reflection session. 
A sceptic only needs to draw on teaching experiences in a class room. What difference 
it makes to the reactions and behaviour of students when they enter a class room in 
which the usual row of chairs and tables are altered into a circle, the tutor sitting 
among them. Actor network theory has long recognised the agency of objects and how 
they impact on humanly behaviour (Latour, 2005).  
More on social meaning. It is the endeavour of the SPM to derive hidden social 
meaning as it is put into thoughts and consecutively words, inspired by photographs. 
This is indeed very different from the notion of consensus. The former is reliant on 
individual contributions, whereas the latter emphasises agreement via group 
conformity. 
Social meaning in the SPM is achieved by communication of individual inner images of 
reality in the form of free association, and by paying careful attention to the nuances 
of unconsciously shared thoughts, feelings and experiences in the workplace (Diamond 
and Allport, 2003). This process is based on the psychoanalytically informed 
assumption that internal realities originate from and are influenced by external reality. 
So for example, taking up a role in an organisation requires the role holder to introject 
its parts (Sievers, 2008). Therefore, externalising them, making them heard, explicit, 
can foster understanding the meaning an individual or a group of individuals attach to 
the environment. Along with this line of thought, photographs of an institution are 
perceived as a means of explicating the representations of the ‘institution-in-the-mind’ 
(Armstrong, 2005). The underlying notion of social systems proclaims that an 
individual’s experiences and resulting thoughts relate to the whole context in which 
they were created. 
Since each individual might have gained different perceptions and understandings of 
the same, shared environment (this is most likely to be the organisation of role 
holders), it is important to provide for a setting throughout the free association 
session, which allows for all individuals to express their own, personal and unique inner 
images. It is in line with this argumentation that Sievers, and Lawrence before him, 
utilizes a matrix set up in contrast to a group setting, as a more democratic 
environment.  
When warning of the tyranny of the group and the urge to conformity, Sievers refers 
to the tendency of individuals to find security and defend against anxiety by ‘hiding’ 
behind others, and simply agree. Such dilemma could materialise itself, for example, 
when the establishment of a leader is allowed in a group setting, and as a 
consequence, other participants contribute with similar thoughts rather than bringing 
to the fore their own free associations. 
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Certainly, in the reflection session, where participants come together in a circle, the 
tendency to draw conclusions makes the avoidance of consensus impossible; however, 
by that time, inner meanings have already been ‘extracted’ and are ‘out in the open’. 
During the free association session, each individual participant (ideally) contributes one 
piece of a puzzle; a puzzle whose final image has remained unknown throughout. 
Sievers describes this development as “something under construction”, without being 
able to know exactly what is being constructed. In the eventual reflection session, 
focus is shifted to gaining overview of the whole puzzle, even if it is not ‘completed’. 
Only now are participants reflecting collectively on the newly discovered meaning that 
has been created in-between and amongst them.  
Boundaries and creativity. The SPM is nourished by ‘boundariless’ creativity which is in 
so far infinite and free, as there are now boundaries set to the free associations. 
However, this also means that there is a very wide focus given, if any at all, often only 
formulated as a general topic. Although this is facilitating richness and thoroughness of 
data, the danger lies in the inability to fit such freedom of outcome to an open but yet 
clearly formulated research question. Although I am intentionally refusing to draw up a 
clear set of research questions and rather plan to let the question become concrete 
during the research encounter itself, I do have a clear area of interest. While the SPM 
accommodates for the researcher’s wish to offer flexibility for themes developing in the 
here and now – Hollway and Jefferson (2005) pointed out themselves that the theme, 
as well as the method, should only be developed in the field, so as to guarantee fit fur 
purpose (please refer to the section on participant observation for further justification) 
- it also comes with the danger of generating data which is too loosely bound to the 
topic, not to say unrelated.  
It is therefore vital to articulate clear boundaries with regards to the focus of the SPM, 
within which, and only within which, creativity can be unleashed. This focus needs to 
be grounded in theory and might even contain the research question itself, which 
should have been formulated at that point. As discussed previously, such focus must 
have already been given at the commencement of the research encounter, even before 
participants set out to take photographs. I also recommend to repeat the task, or the 
theme sentence on one slide just before the first photograph is being projected, 
explaining: “this is what I asked you to do...”. 
Likewise, data analysis might be rendered difficult, if not impossible, due to the 
generation of a vast scope of data. The lack of a framework through and against which 
to evaluate data might be accused of wild analysis (Freud, 2002). Novel insights might 
not be able to be linked back to existing theories so as to develop on from the existing 
body of knowledge. With this aspect in mind, Sievers himself has added his own, 
individual data analysis in addition to the group reflection sessions and thereby did 
offer some form of ‘closure’ (2008). Such analysis includes tentative relations back to 
psychoanalytical theory.  
The role of the host. To establish and maintain such clear focus is but one task of the 
host. In more abstract terms, it is the host who is maintaining the equilibrium of 
rationality and irrationality, for neither one of them is able to make sense without the 
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other, the host allows for irrational free associations but keeps them within rational 
boundaries. Along with this, I do not mean to restrain the free flow of creativity and 
associations; I rather want to guide them, to channel them with clear direction, so as 
to provide the derived linkage making to the theme with more validity. It is important 
to justify the identification of links by making them clearly retraceable. Also, set 
boundaries during data gathering might prove helpful when grounding conclusions in 
theory. I am of the opinion that without such boundaries, grounding is not possible at 
all. 
One must not forget that participants are less likely to be familiar with this novel 
method as they would be with, for example, a more conventional method such as 
interviews. Leading back to the problem of anxiety levels caused by a perceived threat 
of the unknown, such boundaries in form of clear directions or guidelines to purpose 
could serve as a means of containment and might prevent the problem of the 
‘defended subject’ (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005). Along with this, associations would still 
be free in the sense that participants are not restrained directly in what they are 
allowed to say or supposed to say, however, given the photo instruction in advance is 
a form of ‘setting the stage’.  
The role of host as container is an important one. The SPM is a research method which 
empowers the research participants and grants them a lot of initiative throughout the 
entire process of sense-making. Not every participant will be comfortable with such 
freedom and lack of instructions. One might not know what to do with that freedom. 
Detailed instructions at the outset of the SPM can indeed clarify certain expectations 
but are not enough to lover anxiety levels, also referred to as performance anxiety 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2005) to a workable level. Rather, hosts have to provide for a 
facilitating environment throughout. By so doing, they act as a container onto which 
participants can project anxiety, rather than making the photographs targets of their 
projections or even keeping them inside, running the risk of Bion’s basic assumptions 
(1961). This anxiety, if not taken in by the host, who in turn emotionally ‘digests’ it 
(Diamond and Allcorn, 2003) and offers it back to the participants in a more 
manageable form, can lead to defence mechanisms capable of haltering the entire 
matrix and preventing associations of any kind from taking place.  
Some collective defence mechanisms. In the first SPM I undertook, I could witness 
with my entire body such defence mechanisms at work. I noticed that the majority of 
participants directed their free associations at me, by keeping looking at me, seemly so 
as to get some kind of confirmatory signal reassuring them that they are doing ‘the 
right thing’. This made me feel uneasy, because I suspected that this was the very 
same feeling some of the participants were experiencing. I did catch myself 
occasionally answering those questioning looks with a smile and nod– the strong 
transferences compelled me to do so.  
Apart from addressing the free associations at me, I observed that some participants 
formed their own little subgroups in which they started to whisper their free 
associations to each other and then evaluated them by either laughing or frowning. 
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Unfortunately, those contributions were not recorded by the Dictaphone used in the 
very first SPM I conducted.  
Laughing and frowning was present throughout the SPM with regards to all 
participants, too. At times the joking comments became so strong that the whole 
group burst out in laughter. The humorous element is indeed not a negative point, and 
during subsequent SPMs I witnessed the same amount of laughter; however, in this 
very first one, the laughter and joking was evidently serving as a distraction from 
actually doing the task at hand.  
Bion’s basic assumptions model (1961) is a useful theory to shed light onto such 
dynamics. When the shared anxiety of a group reaches a certain level, three different 
emotional responses could occur as a means of defending against anxiety. “The more 
disturbed the groups, the more easily discernible are [...] primitive phantasies and 
mechanisms;” (p 165). Such anxiety could have been caused by the task formulation 
to freely associate, since it was an unfamiliar method for all participants; it might have 
been perceived as a threat.  
When I felt compelled to reassure the group of doing the ‘correct’ thing, the group 
embodied the basic assumption of dependency. Here, they sought a leader who 
relieves them of their anxiety. I felt so much pressure, because the group expected me 
as leader, to be experienced, to know the truth, to be omnipotent.  
Pairing, the second basic assumption, could explain the whispering of two members to 
each other. According to this theory, those two members were engaged in a sexual 
fantasy of creating a child, a messiah figure, which would save them from the threat 
posed by the group task. It does help to come to terms with this explanation when 
thinking of the hope one feels when being engaged in a conflicting discussion; the 
hope to find a relief-bringing solution. 
Also the third basic assumption, fight or flight, is applicable as it helps to understand 
the deviation of the groups into making jokes. The group fled the task by reconfiguring 
it, i.e. turning the task into an entertainment exercise in which everybody has to make 
funny jokes.  
I could add a fourth observation to these three basic assumptions as defence 
behaviour: A minority of participants did not make any contribution at all. The anxiety 
level in these individuals might have been so high that they simply did not dare to say 
anything, but rather wish they could ‘disappear’. It is possible to explain such 
behaviour with Bion’s basic assumption of fight or flight, but I find it appropriate to 
refer to the concept of social loafing (Latané, Williams and Harkins, 1979) here. 
According to this group theory, individuals will withhold effort (loaf) when they do not 
expect any consequences for such behaviour, or when they feel that their effort would 
not contribute to the overall group outcome.  
Winnicott expresses Bion’s idea of the container as ‘holding’, whereby the participants 
are reassured that it is ‘ok’ to ‘let go’ – they are in ‘save hands’. He also suggests that 
‘play’ is necessary before any free association session so as to create an intermediate 
229 
 
space within which feelings can be explored that are otherwise hard to deal with 
(Ogden, 1985). Along with such reassurance, the participants’ capacity of being alone 
is strengthened and they can ‘regress’. In previous SPM sessions, Sievers has utilised 
drawings prior to the beginning of the SPM. One might also think about taking 
Winnicott literally and actually playing a game before photographers are being sent 
out. This might further lower anxiety levels, help participants to feel more comfortable 
and stimulate creativity. 
Drawing back on Winnicott’s theories of the mother and infant dyad sheds more light 
on the role of host in the SPM. Referring to such early child development concepts is in 
so far appropriate, as in a group setting with elevated anxiety levels during the SPM, 
regression into a more developmentally immature level of mental functioning takes 
place collectively and is regarded as one of the mechanisms of defence (Arlow, 1963). 
According to Winnicott (1965), it requires a ‘good enough mother’ to provide sufficient 
security in which the child can freely develop. ‘Holding’, the maternal provision of a 
facilitating environment for the dependent child can create that necessary security and 
comfort. 
I have already illustrated in a previous example how increased anxiety levels of a 
participant group led them to fall into the basic assumption state of becoming 
dependent on the host as a leader (Bion, 1963). Winnicott’s concept could then be 
translated into a ‘good enough host’, on which the outcome of the SPM depends. 
Thereby the host, like the mother, provides for ‘potential space’ – actually a 
playground - a hypothetical area of mutual creativity between mother and infant 
(Winnicott, 1974), or host and participants, and so the baby can in later developmental 
stages re-create this potential space between him-/herself and other objects; likewise, 
participants re-create it between themselves and the photographs.  
Although the application of Winnicott’s concepts is fruitful for understanding the 
unconscious dynamics between host and participants, one needs to bear in mind its 
limitations. These are mainly centred around time constraints. Winnicott bases his 
developmental theories on observations done across several years of a child’s early life. 
An SPM only lasts a few hours. 
In comparison to more controlled research methods, the SPM comes with a lot of 
uncertainties and does require from hosts not only to deal with the anxiety of 
participants, but also with their own. As Lawrence postulates, the matrix “demands a 
different kind of leadership – one inspired by the recognition of the infinite, on not-
knowing, of being in doubt and uncertainty, as opposed to knowing and repeating 
banal facts. “ (2005, 40). Being able to deal with uncertainties, is what the Poet John 
Keats refers to as ‘negative capability’, the ability “...of being in uncertainties, 
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.” (French, 
2003). Later, Heidegger (1993) incorporates these principles into his concept of 
‘Gelassenheit’ (I would translate this into English as meaning ‘serenity’), to describe the 
very same intentional open-mindedness without being terrified of gaps in one’s 
knowledge. Such negative capability is a requirement addressed at hosts; likewise, it is 
that they transfer their ability to the participants. Negative capability provides the room 
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for insight, the flash of suddenly understanding and opposes the premature and 
anxiety driven determination to come up with a creativity diminishing, cognitive 
solution that might even black out vital information for the sake of illusive certainty. 
Contrastingly, the SPM makes room for different modes and kinds of knowing; not just 
either knowing or not knowing.  
Rather than being based on principles of rationality, thinking in the SPM, like the 
concept of negative capability, is based on the notion of ‘play’ as a mutual creative 
process in the potential space (Winnicott, 1974). Hereby, it is the host’s role, as it is 
the therapist’s role in a clinical setting, to bring the participants (the patients) into a 
state of being able to play. It could be argued that in adulthood, such ability is indeed 
forgotten, as the super-ego takes over the role of rationalising our behaviour. 
Winnicott goes on to stress that when a patient (participant) cannot play, attention has 
to be drawn to this major symptom before any interpretation of behaviours can take 
place. Applying this principle to my research would mean that I first need to establish a 
reliable, ‘good enough’ relationship with all participants, or, in the language of 
participant observation, rapport. Milner (1952) understands play as a creative relation 
to the world, whereby the individual is free to be creative; and it is only in being 
creative that the individual discovers the true inner world.  
It requires not only the participants but also the host to adhere to the fundamental rule 
of psychoanalysis, namely, to suspend of any conscious kind of control (Moore and 
Fine, 1990). As discussed in depth earlier, the participants of the SPM follow this 
principle by means of uncensored free associations. The host adheres likewise by 
embodying the mirror-image and shows so called evenly-suspended (or elsewhere 
poised) attention (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1980). Borrowing from Freud, it is the 
analyst’s (host’s) task to “catch the drift of the patient’s (participant’s) unconscious 
with his (or her) own unconscious” (1923; 239). This involves the renunciation of the 
immediate recognition of links of associations. “Free-floating attention provides, so to 
speak, a storeroom of impressions from which later knowledge will suddenly emerge 
(Reik, emphasis added). Being able to keep in mind such multitude of apparently 
insignificant elements whose correlations are only to emerge later on, demands exactly 
that kind of rejection of forestructured knowledge that is described by the principles of 
negative capability.  
Such suspension as explained by Freud includes everything which normally focuses the 
attention: Personal inclinations, prejudice and theoretical assumptions and leads to the 
only truly objective attitude (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1980). 
When applying the principle of evenly-suspended attention to the SPM, the host has to 
bear in mind that it is an ideal state of the mind of the analyst and as part of the 
limitations of being human, impossible to reach. One should nevertheless strive 
towards it so as to avoid jumping to conclusions prematurely and being accused of 
‘wild-analysis’.  
The agency of sense-making. Further attention has to be paid to the matter of agency 
with regards to the creation of meaning. Sievers explains that it is the viewer of the 
photograph that creates the meaning by perceiving it in a certain manner. Hereby it is 
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assumed that the free associations of participants reveal something about their 
projections onto the photographs, and the photographs are understood as containers 
for ‘mental raw material’ (Sievers, 2007). One might want to reflect further on the 
origin of this meaning production. “a photo cannot tell what it is showing” (Sievers, 
2010) is a thought indicating the sole agency of the viewer as generator of meaning.  
However, whereas Sievers only sees the photo as an incentive, a means by which new 
ways of thinking might be stimulated, there is the possibility that the photo itself as 
object holds some form of agency as has been promoted by actor network theory 
(Latour, 2005). Along with this perspective, one might agree that a different set of 
randomly selected photographs would have led to the generation of different 
associations and meaning, just as much as would have been the case if the same set 
of photographs were viewed by different participants. In line with this notion, Sievers 
advices to take care when choosing the first photograph in the free association 
session, is it can ‘set the tone’. It might even be possible that the photograph itself can 
transfer the mood the photographer was in when taking it, as a person in a depressed 
mood might chose different objects or angles to capture than does an upbeat person. 
Such perspective does not only agree with the idea of intersubjectivity, whereby 
meaning is created together by the object, subject and researcher, but also gives some 
more presence to the initial photographer, who has so far been expelled from the 
meaning generating process. Along with this line of thought, the framework of actor 
network theory promotes the agency of the photograph as object, and psychoanalytic 
thought promotes the photograph as medium for transferences and 
countertransferences. In order to further ponder upon the agency of meaning 
generation, it is worth drawing attention to figure 1, in which I have tried to illustrate 
different sources of agency as they come together in the process of sense-making. 
Leading on from the question of agency, critique has been raised by participants who 
felt that the predominantly negative contributions of other participants influenced their 
own associations. One participant reported of “feeling drawn into the negativity”. 
MacCurdy (1999) states this is due to being in connection with the unconscious. The 
stronger this link, the more negative associations become, so he claims. Likewise, 
Douglas suggests that “the black hole of the past is impossible to avoid” (1985, in 
Hunt, 1989).Critics might argue that it is the method itself which implies negativity, as 
participants with a lack of containment might perceive it as a rare opportunity for 
dumping feelings whereby previously held inhibitions about one’s real inner life become 
obsolete. Associations from this point of view could then be seen as representing an 
image in the mind which is more pessimistic than necessary. Here again, the role of 
host as container is emphasised, who can use agency to prevent the SPM turning into 
a dumping place of suppressed sorrow and aggression.  
Even the host’s cheerful personality can reflect positively on the SPM conduct, 
following Foulkes explanation that the group reflects the personality of the conductor 
(1964). I can report from own experiences as host that there certainly is a fun element 
to the sessions, and that associations need not necessarily be negative. To me it 
seems as though there are just as many positive as negative contributions; however, it 
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is the negative ones that seem to stand out. This might be due to the fact that in an 
everyday environment, individuals prefer to avoid negative elements of exchanges.  
Figure 1 
 
 
  
Photo 
 
Photographer 
1st phase; agency 
of photographer 
2nd phase; agency of photo and 
participants 
3rd phase; agency 
of participants 
 
Host 
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Appendix 2: Application letters to the convent 
Dear Abbess, 
My name is Nadine Tchelebi, I am 28 years old and in the first year of my Ph.D. studies at the 
Bristol Business School, University of the West of England. I am writing to you to enquire with 
the utmost respect and sincerity, whether there might be any chance of my becoming a 
temporary member of your community. This would represent a unique and precious experience 
for me. Please allow me to explain the motivation behind my wish in some detail. 
My Ph.D. topic centres around ‘Us-versus-Them’ mentalities in organisations, such as blaming 
others in search for a scapegoat. Such behaviour does not only reduce efficiency, but more 
importantly, also impedes healthy social relationships. Instead of working together with mutual 
support, organisational groups often develop ‘enemy-thinking’ towards each other, creating a 
work atmosphere overshadowed by resentment and mistrust, compromising the well-being of 
the individual. 
In order to explore this social phenomenon in depth, my intention is to become a temporary 
member of two organisations with different group dynamics. Before commencing my studies, I 
worked at x in x, x, my place of birth, and I am planning on including this company as one of 
my research sites. Here I could witness in the past, what devastating consequences the above 
described group dynamics can lead to. Management’s genuine improvement plans to enhance 
conditions of production line workers, were doomed to failure by exactly such resentment and 
mistrust that was directed against them.  
As a result of these experiences, I will be approaching both organisations with a lot of questions 
on my mind: How is daily living and working together organised? How is a productive ‘we-
identity’ maintained? How do people relate to one another? And by turning to your convent, I 
am asking myself what richness of insight is there for me to experience in your community, with 
the possibility in mind of sharing what I have learnt from you in order to improve human 
relations in the organisational world? 
With these reflections in mind, I would very much appreciate the possibility of joining your 
convent in the autumn time for approximately five weeks, not only living with you, but also 
working and praying with you. At the moment, I am studying the ‘Rule of St Benedict’, because 
if you do allow me into your community, I would like to at least have a sound basic 
understanding of your history, values and beliefs. 
I hope that I have been able to convey my intentions and that I have awakened your interest in 
my work. With excitement I am looking forward to hearing from you. Please do not hesitate to 
contact me at any time should you wish to discuss matters further. Please also find attached a 
supporting letter from my supervisor, Robert French, and from our Chaplin here at the 
University of the West of England, Ian Yemm.  
With my best wishes, 
Nadine  
Email:  
Phone:  
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Dear Mother Abbess, 
 
As Director of Studies for Nadine Tchelebi, I am writing to support her request to join your 
community as a part of her research into the dynamics of groups and organizations. 
 
Nadine came to the Bristol Business School from x for her undergraduate degree course, 
sponsored by her employer, x. She was very successful in her degree, receiving the award for 
the best “International Business Studies” student of her grade. She then taught here for a year, 
before being accepted as a PhD student here at BCLOE (the Bristol Centre for Leadership and 
Organizational Ethics). 
 
She is a highly intelligent, committed and hard-working young woman, who brings an open and 
enquiring attitude to all she does – and she has developed a great enthusiasm for this project. 
We believe she would gain a great deal from spending time in your community, but also that 
the questions she is pursuing about the nature and impact of group dynamics and 
organizations is a very important one, so that what she learns in this time may also, in time, be 
of benefit to others. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me, if you have any questions about Nadine herself or about 
her programme of study. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr Robert French 
Reader in Organization Studies 
Bristol Business School 
University of the West of England 
Frenchay Campus 
Coldharbour Lane 
Bristol   BS16 1QY 
Email:  
Phone:  
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Appendix 3: Extracts from Coding Procedure 
a) Extract from memoires for case study 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
b) Extract from interview for case study 1 
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c) Apriori themes that have emerged for case study 1 
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d) Extract from interview for case study 2 
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e) A priori Themes that have emerged for case study 2 
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f) Extract of fieldnotes coding for case study 3 
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g) Apriori themes that have emerged for case study 3 
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Appendix 4: Full interview transcript of case study 1 1 
Well, I was wondering if you could recall for me some impressions that you might have gained 2 
when working for regarding a possible difference between employees who work in the 3 
production lines and those who work in administration and management. To clarify what I mean, 4 
let me give you an example of my own experiences: Back then I found it very crass, for example 5 
when I entered one of the canteens, then you had all the people from production in one corner 6 
and those from the offices in another corner, like some invisible division. Or maybe it wasn’t like 7 
that? I’m not sure, what is your opinion? 8 
Haha, there was this total wall between the Industrials and the Clericals!9 It was as though one 9 
would break a taboo if one sat down with the clericals. That is very much provoked by the 10 
overall structure of the company, how they cope with it; it already starts during the training10 if 11 
one would work in a more integrative way there... for example, I remember that once I was on a 12 
training course in the IT department, and there we learnt together with the Clericals. But we 13 
were not even allowed to take off our overalls! But there it worked, so once you are in it, then it 14 
is not really a problem, so to say.... 15 
There it was simply less people, and I think it is always dependant on the group dynamic – you 16 
come into such a room, and you have the same image as in the canteen: to the left is one 17 
squad, to the right is another squad. And then you don’t want to behave different from everyone 18 
else, so you stick to your own squad. 19 
So what are you saying? Did you adjust your own behaviour? Also, you talked about an ‘image’ – 20 
what is that image exactly? 21 
Well, I meant exactly like what you said at the beginning, well, the thing is it’s not only an 22 
image, but it is really like it – you enter somewhere, here are the Industrials and over there are 23 
the Clericals. And it does indeed always look like an alien if there is a Clerical with his suit 24 
entering the production area or something like that, you know. I think this has a lot to do with 25 
the dress code, it’s the optical impression. If we would do this thing like some schools in other 26 
countries, where they all dress the same, then it would be very different. Because then you 27 
wouldn’t know right from the beginning who is an Industrial and who is a Clerical.  28 
That’s like with the foremen11, they have this ‘in-between-thing x, but it already starts there: a 29 
foreman comes through the production line and you hear “There comes a white frock, there 30 
comes a blue frock”. Whites are the ones from R&D, and Blues are the foremen. Such things I 31 
mean. The thing is, the foreman also wears a grey suit12 but if he goes somewhere, then he says 32 
“oh, I have to throw on my blue frock”. 33 
                                                          
9 Industrials translated from the German “die Gewerblichen” and Clericals from “die 
Kaufmaennischen”, referring to staff doing manual labour and staff in administrative or managerial 
positions respectively. 
10 Generally in Germany, an employer will provide vocational training for at least two years before a 
permanent contract can be offered. It is very rare to get any job without such formal qualification. 
11 Translated from the German “Meister”: The team leader of a group of workers who has got 
additional qualifications such as being able to train and supervise others. 
12 Identical to all other production line workers. 
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But well, I guess you need that in such a huge industrial company. You enter and then you want 34 
to know immediately, ah yes, that is such and such person, I have to go there, I have to talk to 35 
him, and so on and so forth. I think this way it is easier to steer people.  36 
I see, so can you tell me more about the dress code you mentioned? 37 
Well, I can see that there are certain rules of the game at . Well, there are some people who 38 
only want to work for money. And then there are others who want to progress, but they bad-39 
mouth everything, like when they say “but for that you need this and this qualification, it’s 40 
impossible to get”. And then there are some others who see the prospects of a career. Well, at 41 
 you see some prospects which are simply not achievable. Then we are back at the canteen, 42 
where the splitting already starts. If they would all mingle among each other, then you wouldn’t 43 
see them as so far away from you. Then you would think it is achievable. 44 
And then you also hear things like “Hey, he is cheating13” if you do get a job up there, or you are 45 
asked “what do you want up there?”. That is the general perception. 46 
Ok then, so I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but from what you tell me that sounds 47 
quite extreme, don’t you think? – Would you say that there is some form of animosity involved 48 
or am I exaggerating now? 49 
Down in the general mass definitely. But that is the image which is being carried through. 50 
By whom? 51 
I would say by the management. Take for example my first day. Break times. They are arranged 52 
in such a manner for the Industrials, they are different from the ones for the Clericals, because, 53 
I assume that is the way it has to be due to the machine cycles. Well, and then the Clericals 54 
have those big canteens, and we are all dispersed among the little SB shops14. And the Clericals 55 
can nicely stuff their faces in the big canteens, and for us they just throw such little SB shops 56 
into the middle of the production. And they can always sit there in the front on the clean 57 
benches and stuff their faces x. Well, but that is envy. So either I come to terms with it, or I do 58 
something so that I also get there. 59 
Hhmm. I see. Would you like to give me another example to make your point clearer? 60 
Yes, for example, it already starts on the first day. You go into the canteen, and there you 61 
immediately get the picture. The cutting time is 15 minutes, when the break times of both the 62 
Industrials and the Clericals overlap, and then you see it immediately on the first day.  63 
From the foremen onwards, it is different. That’s what they say themselves, they sit between 64 
two chairs. On the one hand, they have to be with the Clericals, they go to meetings and 65 
promote their interests, but they also have to stand behind their workers and lead them. So they 66 
have to get along well with their workers, and simultaneously they get given targets from above 67 
that they have to meet. So they have this key position. Here, two worlds crash into each other. 68 
 69 
                                                          
13 Translated from the German “fremdgehen”: the act of cheating on one’s sexual partner 
14 These are little containers placed at various points in the production and function as little kiosks.  
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Hhm. Interesting. You said “here two worlds crash into each other”. Are the differences between 70 
Industrials and Clericals really that big? Can you explain that in your own words, so that even 71 
somebody who has never been to the company can understand? 72 
It is where dirty meets clean. 73 
Where lower work is met. Like in America, where all the Chinese were let down in baskets into 74 
the tunnels, and if the people on top didn’t pull fast enough, then those down there exploded 75 
along with the bombs. 76 
Well. So this is the lower, manual work, the dirty one. And on top was the clean work. Those on 77 
top are the ‘licked-clean’ ones, an the other play in the dirt. Unfortunately that is the way it has 78 
been fastened into their heads. 79 
The surprising thing is, if they talk to us, I experienced that myself – you can talk with them 80 
completely normally. And the other way around, too. So when I go up there without my overalls, 81 
then they approach me completely different. All of a sudden they know how to greet! Normally 82 
they can’t even shake hands. I remember when we met the head of the training department, he 83 
was wearing a suit and said hello. He didn’t only offer his hand to my foremen, but also to all the 84 
apprentices. Well, that was quiet something, if someone in a suit shakes your hand. Normally 85 
you are left out. So he came to me and stretched out his hand to me, so I said “oh no, my hands 86 
are very dirty” and then he simply replied, “ Yeah, never mind, we all work here”. Afterwards he 87 
wiped his hand on his trousers, but I thought that was awesome. 88 
So I assume that was an exception, because you remember it so well and in detail? 89 
Yes, of course. It was an exception. But that are normal codes of conduct there. No idea where 90 
they come from, it’s like Loch Ness- noone’s every seen it but everyone believes in it”.  91 
Aha, very interesting. Let me give you an example of my own experiences, and I would 92 
appreciate your comment on it. For me, as a former Clerical, the Industrials all look the same – 93 
after all, you are all wearing exactly the same clothes, you are the ones with the uniforms! But  94 
when I was working in the production line to do research for my Bachelor dissertation, and the 95 
workers didn’t know that I was a former Clerical, they told me that they call the Clericals “clone 96 
warriors”. I was completely confused, so I asked why and the answer was: “Because they all 97 
look the same; briefcase, tie and suit. And if one is shot down, the next one replaces him”.  98 
Haha. Yeah, we also call them the “Schlipstraeger”15. Well, there is a culture developing. There 99 
are so many people, it’s like a city. One also says, “Oh look, he is wearing a tie, he made it”. Or 100 
an Industrial gets a job on a project in a foreign country, and when he comes back, he is a 101 
Clerical. And all the “ATler”16, they are all Clerical. You can’t become an AT as an Industrial. For 102 
the Clericals, they have more open-ended opportunities towards the top. In order to step up, 103 
you need to wear a suit. 104 
Hhm. Thanks ever so much for that. Could you briefly summarise for me when you worked for 105 
company and where exactly? 106 
                                                          
15 Literally translated: tie-wearer; derogative expression for someone who has to wear a suit for the 
job. 
16 AT: abbreviation for ‘ausser-tariflich’; “out of tariff” meaning those who earn so much that they are 
off the scale which has been negotiated by the trade union. 
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I started my apprenticeship in 1998, and finished in February 2002. Then I worked in sector 5 107 
for half a year, in body work. After that I had to do my civil service, and when I came back at 108 
the beginning of 2003, I was stationed in the cellar, rear portal. For me as electrician that was 109 
better, because there were a lot of robots that we worked with. Then I did the additional 110 
training, and then, before I left completely, I spent three months in the radiator department, 111 
which is in an extra hall, off the main hall. 112 
But the split is the same everywhere. You know where it mingles a little bit, in the general 113 
assembly. Because on the way there, everyone is going together. But well, actually, once they sit 114 
down, you have the same again. Industrials here, Clericals there. It is always going to be this 115 
way.  116 
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Appendix 5: Table of Complementary Services of the Fun Trust & the Play Trust 
 
The Fun Trust 
 
The Play Trust 
 
Respite care at home 
 
Practical support in the home (including 
household duties) 
Specific nursing care, administration of 
medication and medical procedures such as 
suctioning and tube feeding 
Transport and accompany to hospital 
and other appointments 
 
Terminal care at home 
 
Hospital support (comprising of 
emotional and practical support) 
Play and stimulation Sibling support 
Bereavement support up to 5 years after 
death 
Bereavement support for several years 
after death 
Emotional support for parents and siblings Emotional support for parents and 
siblings 
Organisation of social events, such as 
family days and Christmas parties 
Short breaks at local amenities (e.g. 
ice-skating, horse-riding) 
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Appendix 6: Two examples of the SPM session for case study 2 with free 
associations 
 
 
 
 Breakfast 
 Lunch  
 Fluffy pencil case 
 Work  
 Busy 
 Chaotic 
 Studies 
 Care quality commission 
 Regularities  
 Window outside  
 Empty 
 Busy 
 Hectic 
 Technology 
 Clutter 
 Pressure 
 Tea mugs 
 Complicated work 
 No chair 
 Notes, detailed notes  
 Communication 
 Sustenance  
 Multi-tasking 
 Multiple inputs 
 Confused 
 Confined  
 Help! 
 Busy 
 Administration 
 Face to face 
 Day light 
 I want to go home  
 Lack of space  
 Miss-match  
 Deserted  
 Information overload 
 Trapped  
 Colourful personal items 
 Sharing 
 Eating on the run  
 Ownership 
 Day light 
 Detail 
 Mind bubbling 
 Compliance 
 Deadlines 
 Captive 
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 Play room 
 Music 
 Musical instruments 
 Fun 
 Attention 
 Rolling 
 Laughter 
 Happy 
 Safe 
 Participation 
 Busy 
 Protected 
 Comfort 
 Sensory 
 Busy 
 Togetherness 
 Colour 
 Patience 
 Padded 
 Achievement 
 Time 
 Chillded out 
 Special 
 Space 
 Stressed 
 Balls 
 Special 
 Bonding 
 Bright 
 Inclusive 
 Special toys 
 Shoe-less 
 Communication 
 Relaxed 
 Resource 
 Choice 
 Fun at home 
 Homely 
 Comfortable 
 Joy 
 Vulnerable 
 Trust 
 Opportunity 
 Sharing 
 Inclusive 
 Communication 
 Family 
 Curtains 
 Children playing 
 Comfortable 
 Fun 
 Safe 
 Happy 
 Active 
 Stimulated 
 Hands-on 
 Value 
 Expensive 
 Commitment 
 Worth every penny 
 Opportunity 
 Participation 
 Priceless 
 proud 
 Inside 
 Investment 
 Multi-purpose 
 Rewarding 
 Achievement 
 Responsive 
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Appendix 7: Intercessions for Christian Unity 
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Appendix 8: Two examples of SPM session 1 for case study 3 
 
 
 
 Behind the scenes 
 The organic nature of life, nothing 
is wasted  
 Cabbage leave 
 Light coming from all angles 
 Reflections 
 Our Lady, the stature 
 Our Lord working with us 
 We would never see the choir form 
this angle, would we? 
 Lots of life in little space 
 We need to be muldged down 
 Life under death 
 A breviary 
 Two different settings, but each 
has its beauty and purpose 
 Me and you together 
 Finding God in more things 
 Emptiness 
 Nothing in our lives is horrible; it 
can all be composted to become 
beautiful 
 To bring life 
 The Lord works in our silence 
 Good from rubbish 
 Nothing is wasted 
 
 I can just about smell it 
 Are we wasting our lives? 
 The chapel looks empty, static, but 
once we are in it, its heaving 
 A ‘silence-organ’ 
 The compost heave is full of life 
 God brings good from evil 
 Decomposing to new life 
 Transformation is 95% decay 
 The lack of music without Sister 
Fidelis 
 Let go of who you are 
 Resurrection 
 Death 
 The work of the veg-team 
 Community 
 Everything has meaning  
 Working 
 The cabbage leave says: “is this 
why you created me?” 
 Waiting to be filled by the sisters 
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 Many chickens 
 Golden 
 Morangs 
 What are they? 
 Egg yokes 
 Oh I thought it was a kind of 
facial disease 
 Every yoke is unique 
 Synergetic 
 Miracle of creation 
 They symbolise life 
 Separate, yet together 
 And one of them is broken 
 Yet useful 
 No two are exactly the same 
 Slightly different shapes 
 Just like us 
 That’s cos they are squashed 
together  
 Might become a delicious 
pudding 
 A willingness to be used 
 
 
 
 The community on the outside, 
and the Holy Trinity in the 
middle 
 Cosy 
 Unity 
 Keeps you going 
 Touchy 
 Hens in the garden 
 The hands who cracked the egg 
 Faith 
 Marzipan 
 Confined space 
 I’d like more 
